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Summary 
 
This thesis studies the competitive role of foreign firms in the host economy. 
While the popular belief is that foreign firms act as new competitive forces in the 
host economy, many observers argue that the essence of oligopoly will prevail 
without foreign firms having any significant impact on competition. To decide which 
argument is more realistic, this thesis conducts three empirical studies: one on the 
impact of foreign acquisition on price competition, one on the competitive effect of 
greenfield FDI firms, and lastly one on entry decisions.    
The first chapter sets up the main hypotheses to be tested, and briefly 
outlines the thesis. Chapter 2 investigates the impact of foreign acquisition on price 
competition, utilizing the sharp contrast in foreign firms’ roles before and after 
foreign entry in several Korean industries. The estimation strategy is to compare the 
level of market competitiveness between the two periods through the response of 
prices to marginal costs. Largely the empirical findings do not support the popular 
belief.  
Chapter 3 examines the effect of greenfield FDI firms on price competition, 
employing the empirical opportunity offered by the grocery superstore sector in 
Seoul. Focusing on the existence of difference or rivalry between domestic and 
foreign firms, I develop more specific hypotheses: foreign firms are more 
competitive in their pricing policies; in response, domestic firms adopt more 
 ix
competitive pricing strategies; as a result, the price competition is fiercer where 
foreign firms have entered. The findings indicate that there is no difference or rivalry 
between foreign and domestic chains.    
Chapter 4 investigates firms’ entry behaviour to infer the underlying nature 
of competition between foreign and domestic firms. For the test, I utilize entry 
decisions observed in the Korean grocery sector, which is a fast-growing industry. I 
check how differently foreign firms behave compared to their domestic counterparts 
and how they react to each other, using the latent regression of entry decisions. 
Intense rivalry among large chains in general is found, rather than the rivalry 
between domestic and foreign chains, implying that foreign firms behave as a 
member of an oligopoly group rather than as a kind of maverick. Chapter 5 contains 
some concluding remarks, and discussions on the limitations of the study and 
possible future work.    
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Inward Foreign Direct Investment (hereafter FDI) firms play increasingly 
important roles in the modern economy as multinational corporations (hereafter 
MNCs) keep expanding their cross-border production establishments. The operations 
of FDI firms can affect the host economy in various aspects, ranging from direct 
impacts on tax, employment and capital formation to indirect effects like technology 
spill-over. Among these, the competitive consequences of FDI firms have an 
important implication for the short-run efficiency as well as the long-term 
development of the host economy. If they can act as more competitive forces, as 
many people argue, FDI firms could remove or alleviate monopolistic or 
oligopolistic distortions. Or they could force local firms to increase technical 
efficiency or X-efficiency. Furthermore, their competitive pressure can speed up the 
technological evolution of local firms.  
In an attempt to assess this competitive impact of FDI firms, a small number 
of studies have examined the margin effects of FDI firms. The main hypothesis is 
that FDI firms are, as new entrants to a national market, likely to act as disrupting 
competitive forces. Although any entrant could disrupt an industry with few firms, as 
Caves (1971 and 1996) and many others argue, foreign firms unfamiliar to the local 
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way of running business are less likely to settle down to the prevailing collusive 
cooperation between local firms. As a consequence, inflows of FDI firms could bring 
more competition in the host economy, resulting in lower profits earned by domestic 
firms (or the industry as a whole). That is, a large presence of FDI firms is expected 
to adversely affect firms’ profitability. Based on this hypothesis, Caves (1974), Co 
(2001), and Chung (2001) have examined the statistical relationship between foreign 
firms’ presences and industry (or domestic firms’) profits by utilizing cross-sectional 
variations across industries. Their general findings are that increases in foreign 
presence lower industry’s profits, supporting the hypothesis.   
The main limitation of these studies is the reliance on cross-sectional data, 
apart from the measurement error of profits and endogeneity problem found in the 
traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance (hereafter SCP) paradigm. Based on 
cross-sectional data, they attempt to establish whether variations in the presence of 
FDI firms across industries help to explain industry margins. This estimation strategy 
greatly depends on the restrictive assumption that inter-industry variations can be 
captured by a small number of observed variables. To the extent that the industry-
specific factors are not fully controlled, the estimation results are biased. An 
alternative approach is, as the New Empirical Industrial Organization (hereafter 
NEIO) paradigm argues, to examine the competitive effect of foreign firms within 
the context of a single industry. However, the main obstacle to the use of this 
approach is the availability of data.  
In this regard, recent developments in Korean industries provide an ideal 
opportunity for empirical tests. A large scale of foreign acquisitions in the aftermath 
  
 3
of the economic crisis in 1997 has created stark asymmetry in foreign firms’ role in 
many industries. Until then, the Korean economy was characterized by the least 
reliance on FDI firms in the world, with a handful of domestic conglomerates 
dominating the economy across industries. This unique set-up opens up a chance for 
researchers to compare market competition between the two periods before and after 
foreign entry. Another opportunity arises from the liberalization of FDI regulation in 
the retail sector, which was followed by the rapid expansion of chain networks along 
with a large scale of foreign entries by several global giants. The nature of localized 
competition in the retail sector allows us to observe cross-sectional variations in 
foreign firms’ presence within the context of a single industry.  
Another advantage of the emphasis on a single industry is that we can easily 
differentiate between M&A and green-field FDI. The entry mode of foreign firms 
affects their subsequent competitive consequences. While greenfield entry at least 
initially adds one more firm to the market, the acquisition of existing firms leaves 
market concentration unchanged. Consequently, greenfield FDI firms are expected to 
produce more competitive outcomes. In contrast to the previous studies, which 
attempted to deal with heterogeneities arising from different entry modes by 
introducing a control variable, this dissertation examines the competitive effect of 
each entry mode separately, using the two empirical settings above. The first setting 
is all mature industries where only foreign acquisitions took place. By contrast, the 
second one is a newly developed industry, so that foreign firms have no choice but to 
enter the market by building their own stores.   
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In constructing hypotheses to test, I introduce another line of argument 
concerning the competitive role of foreign firms, in addition to the popular one that 
foreign firms have a positive influence on market competition. The essence of 
oligopoly, i.e. the coexistence of rivalry and collusion, as Cowling (1982), Cubbin 
(1988) and others argue, may underlie the competition among firms in these 
industries. Where a small number of firms are competing, price cuts by any firm can 
easily be detected and invite retaliation from competitors, resulting in the loss of 
profits for all the participants. Thus, in oligopoly, there may be strong motivation for 
firms to accommodate each other’s presence to the extent of avoiding the worst 
situation where all the firms are losing profits. Foreign firms are also expected to 
place this consideration at the forefront of their strategies. As a consequence, being 
either a foreign or domestic firm makes little impact on competition.    
Although the first argument is popular, the question is mainly an empirical 
matter. A simple approach is to examine whether there is an increase in market 
competition after foreign entry using time series data, where finding an increase in 
competition will support the first argument. Another estimation strategy is to ask 
whether foreign firms differ in competitive behaviour from their domestic 
counterparts, and how they react to each other. If foreign firms act as a pro-
competitive force, as the popular belief expects, difference or rivalry between home-
based and foreign firms is more likely to be found. In contrast, if the essence of 
oligopoly prevails, difference or rivalry between domestic and foreign firms will 
hardly be observed.  
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To decide which argument is more realistic, this dissertation conducts three 
empirical studies. Chapter 2 utilizes the sharp distinction of foreign firms’ role in 
several industries which received foreign acquisitions after the economic crisis. 
Following the first estimation strategy, I compare the price competition before and 
after foreign acquisitions. Chapters 3 and 4 take advantage of the rapid expansion in 
the grocery superstore industry, adopting the second estimation approach. Focusing 
on price competition, Chapter 3 asks whether domestic and foreign firms differ in 
pricing policies and how intense rivalry between them evolves. In contrast to the 
other chapters examining price behaviour, Chapter 4 investigates firms’ entry 
behaviour, from which I attempt to infer the underlying nature of competition 
between domestic and foreign firms. The main questions are how different domestic 
and foreign firms are in terms of their entry behaviour and how they react to each 
other’s presence.  
Turning to each empirical study, Chapter 2 examines the price competition 
between the two periods before and after foreign acquisition in the context of a single 
industry. Concerning the effect of foreign acquisition on price competition, there 
could be two competing scenarios. One is the traditional explanation that FDI firms 
are, as newcomers, likely to upset stable collusiveness between local firms and 
increase independent behaviour in the market. The other is that foreign acquisition 
results in only a shift of control over firms from domestic to foreign hands, and that 
the essence of oligopoly may remain effective: a coexistence of rivalry and collusion. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis predicts more competitive pricing behaviour after 
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foreign acquisition, while the second one anticipates no difference in pricing 
behaviour between two periods.  
The estimation strategy is to compare the level of market competitiveness 
between the two periods through the responses of prices to marginal costs. The basic 
idea is similar to Sumner (1981), who attempts to infer the level of market 
competitiveness from the responses to excise tax on cigarettes. The underlying 
intuition is that for a given increase in marginal cost, the extent to which firms pass 
on the increase to prices is supposed to reflect the degree of market competitiveness.   
However, there is a problem in Sumner’s approach, in that results greatly 
depend on the demand specification, which we cannot know a priori. To deal with 
this, in formulating the empirical model, I construct a pricing equation based on a 
very general form of demand function proposed by Genesove and Mullin (1998), 
which can incorporate the linear, the log-linear and the quadratic demand as well as 
the exponential demand curve. The introduction of a general form of demand 
function creates a disadvantage that we can only compare relative changes in market 
competitiveness, although this feature is still appropriate for the analysis in question. 
The focus on relative changes is partly motivated by the fact that an absolute value of 
market competitiveness is not easy to interpret, apart from monopoly and perfect 
competition.  
Another issue arises when we attempt to decide whether a relative change in 
the responses of prices to marginal costs implies an increase or decrease in market 
competition. Because the interpretation greatly depends on the sign of the convexity 
index, a key part of the demand specification, we cannot decide what this change 
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really means without further information or assumptions. The prior information 
about marginal cost can help to decide the sign of the index.  
For the empirical test, this thesis utilizes the sharp contrast in foreign firms’ 
roles before and after foreign acquisitions in the oil, paper, whiskey, lysine and 
carbon black industries. These industries have several common features favourable 
for the test. They employ simple fixed-coefficient production technologies from 
which we can derive partial information on marginal costs. They have undergone few 
structural changes other than foreign acquisitions, free from other sources of noises. 
In fact, estimation results do not seem to support the common belief that foreign 
firms increase competition, although they are slightly mixed. While in rather isolated 
cases foreign acquisitions produce more competitive behaviour, in most cases they 
are found to be irrelevant to market competition or even reduce it. In conclusion, 
these findings suggest that the essence of oligopoly is a more dominant factor in the 
competition.        
Chapter 3 investigates the effect of green-field FDI firms on price 
competition within the context of a differentiated product industry. The focus lies on 
the existence of difference or rivalry between domestic and foreign firms regarding 
price competition. For the test, I set up three hypotheses: (1) foreign firms are more 
competitive in their pricing policies: (2) in response, domestic firms adopt more 
competitive pricing strategies where foreign competitors have a presence: (3) as a 
result, the price competition is fiercer where foreign firms have entered. If the 
traditional belief holds true, then the difference or rivalry between foreign and 
domestic firms will be significant. On the other hand, if general oligopoly 
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considerations are more important, the difference or rivalry between them hardly 
emerges.   
The empirical setting is the grocery superstore sector in Seoul from Jan. 
2001 to Dec. 2003. This is a rich environment for the testing of FDI firms’ effects. 
First, the existence of local markets allows us to observe cross-sectional variations in 
foreign presence, as well as those over time. Second, the availability of store-level 
price data provides a chance to compare pricing behaviour among chains. Since 
direct sales data or store traffic data is not available, however, I construct market 
shares based on the parking space of superstores, where a small test supports a high 
correlation between parking space and sales.  
For the test, I construct a reduced form of pricing equation based on a simple 
logit model. Unlike other studies imposing an equilibrium concept like Bertrand 
competition, I set up a model where the degree of market competitiveness is 
measured as a free parameter. Although it is analytically very simple, the logit model 
has a well-known drawback, the Independence from Irrelevant Alternative (hereafter 
IIA) property, which produces unrealistic implications in many settings. In the 
Korean grocery superstore industry, however, the IIA property is likely to a large 
extent to reflect the economic reality, where superstores as a new sector are 
expanding at the expense of other grocery stores which have a larger market share. 
The estimation strategy is to compare the level of market competition between the 
groups of firms in question using a standard dummy variable technique. For example, 
for the first hypothesis, I form two groups of chains, foreign and domestic chains, 
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and then compare the relative difference in market competitiveness between the two 
periods in question.   
The findings indicate that there is no difference or rivalry between foreign 
and domestic chains, rejecting all three hypotheses set up above. This result strongly 
suggests that oligopolistic consideration is more important than the distinction 
between foreign and domestic firms. To further the argument, I conduct an additional 
test on the hypothesis that leading chains may be different from small chains, finding 
a significant difference in pricing behaviour. Given that the leading chains are a 
group of local and global retail giants, this finding also supports the main result, that 
foreign firms have no significant effect on price competition.   
Compared to other chapters examining the nature of price competition, 
Chapter 4 investigates firms’ entry decisions to infer the underlying nature of 
competition. In a chain-store industry where a number of stores are run under 
common ownership or management, entry decision can be a strategic choice used to 
avoid competitive pressure from competitors. While profits, prices or costs are 
unobservable directly, we can observe the entry decisions made by firms. With the 
assumption that entry decisions are made based on post-entry profits that firms 
expect given market and competitive conditions, then we can infer the nature of 
underlying competition from these entry decisions.          
For the test, I utilize entry decisions observed in the Korean grocery 
superstore sector from 1997 to 2004. This empirical setting provides an ideal context 
for the comparison of entry decisions among firms. First, a number of entry 
occurrences are observable thanks to the rapid expansion and a large scale of foreign 
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entry. Second, comprehensive firm-level entry data are available. Although looking 
at the same sector as Chapter 2, Chapter 3 could produce a broader picture of 
competition in this sector since the data set covers all the stores in Korea. These 
features combined make it possible to allow for asymmetry between firms’ entry 
behaviour. Given the fact that the industry is dominated by five leading chains, I 
focus on the strategic interactions among them. I identify 160 local markets based on 
the Korean local government areas.   
Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992), I construct a 
discrete choice model where entry decisions are related to market demand and 
competitive conditions. A sequential move game is assumed to secure a unique 
equilibrium: larger chains are assumed to move first and smaller chains follow next. 
For a robust check, I try alternative orders of entry, obtaining similar results. Since 
entry decisions in oligopoly are strategic in nature, an endogeneity problem arises 
related to market structural variables, especially in the leaders’ estimations. While 
followers take leaders’ entry decisions as given, leaders take account of followers’ 
responses in making their decisions. To deal with this, I create leaders’ conjectures 
on followers’ optimal responses based on a simulation technique, which extends 
Toivanen and Waterson’s (2001) methodology into an oligopoly industry.   
For the test, I set up two hypotheses: (1) firms care about how many 
competitors they will face after entry, that is, whether they are concerned with 
overall market structure in their entry decisions, as the traditional wisdom of 
industrial organization expects; (2) firms are more concerned with who the 
competitors they will face are, that is, there could be a more intense rivalry between 
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certain groups of firms, like foreign and domestic firms. The estimation strategy is as 
follows. For the first hypothesis, I estimate the latent regression of entry decisions on 
the number of competitors by chain. Then I compare the entry pattern between 
domestic and foreign chains to see how different they are. Second, to see how intense 
rivalry between them evolves after foreign entry, I check how they react to foreign 
and domestic rivals’ presence.  
The first finding is that there is asymmetry in entry behaviour between 
domestic and foreign chains. While foreign chains do not care about how many 
competitors they will face after entry, domestic firms avoid entering markets with the 
growing presence of rivals. However, further examination does not support the 
intense rivalry between domestic and foreign firms. Domestic (foreign) firms do not 
react sensitively to foreign (domestic) rivals’ presence. Instead, a distinctive entry 
pattern between large and small chains emerges, where three large chains sensitively 
react to each other’s presences, supplying strong evidence for the intense rivalry 
between leading firms. Again, the results indicate that an oligopolistic consideration 
is a more important factor in competition. The finding that foreign firms care less 
about overall market structure simply implies that they might be more optimistic 
about post-entry profits or that they prefer established markets to new ones. 
To summarize, this thesis examines the competitive role of FDI firms. The 
popular view argues that foreign firms new to a national market tend to act as a pro-
competitive force, while an alternative view can be developed, that the coexistence 
of oligopoly rivalry and collusion is more fundamental. Since the question is 
basically an empirical matter, the thesis conducts three empirical tests, using unique 
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settings in Korea. The general findings are not consistent with the popular view that 
foreign firms have a positive effect on market competition: (1) no systematic 
differences are found in price competition between the two periods before and after 
foreign acquisition, suggesting that foreign acquisition has little significant effect on 
market competition; (2) instead of the difference or rivalry between domestic and 
foreign firms as the popular view predicts, asymmetry between leading and small 
firms’ pricing behaviour is found, indicating the rivalry between leading firms is 
more important; (3) the intense rivalry among leading firms is inferred from their 
entry decisions, reinforcing the results of the second study. These findings combined 
strongly support the alternative view, that considerations as a member of an 
oligopoly group are a more dominant factor in firms’ competition in oligopoly.     
This dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 covers the empirical tests on 
the competitive impact of foreign acquisition, where I exploit the sharp contrast in 
foreign firms’ role found in Korean industries. Chapter 3 investigates the effect of 
green-field FDI firms on price competition using the empirical setting of the grocery 
superstore industry in Seoul. In contrast to the preceding chapters, Chapter 4 
examines entry decisions of firms to infer the underlying nature of competition in the 
Korean grocery superstore industry. Chapter 5 concludes by summarizing the results 
and discussing possible future work. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Foreign Acquisition and Price Competition 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
In the aftermath of the East Asian economic crisis in 1997, many Korean 
conglomerates, so-called Chaebols, had to sell off their divisions or companies 
simply in order to raise cash. This inevitably led to a large scale of foreign 
acquisitions across industries for the first time in the Korean economic history, 
allowing foreign firms to become major players along with Chaebols in many 
industries. Until then, the Korean economy had been characterised by the lowest 
reliance on FDI in the world, with a small number of domestic conglomerates 
dominating the economy. Therefore, foreign acquisitions created a sharp contrast in 
foreign firms’ roles before and after foreign entry in these industries, which provides 
an ideal opportunity to assess the effect of foreign acquisitions empirically.   
FDI firms affect the host economy in many ways: they could directly 
influence macro variables like capital formation, tax revenue and employment: on 
the other hand, FDI may also affect the conduct and performance of locally owned 
firms indirectly. Of these, the competitive impact of foreign firms has an important 
implication for the short-run efficiency and the long-term prosperity of the host 
economy. If they can act as more competitive forces, FDI firms could remove or 
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alleviate monopolistic or oligopolistic distortions. Or they could force local firms to 
increase technical efficiency or X-efficiency. Furthermore, their competitive pressure 
can speed up the technological evolution of local firms.  
This was the view strongly held at the time in Korea. From the perspectives 
of competition and industrial policy, there was high expectation that foreign firms 
might put more competitive pressure on domestic conglomerates and force them to 
improve their productivity where oligopolistic inefficiency and collusion was 
believed to prevail.  
Theoretically, the effect of foreign acquisition on market competition 
depends on the interaction between foreign and domestic firms, more importantly on 
foreign firms’ behaviour. Insofar as foreign firms’ behaviour is concerned, there 
could be two competing hypotheses. The first one is that an FDI firm, especially as a 
newcomer to a market, may “upset the prevailing collusive tranquility” and “reduce 
the quasi-rents that can allow inefficiency to persist” (Caves, 1974). As newcomers, 
foreign firms have not settled into the stable pattern of oligopolistic interdependence 
or mutual accommodation that will normally evolve among a market’s long-term 
tenants, so that their pricing strategies are likely to disrupt established patterns and 
increase the amount of independent behaviour (Caves, 1971). As a consequence, 
foreign entry is expected to produce more competitive behaviour in the market.  
 The second hypothesis is that foreign acquisition mainly results in a change 
of ownership and a shift of control from domestic to foreign hands. The essence of 
the oligopoly may remain effective: a coexistence of rivalry and collusion. If a firm 
cuts its prices in an oligopoly market, it may invite retaliating price cuts from rival 
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firms and this may result in the loss of profits altogether. Therefore, firms have 
strong motivation to accommodate each other’s presence to the extent of avoiding 
situations which leave all the firms in a worse position (Baran and Sweezy, 1966, 
and Cowling, 1982). It may be the case that, as Caves (1971) noted, the innate risks 
of FDI could force foreign firms to take a cautious course, avoiding an independent 
action. Therefore, this line of argument anticipates no significant difference in 
competition between the two periods before and after foreign acquisition.  
Though the first argument is widely accepted, the question is basically an 
empirical matter. However, few studies (Caves, 1974, Chung, 2001, and Co, 2001) 
have empirically examined this issue. Their estimations are based on the logic that if 
foreign firms have the virtue of increasing market competition, greater foreign 
presence corresponds to lower industry profits. So, they investigate the statistical 
relationship between foreign firms’ presence and industry profits across industries, 
finding that the results support the popular argument. However, their methodology is 
subject to the well-known criticisms of the traditional SCP paradigm: individual 
industry idiosyncracies, as they implicitly assume, cannot be fully controlled by a 
small number of observable variables: profit measures are not free from the 
measurement error which arises from unobservable marginal costs.  
To avoid the shortcomings of the previous studies, this study takes the NEIO 
approach, returning to the old tradition of case studies of individual industries. The 
estimation strategy of the study is to compare the level of market competitiveness 
between the two periods before and after foreign acquisition through the response of 
prices to marginal costs. This methodology is similar to Sumner’s (1981) idea, where 
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he attempts to proxy market power from the response of prices to excise taxes on 
cigarettes. Apart from the availability of a direct measure of marginal cost, this 
methodology has a problem that, as Genesove and Mullin (1998) show, the results 
greatly depend on the demand specification, which we cannot know a priori. In 
dealing with this, I construct a pricing equation based on a very general form of 
demand function, which is a unique feature of the study. This is possible by focusing 
on the relative changes in market competitiveness between the two periods rather 
than on absolute values. The focus on relative changes is partially motivated by the 
criticism that it is not easy to interpret the meaning of an absolute value except for 
monopoly and perfect competition. As explained later, the interpretation greatly 
depends on the sign of a convexity index, which is a key ingredient of the demand 
specification. This study allows the data to speak for themselves in deciding the sign 
of the index, with the help of a direct measure of marginal cost.      
For the empirical test of the hypothesis, this study takes advantage of the 
disparity in foreign firms’ roles before and after foreign acquisition in several 
industries in Korea. As mentioned above, the estimation methodology crucially 
depends on the availability of a precise measure of the marginal cost. Several 
industries meet this requirement: the oil refining industry (gasoline, diesel, z-oil, 
heating oil, naphtha, B-A oil, B-C oil), the paper industry (kraft paper, sanitary paper, 
woody paper), whiskey, lysine and carbon black. These industries employ simple 
fixed coefficient production technologies between final products and raw materials, 
from which we can derive a precise measure of a marginal component.  
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In addition, these industries have other features favourable to the empirical 
test in question. They are characterized by a typical oligopoly industry, most of them 
consisting of three to five firms with the reputation that a collusive interdependence 
between domestic firms prevailed before foreign entry. This characteristic makes 
them good candidates for the test of the hypothesis. Secondly, there are few 
structural changes other than foreign acquisition over the sample period, which 
enables us safely to ascribe the change in market behaviour, if any, to foreign 
acquisition. On the other hand, the existence of a recession period following the 
economic crisis could raise a doubt over the results, since the degree of collusion 
may increase in the recession period (Cowling, 1982). In an attempt to control for the 
likely effect of the recession period on market competition, I exclude the severe 
recession period from the sample period, obtaining qualitatively similar results.   
In contrast to the popular belief, the results do not support the hypothesis 
that foreign entry introduces more competitive pressure on the industry. It is in rather 
isolated cases of some products that foreign acquisition produces more competitive 
behavior. The findings from other products suggest that foreign acquisitions are 
either irrelevant to market competition or even worsen it. Applying the same 
methodology, I also investigate the impact of deregulation in the oil industry to find 
that the deregulation was largely successful in increasing market competition. In an 
attempt to check the predictive power of the methodology, I test the impact of 
deregulation in the LPG industry, where the deregulation was already known to have 
had no significant effect on pricing behaviour. The simple experiment shows that the 
predictive power is quite satisfactory.  
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous 
studies. Section 3 constructs the theoretical and empirical model. Section 4 explains 
the data and the industry background. Section 5 presents the results of estimation, 
and Section 6 concludes.   
 
2.2 Review of previous literature 
 
While numerous researchers focus on the effect of FDI on host industry 
productivity, few studies pay attention to its effect on market competition. To the 
best of my knowledge, there are three studies (Caves, 1974, Chung, 2001, and Co, 
2001) which examine the effect of FDI on market competition empirically. These 
studies employ the traditional SCP paradigm that links market concentration with 
supra-competitive profits, and implicitly with higher prices. Hence, they examine a 
statistical relationship between foreign firms’ presence (measured by the market 
share of FDI firms or magnitude of FDI inflows) and industry profits, where a 
decline in profits suggests an increase in market competition due to FDI inflows.  
The first empirical attempt is a study by Caves (1974). If FDI increases 
market competition, the profits of domestic firms should decrease. Hence, he 
hypothesizes that a larger presence of foreign firms should correspond to lower 
profits earned by domestic firms. Using Canadian manufacturing industries, he finds 
that average profits of domestic firms are lower where FDI firms account for a 
greater market share.  
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Chung (2001) stresses that FDI inflows are heterogeneous in terms of entry 
mode, relative size, and location. Therefore, in contrast to Caves, he explicitly 
considers the effect of FDI entry mode, even though the control is not complete, 
hypothesizing that the greater the portion of greenfield FDI is, the more industry 
profits will decrease. Examining US manufacturing industries between 1987 and 
1991, he finds that increases in foreign presence significantly decrease the industry 
profits, which is consistent with Caves’ findings. However, the result shows that 
entry mode is not significant, although the sign is the same as expected.  
Co (2001) investigates the US margins effect of imports and FDI, 
incorporating FDI into the imports-as-market discipline literature. She also 
recognizes the difference between greenfield FDI and M&A FDI, although the 
control for heterogeneity is still not sufficient. M&A effects appear with a lag. The 
results for greenfield FDI indicate that the effect depends on concentration levels. 
greenfield FDI is found to increase the margins of industries with low levels of 
concentration, while, beyond a certain critical concentration level, the competitive 
effect of FDI predominates (margins decline).  
The main shortcomings of the previous studies arise from the fact that they 
adopt the traditional SCP paradigm. This paradigm argues that structure affects 
conduct which, in turn, determines economic performance (Bain, 1951). The key 
hypothesis is that, as high seller concentration facilitates collusion, highly 
concentrated industry experiences on average supra-competitive profits. Since Bain’s 
seminal paper, a huge number of studies have employed this approach to test the 
relationship between structure and performance (see Schmalensee, 1989).  
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This paradigm, however, is subject to a number of criticisms. First, the SCP 
approach is intrinsically a cross-sectional study, assuming that inter-industry 
variations can be captured by a small number of observable measures. However, as 
the NEIO approach argues, individual industries have important idiosyncracies 
which are not controlled enough in inter-industry studies (Bresnahan, 1989). To the 
extent that this argument holds, the estimates are in question. Second, the SCP 
paradigm is not free from measurement errors, especially in the measurement of 
profits. A number of studies point out the problem in using accounting data. As the 
NEIO approach emphasizes, the dependent variable, price-cost margin, cannot be 
taken to be observable, since economic marginal cost cannot be directly or 
straightforwardly observed (Bresnahan, 1989). Another well-known weakness is that 
the SCP studies omit important variables, such as the price elasticity of demand. 
Cowling and Waterson (1976) show that profit-revenue ratio is related directly to the 
Herfindahl index and inversely to the industry price elasticity of demand, which is 
typically left out of inter-industry structure-performance regressions because of the 
non-availability of good measures of it (Katics and Petersen, 1994).  
The basic idea of this study is similar to the approach by Sumner (1981), 
who attempts to measure the level of competitiveness from the response of prices to 
marginal costs. Since no direct measurement of costs is normally available, the 
response of prices to marginal cost factors cannot identify the level of market power. 
He exploits variations in marginal costs due to varying levels of state taxes in the US 
cigarette industry. Then he infers from the response of prices to marginal costs the 
  
 21
elasticity of demand to proxy the level of market power. His results reject the 
existence of both perfect competition and an effective cartel in the industry.  
However, his methodology has some limitations. As Bulow and Pfleiderer 
(1983) show, the one-to-one relationship between the elasticity of demand and the 
response of prices to marginal costs only holds where the demand elasticity is 
constant. If this is not the case, then the elasticity of demand cannot be inferred from 
the response of prices to marginal costs. Another point is that he attempts to identify 
the demand of elasticity based on monopoly competition, and proxies the level of 
market power from it. Speaking in the language of NEIO, it is the same as if he sets 
the level of market power to monopoly first, and then attempts to identify the 
demand elasticity. In this respect, Genesove and Mullin (1998) provide a more 
developed formulation based on a very general form of demand function. Following 
the standard NEIO approach, they allow the conduct parameter as a free parameter.   
 
2.3 The model 
 
This study incorporates Sumner’s idea within the standard NEIO paradigm 
to avoid the limitations of both the SCP paradigm and Sumner’s approach mentioned 
in the previous section. As Bresnahan (1989) points out, NEIO studies take views 
which are distinct from traditional SCP studies in several aspects. First, NEIO 
assumes that price-cost margins, more precisely marginal costs, are not obtainable 
directly from accounting data. Typical NEIO studies measure the level of 
competitiveness without measuring marginal costs directly. In this respect, the NEIO 
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approach differs from the SCP paradigm completely. Second, individual industries 
are assumed to have their own unusual features, which are not to be controlled by a 
small number of observable variables. Accordingly a typical NEIO study employs an 
econometric model of an industry or very closely related markets. Lastly, NEIO 
studies attempt to model and directly estimate firms’ behaviour. Firms’ conduct is 
measured from the supply equation built on profit maximization.  
On the other hand, Sumner’s approach shares the same viewpoints on these 
points with a standard NEIO approach: his model does not need price-cost margins; 
he focuses on a single industry; and he constructs a pricing equation and attempts to 
estimate firms’ behaviour through a single parameter. However, they depart from 
each other in dealing with the identification problem. Sumner’s methodology 
crucially depends on a direct measure of costs, while a standard NEIO approach 
assumes a constant marginal cost or requires an exogenous variable to rotate the 
demand curve. Another difference is that Sumner attempts to proxy market power 
through the elasticity of demand, in contrast to the NEIO approach which measures it 
through a conduct parameter. 
      There are several questions which can be raised relating to the NEIO 
methodology, including Sumner’s method. The first one concerns the specification of 
the demand function. A typical NEIO study employs a linear or a log-linear demand 
function. However, if all the underlying structural equations are not correctly 
specified, as Hyde and Perloff (1995) argue, the inference about market 
competitiveness may be problematic. Their simulation results suggest that NEIO 
estimates are sensitive to specifications. In response to this criticism, Genesove and 
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Mullin (1998) show that the NEIO estimate is satisfactorily robust irrespective of 
demand specifications, supporting the use of the NEIO approach. However, as they 
admit, while for small values of the conduct parameter, the demand specification 
does not affect the estimation significantly, results can still be sensitive to the 
assumed demand specification for larger values of the conduct parameter. 
Furthermore, Sumner’s approach identifying the conduct parameter through the 
response of prices to marginal costs clearly depends on the demand specification. 
The problem is that we do not know which specification is correct a priori.  
To deal with this problem, I employ a very general form of demand function 
set in Genesove and Mullin (1998), which can incorporate, as a special case, the 
linear, the log-linear and the quadratic demand as well as the exponential demand 
function. The introduction of a general form of demand function is possible since this 
study is only interested in identifying relative changes between two periods in market 
competitiveness rather than estimating absolute levels of two periods. The focus on 
relative changes is partially motivated by the criticism that it is difficult to interpret 
what an absolute value of conduct parameter means, except for monopoly and perfect 
competition.   
Second, as Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) show, identification problems 
can arise. The conduct parameter cannot be identified in some specifications of the 
demand function. To put it in Bresnahan’s language, if a demand function does not 
rotate and shift as exogenous variables change in a linear specification, the index of 
competitiveness cannot be identified. Concerning the identification problem, this 
study assumes a constant marginal cost function and utilizes a direct measure of the 
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cost function.1 Certainly, the plausibility of this assumption and the information on 
costs crucially depends on the nature of the industries in question. Given the nature 
of fixed-coefficient production technology in the industries in the study, it is not very 
restrictive to impose the assumption of a constant marginal cost. In addition, the 
partial information on marginal costs derived from the simple production technology 
enables us to determine which demand specification is more appropriate.  
 
2.3.1 The Basic framework of NEIO  
 
To show the basic framework of NEIO, I take an industry-level approach. 
Suppose an oligopolistic market of several firms producing a homogeneous product. 
We can write the industry inverse demand function as  
(2.1)    ( ; )P P Q Z=
where P is price, Q is total industry output and Z is a vector of variables to shift the 
demand curve.   
The marginal revenue curve can be derived from equation (2.1) by taking the 
derivative of (2.1) with respect to output.  
(2.2) (1 ) P PMR P Q P Q
Q Q
λ θ∂ ∂= + + = +∂ ∂   
                                                 
 
1 There are several ways to identify the conduct parameter without adding an exogenous variable to 
rotate the demand curve. The most common method is to assume a constant marginal cost function. 
Another alternative is to use comparative statics in cost. Lastly, a direct measure of the cost function 
can also solve the identification problem. 
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where  is the slope of the demand curve, and θ is a conduct parameter to 
index the competitiveness of an industry
/P Q∂ ∂
2.  
With the introduction of the profit maximizing assumption, the equilibrium 
occurs where its marginal revenue is equal to its marginal cost,   
(2.3) PMR P Q MC
Q
θ ∂= + =∂  
where MC is a marginal cost which can be a function of the input variables.  
Rearranging (2.3) with respect to P gives 
(2.4) PP MC Q
Q
θ ∂= − ∂    
The interpretation of the conduct parameter, θ, is as follows: if θ = 0, the 
market is perfectly competitive since marginal revenue equals price; if θ = 1, the 
market plays monopoly; if 0 < θ < 1, the market competes between monopoly and 
perfect competition; if θ = 1/N, firms play an N-firm Cournot game.3 A typical NEIO 
study estimates a system of equation (2.1) and (2.4), which yields an estimate of θ 
with other parameters in the demand and cost function, under the assumption that 
they are all separately identified.  
                                                 
 
2 Iwata (1974) and many others view this conduct parameter as the conjectural variation: that is, firms’ 
conjectures about the reaction of rivals to an increase in their supply.   
 
3 With a firm level approach, the interpretation of the conduct parameter varies. The pricing equation 
is given as i i
P
ip mc q
Q
θ ∂= − ∂ , where is firm i’s marginal cost, imc iθ is firm i’s conduct 
parameter, is the first derivative of the industry demand function, and qi is firm i’s quantity. /P Q∂ ∂
0iθ = means perfect competition, 1iθ = implies Cournot competition, and i Nθ = indicates perfect 
collusion.  
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It should be noted that the conduct parameter measures “the degree of 
competition”, while the Lerner Index measures “the degree of market (or oligopoly) 
power” (Appelbaum, 1982; Genesove and Mullin, 1998). Rewriting (2.4) in terms of 
the elasticity of demand gives 
(2.5) ( )P MC L
P
θ η η−= ≡ ∗  
where η is the price elasticity of demand and L is Lerner index. It is obvious that the 
Lerner index measures the degree of market power. However, it is not sufficient to 
determine the level of competition since low demand elasticity will tend to yield a 
high Lerner index and vice versa (Appelbaum, 1982). From (2.5), we can see that the 
conduct parameter equals the elasticity-adjusted Lerner Index, measuring the level of 
competition itself.  
 
2.3.2 The empirical model  
 
2.3.2.1. The pricing equation 
 
This study attempts to examine whether foreign acquisition changes the level 
of market competition. Due to data availability, this study takes an industry-level 
approach. Following Genesove and Mullin (1998), the demand function is defined as 
(2.6) ( )Q k dP δα= −  
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where Q is industry demand, P is price and d  is an indicator variable taking a value 
of -1 if the log-linear ( 0,α δ=  < 0)  and 1 otherwise.4 k measures the size of market 
demand, and an increase in k rotates the demand function anticlockwise, increasing 
demand at any price by the same proportion. Thus the exogenous shift in the market 
demand can be reflected in the change of the variable k. 5  α is the maximum 
willingness to pay, a so-called reservation price. This specification of demand is a 
kind of general form of demand function in that it can incorporate various functional 
forms of demand. The demand curve can be quadratic (δ=2), linear (δ=1), log-linear 
(δ<0, α =0) and exponential (α, δ → ∞, and α/δ constant).6  
With the demand function as (2.6), the marginal revenue function is given as 
(2.7) ( )PMR P Q P d
Q
δ θ αθ θδ δ
∂ += + = −∂  
where θ is the conduct parameter. Since this study takes an industry-level approach, 
θ is viewed as an industry conduct parameter, a weighted average of firm-level 
conduct parameters, where the aggregation assumption follows Cowling and 
Waterson (1976). 
                                                 
 
4 This is to exclude the case of raising a negative number to a power, which leads to a complex 
number of quantities demanded and a positive slope of demand function.     
5 This specification of demand implicitly imposes a restriction on price behaviour. As shown in (2.9), 
under this specification of demand function, the general price rule is not affected by the size of market 
demand.  
6 The corresponding functions are given as  
    Linear                 ( )Q k Pα= −  
    Quadratic            ln ln( ) 2ln( )Q k Pα= + −  
    Log-linear           ln ln( ) ln( )Q k Pδ= +  
    Exponential         ln ln( ) ( / )Q k Pδ α= + . 
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With the profit maximizing assumption, the equilibrium occurs where 
marginal revenue is equal to its marginal cost,  
(2.8) ( )MR P d MCδ θ αθδ δ
+= − =   
where MC is a marginal cost function.  
Rearranging (2.8) with regard to price gives the general price rule (or pricing 
equation) 
(2.9) ( )P MC d MCθα δδ θ δ θ= ++ +  
We now introduce two standard assumptions. First, the index of convexity in the 
demand curve, δ, is assumed to be constant over time. In other words, the shape of 
the demand curve does not vary over time. Note that this does not impose a specific 
functional form for the demand curve. The specification (2.6) is a general form of 
demand function, including the quadratic demand curve (δ=2), the linear (δ=1), and 
the log-linear (α = 0, δ<0) and the exponential (α, δ →∞ and α/δ constant). Therefore, 
this assumption is much less restrictive compared to the popular one of a linear 
demand or log-linear demand curve. Second, the conduct parameter is time invariant 
at least for a certain period of time, which is a standard practice in NEIO studies. 
Given that the level of competition could vary over time, this assumption is 
restrictive. If this assumption is not acceptable, however, the conduct parameter is 
viewed as measuring average competition over a certain period of time (Bresnahan, 
1989). That is, as Genesove and Mullin (1998) point out, where behaviour oscillated 
between perfect competition and monopoly, the conduct parameter measures the 
average level of market power at 0.50. In addition, it might be the case that it takes 
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time for MNCs to act competitively after their entry.7 They may take a cautious 
course until they get used to local markets. Taking this possibility into account, I 
perform robustness checks, if applicable, where I compare the average level of 
competition between two periods, before foreign entry and one or two years after 
foreign entry.8
By these assumptions, we have a stable relationship between price and 
marginal cost. To put it another way, the ratio in which firms pass changes in 
marginal cost into prices is constant over time regardless of the output level. This 
restriction is equivalent to imposing the condition that the ratio of the slope of the 
demand curve and the slope of the marginal revenue curve is constant, as Burlow and 
Pfleiderer’s (1983) analysis shows.9  It should be noted that with the two above 
                                                 
7 One might argue that it is more preferable to model a conduct parameter that varies with the degree 
of entry. It should be noted that most sample industries experienced just one foreign acquisition during 
the sample period. Even where a couple of foreign acquisitions happened, as seen in table 2.3, two 
incidents were very adjacent in time space. Furthermore, foreign acquisitions were large enough to 
make competitive impact, if any, as soon as foreign firms entered the industry. Foreign firms acquired 
one or two large firms in a typical oligopolistic industry with 2 to 5 firms. Furthermore, the industry 
structure including foreign firms’ market share was quite stable over the period after acquisition. 
These facts together provide reasonable grounds for us not to pursue a model where a conduct 
parameter varies with the degree of foreign entry. 
8 The robustness checks do not produce results qualitatively different from main findings. 
9 With a general form of demand function, the optimal output level solves 
(1) 'MR QP P c MCθ≡ + = ≡  
where P’ is the first derivative of the inverse demand function with regard to quantity.   
From (1), Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983) obtain an expression (2) for the rate at which price is changed 
to accommodate changes in marginal cost, where I add the conduct parameter.   
[ ]
[ ]
( 2 ) / / (1)
          (s lo p e  o f d em an d  cu rve)/(s lo p e o f m arg in a l reven u e  cu rve )
'/ ' ( ' '')
1 / 1 (1 ''/ ')
P P c P M R fro m
c Q Q Q Q
P P P Q P
Q P P
θ
θ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = =      ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
=
           = + +
           = + +
  
where P’’ is the second derivative of the inverse demand function with regard to quantity. Therefore, if 
the change in price to the change in marginal cost is constant, it means that the ratio of the slope of the 
demand curve and the slope of the marginal revenue curve is constant. Also it is equivalent to say 
is a constant with the conduct parameter being constant.   ''/ ' ,Q P P k w h e r e k=   
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assumptions imposed, the demand function specified in (2.6) always ensures a 
constant relationship between marginal costs and price.10  
This conclusion is useful for assessing the effect of foreign acquisition on 
market competition. If foreign entry affects market competition, the conduct 
parameter (θ) will vary after foreign acquisition. Therefore, the ratio in the period 
following foreign acquisition, [δ / (δ +θ1)], will be different from the one in the 
previous period, [δ / (δ +θ0)]. The intuition is that, for a given increase in marginal 
cost, the magnitude of price change will vary due to the change in competition 
intensity. On the other hand, it is obvious that if foreign acquisition does not make 
any difference in market competition, i.e. θ0 = θ1, then the ratio remains the same, [δ / 
(δ + θ0)] = [δ / (δ + θ1)]. 
                                                 
10 It can be shown that the rate at which price is changed in response to the change in marginal cost, 
P
c
∂
∂ , is constant for the demand function specified as  
(3) ( )Q k P δα= − ,  
the first derivative and second derivative are given as  
(4)
1 1 11 1'( ) ( )P Q d Q
k
δ δ
δ
−= −  and 
1 1 21 1 1''( ) ( ) ( 1)P Q d Q
k
δ δ
δ δ
−= − −  
Substituting (4) into (2) gives  
(5) P
c
δ
δ θ
∂ =∂ +  
With the conduct parameter (θ) and the index of convexity (δ) being constant, 
P
c
∂
∂ is constant. Note 
that this result remains effective for special cases which the specification (3) includes, such as a linear, 
quadratic, and log linear demand function. For a linear demand function (δ=1), 
1
1
P
c θ
∂ =∂ + . For a 
quadratic function, 
2
2
P
c θ
∂ =∂ + . And for a constant elasticity demand curve (or log-linear demand 
curve), 
P
c
η
η θ
∂ =∂ + where η is the demand elasticity. Note that this study excludes the possibility of 
non-constant 
P
c
∂
∂ by specifying the demand function as (3).  
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(2.10) 0
0 0
P d MCθ α δδ θ δ θ= ++ + ,       before foreign acquisition              
(2.11) 1
1 1
P d MCθ α δδ θ δ θ= ++ + ,        after foreign acquisition            
A problem arises when we try to identify whether the change in the ratio means an 
increase (or decrease) in market competition. The interpretation crucially depends on 
the demand specification: more precisely, the sign of the convexity index, δ.  
(1) In the first place, suppose the convexity index is positive, i.e., δ > 0, which 
implies that the true demand function could be a linear, quadratic or 
exponential function. If foreign acquisition improves market competition, i.e., 
θ1 < θ0, then the ratio varies from [δ / (δ + θ0)] to [δ / (δ + θ1)], where [δ / (δ + 
θ1)] > [δ / (δ + θ0)]. Note that as market competition increases, firms raise 
prices more for a given cost increase than before.11 
(2) Second, consider the case that the convexity index is negative, i.e., δ < 0. For 
simplicity, consider the log-linear case (δ < 0, α=0). Remember that (-δ) is 
the price elasticity of demand. With the help of a standard economic theory, 
we know that  0 > ( )δ θ+  at equilibrium.12 In other words, an oligopolist 
sets its prices where the price elasticity is larger than the conduct parameter. 
                                                 
11 For the simplicity of exposition, consider a linear demand function. The ratio of the increase in 
prices for a given cost increase is as follows. For monopoly it is a half, while it is n/(n+1) for Cournot 
competition, and 1 for perfect competition.   
 
12 At the oligopoly equilibrium, the marginal revenue should be equal to the marginal cost. With 
simple manipulation, this condition is given as  
(1 )MR p MCθε= − =  
where ε is the price elasticity and θ is the conduct parameter. Since the marginal cost is positive, the 
marginal revenue should be positive as well, which requires that the price elasticity should be greater 
than the conduct parameter, θ.  
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Therefore, if foreign entry increases market competition, i.e., θ1 < θ0, then the 
ratio varies from [δ / (δ + θ0)] to [δ / (δ + θ1)], where [δ / (δ + θ1)] < [δ / (δ + 
θ0)]. As market competition increases, firms raise prices less for a given cost 
increase than before. Note that this result is contrary to the case of δ > 0.  
The problem is that we do not know what specification of demand function 
or what value of convexity index, δ, is true. Without additional information (or 
assumptions), therefore, we cannot tell whether the change in the ratio implies an 
increase or decrease in market competition, although we can easily see whether there 
is a change in market competition due to foreign entry. To overcome this problem I 
make use of a direct measure of cost, explained later.    
 
2.3.2.2 The marginal cost function 
 
The specification of the marginal cost function completes the pricing 
equation. I assume a constant marginal cost as  
(2.12) 0 1MC Inputβ β= +  
where Input stands for the price of a main raw material and the β s are parameters. 
0β  measures all variable costs other than the raw material and 1β  represents the 
fixed relationship between the raw material and a final product, which plays an 
important role in the study. Substituting (2.12) into (2.9) gives 
(2.13) 0 1P d Input Inputθα δ δβ β γ ϕδ θ δ θ δ θ= + +   = ++ + +   
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where  0d θα δγ βδ θ δ θ= ++ +  and 1
δϕ βδ θ= + . 
We are interested in assessing the effect of foreign acquisition, that is, 
whether the conduct parameter (θ) varies between the periods before and after 
foreign acquisition.13 Imposing another assumption that the βs are constant over time, 
in other words, the production technology is constant over time, we can infer the 
change in the degree of competition from the coefficient on the raw material price. 
This assumption is not too restrictive given the fact that the industries in question 
employ simple fixed-coefficient production technologies. In addition, they fall within 
the group of mature industries where production technologies are expected to be 
stable over time. Furthermore, the sample period is relatively short.  
One might argue that MNCs employ newer, more efficient technology, or that 
they source from their own, lower cost subsidiaries abroad. The industries in the 
sample are rather free from those kinds of noises. Due to the nature of simple fixed-
coefficient production technology, it is very difficult to enhance productivity without 
significant investment in production facilities. According to industry experts, little 
investment in production facilities had been made after foreign acquisition in the 
sample industries. 
As explained earlier, without any information on the sign of the convexity 
index, δ, we cannot tell whether there is an increase (or decrease) in market 
competition, even though we know that there is a change in market competition. The 
                                                 
13 The estimation of equation (2.13) cannot identify the conduct parameter separately, unless both 
convex index and the parameter, β1, in the marginal cost function, are known. Genesove and Mullin 
(1998) deal with this identification problem by utilizing the seasonality in the demand system, more 
precisely, the maximum willingness to pay, α.  
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study utilizes a direct measure of 1β  in dealing with this problem. In some industries, 
the production technology is quite simple in a mechanical sense, providing a precise 
estimate of the marginal cost coefficient. For instance, in the oil refining industry, 
there exists fixed-coefficient production technology between crude oil and refined oil 
products, from which we derive the value of β1. So we can use the value to determine 
the sign of the convexity index, δ. Rearranging of the coefficient on raw material 
price in (2.13) gives  
(2.14) 1( )0 1δ β ϕθ ϕ
−≤ = ≤  
I exploit the condition that the conduct parameter should not be negative. 
And we expect the sign of ϕ  to be positive. If 1( )β ϕ−  < 0 along with ϕ  > 0, then δ 
should be negative. If 1( )β ϕ−  > 0 along with ϕ  > 0, then δ should be positive. Now 
we know the sign of the convexity index, δ, from the regression result, so that we can 
tell whether foreign acquisition leads to an increase (or decrease) in market 
competition. 14  To summarize, this approach develops Sumner’s (1981) idea in 
several ways. I extend applicability to a various form of demand functions. Second, I 
explicitly introduce the conduct parameter to measure the level of market 
competitiveness. Focusing on relative changes in the response of prices to marginal 
costs, I can build a model based on a general form of demand function. Lastly, the 
                                                 
 
14 As Genesove and Mullin (1998) point out, this approach has a shortcoming that the conduct 
parameter greatly depends on the demand specification, δ, which we do not know. Since this study is 
interested in comparing the conduct parameter between periods, not in the absolute value of the 
conduct parameter, however, this does not create a serious problem.  
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partial information on marginal cost helps in interpreting the change in market 
competitiveness between two periods.       
 
2.3.2.3 The estimation equation   
 
To check if there is a change in the conduct parameter between the periods 
before and after foreign acquisition, I employ a standard dummy variable technique15, 
which is similar to Parker and Roller (1997) and Rubinovitz (1993). With the 
introduction of a dummy variable, we can write the equation (2.13) as  
(2.15) 1 2 1 1 2 1( ) ( )t t t tP Dum Input Dum Inputt tγ γ γ ϕ ϕ ϕ ε= + − + + − ∗ +   
where Dum is a value of 1 for period 2, and 0 otherwise. Note that I 
introduce an intercept dummy variable as well, which is expected to capture various 
effects arising from changes in the demand and cost as well as in competition. 
Therefore, I focus on the parameter on Dum*Input. The hypothesis is that the 
coefficients on Input are the same between the periods: in other words, 0 1 2;H ϕ ϕ= . 
An insignificant coefficient suggests foreign acquisition does not have a significant 
effect on market competition.  
 
2.4 Industries and Data  
 
2.4.1 Industries  
                                                 
 
15 Chow tests cannot be alternative methods, since they are not able to tell which variable is different. 
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To test the effect of foreign acquisition on market competition, this study 
examines several industries which have experienced foreign acquisition after the 
economic crisis in Korea. Facing a severe credit crunch due to the economic crisis, 
many Korean conglomerates had to sell off their divisions or companies to foreigners 
simply to raise cash. As a result, for the first time in Korean economic history, a 
number of fire sales to foreigners took place. Any of the industries experiencing 
foreign acquisition could be candidates for the study. As explained in earlier sections, 
however, the methodology crucially depends on the availability of a precise measure 
of the marginal cost component.  
Several industries meet this requirement: the oil refining industry (gasoline, 
diesel, z-oil, heating oil, naphtha, B-A oil, B-C oil), the paper industry (kraft paper, 
sanitary paper, woody paper), whiskey, lysine and carbon black. Table 2.1 outlines 
foreign acquisitions in these industries, along with other important structural changes 
such as deregulation. It is not surprising that most foreign acquisitions took place 
between 1998 and 2000, considering the credit problem Korean firms faced after the 
economic crisis in Dec 1997.  
 
[ Insert Table 2.1 here ]  
 
Table 2.1 presents the information relating to a direct measure of the cost 
component for these industries. Relying on various sources, I identify key materials 
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and direct measures of cost.16 They are all mature industries, employing fixed rate 
production technology between a final product and key materials, from which we can 
derive a very precise measure of a cost component. Consider the oil industry as an 
example. Crude oil shipped from the Middle East is, at a fixed rate, processed into 
various oil products: gasoline, diesel, z-oil, heating oil, naphtha, B-A oil, B-C oil and 
others. Since a small amount of crude oil is lost during the shipment and refining 
process, the rate is not one-to-one. According to the Korea Energy Economic 
Institute, the loss rate is around 3.62 per cent. This means that l litre of crude oil 
yields 0.9638 litres of refined oil. So l litre of oil product requires 1.0375 litres of 
crude oil.17 Therefore, the marginal coefficient on crude oil is 1.0375, which is fixed 
over time. Kraft paper is a little different from the others, in that two important raw 
materials are involved. Kraft paper requires waste paper as well as pulp. 1 kg of raw 
material produces 0.882 kg of kraft paper. In other words, 1kg of kraft paper needs 
1.13 kg of raw material, which implies that the direct measure is 1.13. 
 
[ Insert Table 2.2 here ] 
 
The industries have other features favourable for the empirical test in 
question. First, they are characterized by a typical oligopoly industry, most of them 
                                                 
16 A key material for each product is identified with the help of publications by related trade 
associations or industry experts. Most of the direct cost measures are obtained from industry experts, 
who provide the information with a condition that I do not disclose the source of the information. The 
oil industry is one exception since the production relationship is common knowledge.    
 
17 They do not apply different loss rates across various refining oils, so that I use the same rate for 
various refined oil products.  
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consisting of 3 to 5 firms. Accordingly they are highly concentrated industries, 
having been listed by the Korea Fair Trade Commission as “highly concentrated 
markets”18, where one firm accounts for a more than 50 per cent market share or 
where the top two or three firms combined hold a more than 75 per cent market share. 
Furthermore, in these industries, collusive interdependence or mutual 
accommodation seems to have prevailed before foreign firms’ entry. 19  This 
characteristic makes these industries obvious candidates in assessing if foreign firms 
as newcomers disrupt the prevailing collusive stability among domestic firms. 
Second, market structure is very stable over the sample period. Most industries have 
undergone few structural changes except for foreign acquisition over the sample 
period, so that we can safely ascribe the change in market competition, if any, to 
foreign acquisition. 
The recession period following the economic crisis may affect the behaviour 
of economic agents significantly, making the interpretation of the change in market 
competition more complicated. A possible scenario is that in the recession the degree 
of collusion can rise, as many studies (Cowling, 1982 and others) suggest. The 
existence of excess capacity during the recession may imply immediate retaliation to 
anyone’s price cutting and thus make all participants more cooperative. If this is the 
case, then I could not ascribe a change in the ratio only to foreign acquisition. As a 
                                                 
 
18 The Korean Fair Trade Commission had annually listed and monitored highly concentrated markets 
since 1991 to regulate oligopolistic markets. The listing system, however, was abolished in 2000.  
19 For instance, leading firms in the oil and the paper industry had been heavily punished for price 
cartels by the Korea Fair Trade Commission. 
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way to control this source of noises, I drop the recession period from Dec. 1997 to 
Dec 199820, and re-estimate the model.  
Among the sample industries, the oil industry experienced another important 
change in market structure, that is, there was price deregulation. While liberalizing 
the regulation on oil products gradually, the Korean government had been regulating 
the price levels of refined oil products until Feb 1998, when it abolished the 
regulation completely.21 This implies that all oil products were not subject to a single 
scheme of price regulation: gasoline, heating oil, diesel, B-A oil, and B-C oil were 
under control during some early part of the sample period, while Z-oil and naphtha 
were not at all. Lastly, to test the predictive power of the methodology, I include the 
LPG industry, which has never received foreign entry.22 The Korean government 
liberalized LPG prices in 2001. For the test, I exploit the fact that they did not change 
the pricing policy at all despite the deregulation.   
In the case of oil industry, the existence of deregulation could introduce a 
difficulty in estimating the effect of foreign firms on price competition. It could be 
that, while price deregulation increased competition, foreign entries did not. I attempt 
to disentangle the two effects from each other by introducing two dummy variables, 
                                                 
 
20 In 1998, the Korean economy experienced a minus 7 per cent growth rate, while it quickly bounced 
back to nearly 10 per cent of annual growth rate the next year.  
21 Although the Korean government abolished existing price regulation and liberalized imports in 
January 1997, it maintained another regulation to require oil companies to report their increases in 
prices in advance. Therefore, to examine the effect of regime change in regulation, I separate two 
periods, before and after Feb, 1998.  
22 Although LPG is one of the refined oil products, I treat LPG as a separate product from others for 
the reasons explained in the next section. 
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as seen in (2.16) later.23 In contrast to the oil industry, the other industries are free 
from this kind of complexity arising from the existence of deregulation. By putting 
the results together, therefore, we could draw the picture about foreign firms’ roles. 
 
2.4.2 Data 
 
The sample period is from Jan 1993 to Aug 2004, except for whiskey where 
the sample period is between Jan 1995 and Aug 2004. Table 2.3 summarizes the 
structure of the sample. The study includes two important variables: final product 
prices and key material prices. The product and raw material prices are obtained 
from the Producer Price Index or the Trade Statistics compiled by the Korea Customs 
Service. All of product prices come from the Producer Price Index, while most of the 
raw material prices are taken from the Trade Statistics. The Trade Statistics provide 
both quantities and values of imported goods by the HS (Harmonized Commodity 
Description and Coding System) code, from which I derive average prices of raw 
materials on a monthly basis. The price index, from the Producer Price Index, is also 
satisfactorily specific. The Bank of Korea publishes the price index for more than 
800 products as well as for groups of products. A problem is that the Producer Price 
Index provides only the price index normalized against the average price of 100 in 
2000. Using a nominal price obtained from related trade associations or companies, I 
reconstruct the time series of the nominal prices. Then I deflate each series by the 
                                                 
 
23  The existence of recession period leaves a short second period, that is, a small number of 
observations for the deregulation period before MNCs appear. 
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general producer price index to obtain the real price series. The study uses monthly 
data. Table 2.4 and 2.5 present summary statistics for variables of each product. 
 
[ Insert Table 2.3 here ] 
[ Insert Table 2.4 here ] 
[ Insert Table 2.5 here ] 
 
2.5 The Estimation Results 
 
For all the estimation, following Genesove and Mullin (1998), the error terms 
are assumed to have heteroskedasticiy and autocorrelation of unknown form. In the 
presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, OLS estimators are inefficient 
and their standard errors are biased. To obtain efficient estimators, this study 
employs Newey-West method. So the standard errors are autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticiy robust.  
 
2.5.1 Oil refining industry 
 
Experiencing a change in regulation regime as well as foreign acquisition 
over the last ten years, the oil refining industry in Korea can serve as an ideal testing 
ground to examine the impact of foreign acquisition and deregulation on market 
competition. The main aim is to assess two issues: whether the deregulation, that is, 
the abolition of price regulation and the liberalization of imports, leads to an increase 
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in market competition; and whether foreign acquisition has brought more 
competitive pressure into the market.24 Along with this, the study investigates the 
popular notion that oil companies tend to raise prices more when crude oil prices rise, 
while they do not lower them enough with crude oil prices falling. Assuming that oil 
firms maximize their profits product by product, I estimate the model for each 
product. This is not very restrictive, given that each oil product constitutes a separate 
market.25 Note that in the following tables, a variable of Input incorporates energy 
taxes as well as crude oil prices in order to control for the impact of the varying taxes 
levied on oil products.26 Another point to make is that an endogeneity problem does 
not arise since the Korean oil industry totally depends on crude oil imported from 
abroad and the demand in Korea is marginal to the world demand.   
Table 2.6 examines whether the deregulation increases market competition 
or not. I present two groups of oil products, where the first five products experienced 
the deregulation during the sample period and the last two products already 
underwent deregulation in the 1980s. Although we can expect that there is no 
significant impact of the deregulation in the second group, I do the same test on the 
second group to compare it with the first group. Throughout the columns, Dum is a 
                                                 
24 A fourth firm acquired the fifth company on September 1999, making a 5-firms-industry into a 4-
firms-industry. Then on September 2001, it became a 5-firms-industry again, since they were 
separated due to bankruptcy of the fifth company. I assess the effect of the change in the number of 
firms, failing to find any significant effect.  
25 Most oil products have different uses, providing a reasonable ground to constitute a separate market 
for each. For instance, Z oil is used for airplane fuel, while naphtha is a key material for the chemical 
industries. When it comes to gasoline and diesel, it is not clear. Both of them are used for cars, 
although they are for different types of cars. Given that the conversion from a gasoline to a diesel car 
is not common in the short run, I assume separate markets for each.  
26 The Korean government has imposed heavy energy taxes on oil products such as gasoline, diesel, 
heating oil and LPG (butane). Over the sample period, these taxes have varied to some extent, due to 
changes in energy policy or tax policy. Especially since 2000, a new energy policy has initiated a 
sharp tax increase on heating oil, diesel and LPG (butane).   
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dummy variable with a value being 1 for the period after the deregulation (Feb 1998 
to Aug 2004) and 0 otherwise. A significant coefficient on the interaction term of 
Dum and Input implies a significant difference in pricing behaviour between the two 
periods, supporting the hypothesis that deregulation has an impact on market 
competition.  
 
[ Insert Table 2.6. here ]  
 
As explained earlier, the interpretation depends on the demand specification, 
more precisely, on the sign of the convexity index, δ, which we do not know. Based 
on the relationship (2.14), I determine the sign of convexity index for each product 
with the help of partial information on marginal costs. The procedure is as follows. 
The first step is to estimate the pricing equation without dummy variables using the 
whole sample period. The use of the whole sample period without dummy variables 
assumes that the sign of convexity index does not vary over the sample period. The 
second step is to compare the estimated parameter φ with β1 obtained extraneously 
from industry experts. From the relationship (2.14), if the parameter φ is larger than 
β1, it implies that the convexity index should be negative. On the other hand, if the 
parameter φ is smaller than β1, the convexity index should be positive. To compare 
them, I conduct a simple t-test. Consider the case of gasoline. I estimate the pricing 
equation for gasoline without dummy variables, using the whole sample. I set up a 
hypothesis that β1 > φ. Since β1 is 1.0375 in the oil industry, the hypothesis is that 
1.0375 > φ. Then we conduct simple hypothesis testing. The t-ratio is 4.63, rejecting 
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the hypothesis at the 1% level. According to the relationship (2.14), this result 
implies a negative convexity index. Note that I do not report the results of estimation 
without dummy variables. 
In passing, the extraneous estimates of β1 play a key role in deciding the sign 
of the convexity index. Considering the nature of production technologies employed 
in the sample industries and the data sources, the estimates are relatively reliable. In 
addition, the sign of the convexity index greatly depends on the difference between 
the extraneous estimate of β1 and the regression estimates of φ. With the regression 
results, the differences are considerably large or small enough to make safe 
inferences on the sign of the convexity index. 
All coefficients of interest in the first five columns are negative and 
significant except gasoline, suggesting that the deregulation brings more competitive 
behaviour into the oil industry. In contrast, the last two columns of Naphtha and Z oil 
report insignificant coefficients, as expected. In other words, there exists no 
significant difference between the two periods before and after Feb 1998. This sharp 
contrast between the two groups of products strengthens the conclusion that the 
deregulation has a significant impact on price competition.  
As mentioned earlier, one might argue that the economic crisis itself could 
have disrupted the constant relationship between prices and marginal costs by 
affecting the behaviour of economic agents. If this is the case, we could not ascribe a 
change in market competition, if any, only to foreign acquisition. To separate the 
possible effect of the shock on market competitiveness, I drop observations which 
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belong to the recession period from Dec 1997 to the end of 1998, when the Korean 
economy plunged following the shock. 
Table 2.7 shows the results. The competitive effect of the deregulation is less 
apparent compared to Table 2.6, although a largely similar pattern remains. In the 
case of gasoline and heating oil, the deregulation is irrelevant to price competition or 
brings more cooperative pricing behaviour. Except for these points, the results are 
the same as Table 2.6. A point to note is that the exclusion of the recession period 
significantly increases the goodness of fit across columns, suggesting there was some 
deviation from the average during the recession.  
 
[ Insert Table 2.7 here ]  
 
Table 2.8 refers to the issue of the impact of foreign acquisition. The sample 
period is between Jan 1993 to Aug 2004, which I split into three sub-periods 
according to regulation regime and foreign acquisition: regulated period, deregulated 
period before foreign acquisition, and deregulated period after foreign acquisition.27 I 
introduce two dummy variables to compare the level of market competition among 
three periods, where I use the second period as a base period. 28 Then I re-specify the 
model as  
                                                 
27 Since two foreign acquisitions are very close in time space, I use the second foreign acquisition in 
constructing sub-periods.  
 
28 Using a short sample period from Feb 1998 to Aug 2004, I also did a test. The result mainly remains 
unchanged.   
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(2.16)
1 2 1 3 1 1 2 1
3 1 *
( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 1 *
( ) 2
t t t t
t t t
P Dum Dum Input Dum Input
Dum Input
t tγ γ γ γ γ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ε              
= + − + − + + −
+ − +  
where Dum1 is 1 for the first sub-period, Dum2 is 1 for the third sub-period, and 0 
for the second period. The coefficient on Dum1*Input measures the impact of 
deregulation, while that on Dum2*Input measures the effect of foreign acquisition.  
The results are mixed. For Naphtha and Z oil, foreign entry increases price 
competition, while for the others foreign firms have few significant effects or even 
worsen it. Note that Naphtha and Z oil have a positive convex index so that a positive 
coefficient implies an increase in price competition.29 Dropping the recession period 
provides qualitatively similar results, as seen in Table 2.9, where foreign firms have 
no significant effect on the first five products, with significant impact on Naphtha 
and Z oil. The results in Table 2.9 seem more reliable in two aspects: the goodness of 
fit improves across columns; and the coefficient on input prices becomes significant 
in the case of gasoline and diesel.     
 
[ Insert Table 2.8 here ]  
[ Insert Table 2.9 here ]  
 
Table 2.10 examines the common belief that oil companies increase prices 
more when crude oil prices rise, while they are reluctant to lower prices when crude 
oil prices are falling. I construct two sub-periods depending on crude oil prices. Dum 
                                                 
 
29 For these two products, there should be only two sub-periods; the period before and after foreign 
acquisition. Applying one dummy variable also produces the same results.   
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is a dummy variable with its value being 1 when crude oil prices rise, and 0 
otherwise. The coefficient on Dum*Input measures the difference between the two 
periods. The results are consistent across columns, that pricing behaviour is not 
different between the two periods. As shown in Table 2.11, excluding the recession 
period produces a qualitatively similar pattern, which does not support the popular 
belief. When crude oil prices rise, the pricing pattern does not vary in most products. 
Only the pricing of heating oil shows as less competitive, but the estimate suggests a 
very small fraction of price increase, if any.     
 
[ Insert Table 2.10 here ]  
[ Insert Table 2.11 here ]  
 
To summarize, the deregulation is largely successful in increasing market 
competitiveness in some oil products, while foreign acquisition does not manage to 
raise market competitiveness, except for two products. And the pricing pattern does 
not support the popular belief that oil companies increase price more when crude oil 
prices rise.    
 
2.5.2 Paper industry 
 
The paper industry is one of the largest FDI recipient industries after the 
economic crisis in Korea. Despite several foreign acquisitions, we could see 
variations in foreign presence among paper products because there are various types 
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of paper in the industry and no firms cover the entire range of paper products. This 
provides a chance to compare the results with those for other papers which have not 
experienced foreign acquisition. To see the impact of foreign acquisition, I look at 
sanitary paper, Kraft paper and woody paper among many candidates. Along with 
this, I estimate the model for woody-free paper and art paper as well, which have not 
been subject to foreign acquisition.   
In Table 2.12, the first three columns examine the difference in pricing 
behaviour between the two periods before and after foreign acquisition. A significant 
coefficient on the interaction term of Dum and Input implies significant difference in 
pricing behaviour between the two periods. Since the interpretation crucially depends 
on the demand specification, more precisely, the sign of the convexity index, δ, I 
determine the sign for each product with the help of direct measures of cost. I 
conduct hypothesis testing. The null hypothesis is 0δ > , that is, 1β ϕ> , where 1β  
is a direct measure of cost for each product and ϕ  is an estimate of the response of 
prices to marginal costs. The second set of rows presents the results of the test. For 
all three products, the sign of the convex index is positive. With a positive convex 
index, a negative coefficient on the interaction term indicates less competitive 
pricing behaviour. 
 The first three columns present significant and negative coefficients, 
suggesting that foreign acquisition brings more cooperation between firms. The last 
two columns refer to the results relating to other papers which have not experienced 
foreign acquisition. The same dummy variable as the one in the third column is 
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introduced, considering that they all belong to the category of printing paper.30 A 
priori we expect insignificant coefficients on Dum*Input since they were not subject 
to foreign acquisition. However, the result is unexpectedly very similar to those for 
the first set of paper, strongly suggesting deterioration in market competition. A 
likely explanation is that foreign acquisition has brought more cooperation in the 
sector of woody free paper and art paper as well since they belong to a market in a 
broad sense. Table 2.13 presents the results for a sub-sample which excludes the 
recession period. The pattern of results does not vary.  
To put together these results, we can conclude that foreign acquisition in the 
paper industry worsens market competition, contrary to the popular belief that 
foreign entry brings more competitive behaviour into the market. Note that a 
traditional endogeneity problem does not arise since paper companies greatly depend 
on pulp imported from abroad and the demand in Korea is marginal to the world 
demand.   
 
[ Insert Table 2.12 here ]  
[ Insert Table 2.13 here ]  
 
2.5.3 Other industries 
 
                                                 
30  Roughly speaking, paper is categorized into four groups of paper: newsprint, sanitary paper, 
printing paper, and board paper. The printing paper includes woody paper, woody-free paper and art 
(or coated) paper. Woody paper is low quality paper, used for notebooks, while woody-free paper is 
high quality printing paper used for printing books. Art paper is different from woody-free paper in 
that it is coated.  
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Although there are many other industries where foreign firms have 
succeeded in take-overs of Korean firms, data limitation restricts the empirical 
estimation to several industries, such as whiskey, lysine and carbon black. They 
share a characteristic in common, that foreign firms are dominant players in the 
market. Combined together, they account for more than two-thirds of the market. 
Since foreign acquisition took place in different times for each industry, Dum 
represents a different series for each product. The whiskey industry experienced two 
foreign acquisitions, which were apart in time, so that I estimate the model using 
both incidents. On the other hand, in the case of carbon black, I estimate the model 
only using the second acquisition, since they happened at nearly the same time.  
Tables 2.14 and 2.15 present the results, where Table 2.14 employs the 
whole sample period while Table 2.15 excludes the recession period. In each table, 
the first two columns refer to the results for whiskey. The first foreign acquisition has 
no significant effect on market competition, while the second foreign acquisition is 
found to worsen it significantly. In the case of lysine and carbon black, the two tables 
provide different explanations. Because the exclusion of the depression period 
increases the goodness of fit substantially, I concentrated on the second table. In the 
case of lysine, foreign acquisition leads to worsened market competition. Although 
foreign firms are dominating the market like in the other two industries, the carbon 
black industry is found to have experienced a significant increase in market 
competitiveness, supporting the common belief.  
 
[ Insert Table 2.14. here ]  
  
 51
[ Insert Table 2.15. here ]  
 
2.5.4 LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) industry  
 
This section investigates the predicting power of the methodology proposed 
in the study, employing the prior information on the competitive level in the LPG 
industry. There are two types of LPG, Butane and Propane.31 Although they are 
produced in the processing of refining crude oil, LPG is different from other oil 
products in several aspects. First, the LPG industry is practically a duopoly, in 
contrast to a 5-firms industry for other oil products. Since the production of LPG is 
not sufficient to cover the domestic demand, the import of LPG is inevitable. Two 
LPG companies involved in the import of LPG account for nearly 80 per cent of the 
market with their subsidiary oil companies. And LPG was subject to a different 
regulation regime from other oil products, a regime which remained effective for 
three more years even after the regulation for oil products was abolished. The price 
of LPG was finally liberalized in Jan 2001. However, firms did not change their 
pricing pattern at all. Finding that they stuck to the old pricing formula of the 
regulation regime which was identical between two firms, the Korea Fair Trade 
Commission imposed a considerable amount of surcharges against their de facto 
price fixing.  
                                                 
31 Butane is used for LPG cars, while Propane is mainly for domestic and industry heating fuel. The 
different uses of LPG provide reasonable grounds to define a separate market for each. Therefore, I 
estimate the model for each LPG.  
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Tables 2.16 and 2.17 look at whether there is any change in market 
competition between periods before and after the deregulation, where Table 2.16 
uses all observations in the sample, while Table 2.17 drops the recession period. As 
expected from the prior information, the deregulation does not make any difference 
in firms’ pricing policies. The first and second column for each product examine the 
impact of the deregulation, where the first columns employ the sub-sample period of 
Jan 1993 to June 2002 and the second ones extend the period to the whole sample 
period of Jan 1993 to Aug 2004. Since the FTC decision deals with the period of Jan 
2001 to Jun 2002, the use of the sub-sample period is a simple way to exclude the 
likely impact of the FTC investigation from the estimation. The parameters on 
Dum*Input are found to be insignificant in both products, which is consistent with 
the prior information that they stuck to the old regime of pricing policies with no 
change.32 Therefore, it can be said that although it is very simple, this methodology 
seems to capture very well whether there is change in market competition or not.  
The third column for each product refers to the effect of the FTC decision on 
market competition. Since the FTC decision was officially made in Dec 2002, I 
define a dummy variable whose value is 1 for the period of Dec 2002 to Aug 2004 
and 0 otherwise.33 The hypothesis that the convex index is positive is rejected at 1 
percent level for both products. The parameter of interest is negative and significant 
in the case of Butane, indicating that the FTC decision was successful in making 
                                                 
 
32 Like the oil industry, a variable of Input incorporates energy taxes as well as crude oil prices in 
order to control for the impact of varying taxes levied on oil products. 
33 I estimate the model using a dummy variable whose value is 1 for July 2002 to Aug 2004 and 0 
otherwise. The estimation result is very similar to the above.   
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firms adopt more competitive pricing policies. Excluding the recession period does 
not make any qualitative difference except that the FTC decision is marginally 
successful in lowering the prices of propane as well.     
 
[ Insert Table 2.16 here ]  
[ Insert Table 2.17 here ]  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
Using the Korean experience, this study has investigated the effect of foreign 
acquisition on market competition. The estimation strategy is to infer the level of 
market competitiveness from the response of prices to marginal costs. The basic idea 
is similar to Sumner’s approach, which is subject to some limitations, as mentioned 
earlier: he attempts to proxy the level of market power from the elasticity of demand; 
the estimation results vary according to the specification of demand, which we 
cannot know a priori. In avoiding them, this study incorporates Sumner’s idea within 
the NEIO paradigm to introduce a conduct parameter. Focusing on relative changes 
in market competition, I then construct a pricing equation based on a very general 
form of demand function. This feature distinguishes this study from a standard NEIO 
study which typically assumes a log-linear or linear demand function. The next step 
is to compare the conduct parameter between two periods before and after foreign 
acquisition. As explained, a problem arises from the fact that the interpretation 
depends on the sign of the convexity index. The partial information about marginal 
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costs solves the problem by allowing the data to determine which one is more 
compatible with the results.  
Since the empirical methodology relies on the availability of a precise 
measure of the marginal cost component, I have chosen several industries where we 
can obtain a direct measure of cost components from their simple fixed ratio 
production technologies between final products and raw materials. The list includes 
the oil industry (gasoline, diesel, z-oil, heating oil, naphtha, B-A oil, B-C oil), the 
paper industry (kraft paper, sanitary paper, woody paper), whiskey, lysine and carbon 
black. These industries have other features favourable for the empirical test. They are 
all highly concentrated industries, having undergone few structural changes except 
for foreign acquisition over the recent years. Hence we can safely ascribe the change 
in market behaviour, if any, to foreign acquisition. The existence of a recession 
period just following the economic crisis could make the interpretation complicated, 
since the degree of collusion may increase in the recession period. In controlling the 
likely effect of the recession period on market competition, I exclude the recession 
period from the sample period, obtaining qualitatively similar results.   
Contrary to the common belief, the results do not support the hypothesis that 
foreign entry introduces competitive pressure on domestic firms. It seems that mostly 
in isolated cases foreign acquisition increases price competition: in the sector of 
naphtha, z oil and carbon black foreign acquisition does bring in competitive 
pressure into the market. The results from other products suggest that foreign 
acquisition is irrelevant to market competition or even reduces price competition. I 
also investigate the impact of deregulation in the oil industry, finding that it was 
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largely successful in increasing market competitiveness. A simple test on the LPG 
industry shows that the predictive power of this methodology is quite satisfactory. 
Given that the data requirement is modest, this methodology can be a useful tool for 
the detection of change in market competition in homogenous product industries, 
especially where partial information about the marginal cost is available. A possible 
extension would be to estimate a system of demand and pricing equation, employing 
a standard NEIO approach. The comparison between two sets of results would help 
to check how good the methodology of this study is. Certainly, the extension would 
greatly depend on the availability of quantity data.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 2.1. Key dates in the history of each industry 
Industry Date Event 
Feb 1998  
The Korea government abolished price 
regulation completely for gasoline, diesel, 
heating oil, B-A oil and B-C oil 
Sep 1999 
Hyundai Oil Bank acquired Inchon Oil 
Refinery, making a 5-firm into a 4-firm 
industry  
Oct 1999 IPIC (UAE) acquired 50 % of shares in Hyundai Oil Bank, to exercise co-management 
Nov 1999  Aramco (Saudi) acquired S-Oil  
 
Oil  
Sep 2001 
Inchon Oil Refinery went bankrupt to be under 
the control of the court, making again a 5-firm 
industry.   
LPG  Jan 2001 The Korea government liberalized LPG prices. 
 Dec 2002  Korea Fair Trade Commission imposed a large amount of surcharges against price fixing 
Kraft paper 
and sanitary 
paper 
Dec 1997 
P&G (US) acquired Ssangyong Paper, which 
produced Kraft paper, sanitary paper, and 
Nappies.   
Printing paper Dec 1998 
Delphinium Enterprise Pte Ltd 
(Norway+Canada) acquired the printing paper 
division from Hansol Paper.   
Whiskey Jun 1998 Seagram (Canada) acquired Dusan Seagram  
 Oct 1999 Allied Domecq PLS (UK) acquired the division of whiskey from Jinro Ltd. 
Lysine Mar 1998 Basf (Germany) acquired the division of lysine from Daesang  
Carbonblack Nov 1998 Degussa A.G (Germany) acquired Korea Carbon Black 
 Dec 1998 Columbian Chemical (US) acquired the division of carbon black from Keumho 
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Table 2.2. Direct measures of cost 
Industry Key material Direct measure of cost  
Oil products  Crude oil - A litre of crude oil produces 0.9638 litres 
of refined oil. In other words, 1 litre of oil 
products requires 1.0375 litres of crude oil. 
- Therefore, the direct measure of cost is 
1.0375  
- A litre of imported LPG means a litre of 
LPG since imported LPG is sold without 
additional processing  
LPG  Imported LPG 
- The direct measure of cost is 1  
Sanitary paper Pulp  - 1 kg of pulp (BKP) produces 0.93 kg of 
sanitary paper. In other words, 1 kg of 
sanitary paper requires 1.07 kg of pulp.  
- The direct measure of cost is 1.07.  
Kraft paper Pulp and waste 
paper 
- 40 % of pulp (UKP) and 60 % of waste 
paper (OCC) is used. And 1 kg of raw 
material produces 0.882 kg of kraft. In other 
words, 1 kg of kraft needs 1.13 kg of raw 
material.     
- The direct measure of cost is 1.13. 
Printing paper Pulp - 1 kg of pulp (BKP) produces 1.2 kg of 
printing paper. In other words, 1 kg of 
printing paper needs 0.833 kg of pulp 
- The direct measure of cost is 0.833 
Whiskey Undiluted Scotch 
whiskey 
  
- 1 litre of undiluted whiskey produces 
1.425 litres of whiskey. In other words, 1 litre 
of whiskey requires 0.70 litres of undiluted 
whiskey.   
- The direct measure of cost is 0.70.  
Lysine Raw sugar - 1 kg of raw sugar produces 0.70 kg of 
lysine. In other words, 1 kg of lysine needs 
1.428 kg of raw sugar.   
- The direct measure of cost is 1.428.  
Carbon black 
 
FCC oil - 1kg of FCC oil produces 0.20-0.50kg of 
carbon black. In other words, 1kg of carbon 
black needs 2-5kg of FCC oil.  
- The direct measure of cost is 2.0-5.0. 
* In the case of oil products and LPG, the energy taxes are not explained here  
Source: The Korea Energy Economic Institute and anonymous others. 
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Table 2.3 The structure of the sample 
 Oil industry Kraft Sanitary paper Printing paper Whiskey Lysine Carbonblack 
Sample period Jan 1993 – 
Aug 2004 
Jan 1993 –  
Aug 2004 
Jan 1993 –  
Aug 2004 
Jan 1993 –  
Aug 2004 
Jan 1995 – 
Aug 2004 
Jan 1993 – 
Aug 2004 
Jan 1993 – 
Aug 2004 
The level of 
Data Industry Level Industry Level Industry Level
Industry Level Industry Level Industry Level Industry Level 
Data Frequency Monthly data Monthly data Monthly data Monthly data Monthly data Monthly data Monthly data 
No. of Obs 140 140 140 140 116 140 140 
Foreign Entry        
- How many  2 firms 1 firm 1 firm 1 firm 2 firms 1 firms 2 firms 
- When  Oct 1999 
Nov 1999 Dec 1997 Dec 1997 Dec 1998 
Jun 1998 
Oct 1999 Mar 1998 
Nov 1998 
Dec 1998 
- How big 
(market share) 
21% 44% 27% 50% 68% 70% 70% 
Other structural 
change 
Price 
Deregulation None None None None None None 
- When Feb 1998 - - - - - - 
Data Sources Korea 
National Oil 
Corporation 
Korea Paper 
Manufacturers’ 
Association 
Korea Paper 
Manufacturers’ 
Association 
Korea Paper 
Manufacturers’ 
Association 
Hite 
Corporation 
CJ 
Corporation 
Kumho 
Petrochemical 
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Table 2.4. Descriptive Statistics of the data (1) 
 
Whole Sample Subsample1 (before foreign entry) Subsample2 (after foreign entry)  
Mean Std.Dev Min Max Mean Std.Dev Min Max Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Gasoline price 1043.8 251.7 684.8 1348.6 864.6 186.3 644.8 1210.6 1282.7 36.02 1188.7 1348.6 
Input price 755.7 206.4 437.6 997.8 610.6 158.1 437.6 922.4 949.1 19.6 897.9 997.8 
No of Obs. 140 80 60 
Heating oil price 482.9 141.0 296.5 775.2 385.3 90.8 296.5 760.9 613.0 75.5 474.0 775.2 
Input price 337.1 48.1 252.9 450.1 167.4 36.3 113.7 274.2 337.1 48.1 252.9 450.1 
No of Obs. 140 80 60 
Diesel price 513.2 208.7 255.0 899.1 360.1 114.4 255.0 729.0 717.4 104.6 545.0 899.1 
Input price 160.7 55.1 86.6 277.7 117.4 20.1 86.6 193.3 218.5 25.8 162.3 277.7 
No of Obs. 140 80 60 
Bcoil price 249.9 89.4 114.3 437.2 187.8 65.5 114.3 437.2 332.8 29.4 252.0 393.6 
Input price 160.7 55.1 86.6 277.2 117.4 20.1 86.6 193.3 218.5 25.8 162.3 277.7 
No of Obs. 140 80 60 
Baoil price 295.4 99.7 162.6 547.9 229.3 75.3 162.6 547.9 383.7 44.6 285.7 475.5 
Input price 160.7 55.1 86.6 277.7 117.4 20.1 86.6 193.3 218.5 25.8 162.3 277.7 
No of Obs. 140 80 60 
* Input price includes energy tax on each product as well as crude oil prices. 
 
 
  
 60 
Table 2.5. Descriptive Statistics of the data (2) 
Whole Sample Subsample1 (before foreign entry) Subsample2 (after foreign entry)  
Mean Std.Dev Min Max Mean Std.Dev Min Max Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Kraft price 575.0 48.1 486.6 670.3 545.7 54.9 486.6 670.3 596.4 27.2 497.2 637.7 
Input price 480.4 95.5 331.4 766.2 473.0 123.8 331.4 766.2 485.7 68.3 404.4 756.8 
No of Obs. 140 59 81 
Sanitary paper 1933.8 115.2 1691.1 2098.3 1899.8 144.5 1691.1 2098.3 1958.6 80.4 1808.5 2073.7 
Input price 594.1 126.2 371.1 942.6 550.1 138.6 371.1 851.3 620.9 107.6 484.6 942.6 
No of Obs. 140 59 81 
Writing paper 677.6 68.8 549.8 768.4 608.3 41.3 549.8 681.2 728.0 29.5 605.8 768.4 
Input price 537.4 103.9 364.9 853.9 505.2 112.1 364.9 734.1 560.9 91.2 451.0 853.9 
No of Obs. 140  60 
Whiskey price 44542 4074 38919 53093 45120 5369 38919 53093 43984 2106 40459 51915 
Input price 11798 2452 6908 19041 11201 3243 6908 19041 12374 1038 10121 15304 
No of Obs. 116 57 59 
Lysine price 4159 607 2933 5107 4602 322 3735 5076 3807 547 2933 5107 
Input price 277 57 182 521 302 49 247 521 256 56 182 448 
No of Obs. 140 62 78 
Carbonblack 800.6 61.9 692.2 939.7 769.2 60.5 692.2 939.7 832.0 45.3 784.4 926.4 
Input price 230.9 82.5 105.6 403.8 175.2 60.9 105.6 403.8 292.9 44.0 180.9 363.6 
No of Obs.  140 70 70 
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Table 2.6. The impact of deregulation in the oil industry  
 
Dependent variables: product prices 
 
Gasoline  Heating oil Diesel BC oil BA oil Naphtha Z oil 
Constant  2.26** (0.95) 
0.48 
(0.53) 
-0.66* 
(0.38) 
-1.31*** 
(0.40) 
-1.28*** 
(0.39) 
0.26** 
(0.12) 
0.73*** 
(0.25) 
Dum   1.74 (2.11) 
1.54* 
(0.84) 
2.45*** 
(0.83) 
2.75*** 
(0.52) 
2.59*** 
(0.63) 
-0.13 
(0.17) 
-0.36 
(0.26) 
Input 1.02*** (0.16) 
1.99*** 
(0.35) 
2.36*** 
(0.24) 
2.55*** 
(0.35) 
2.90*** 
(0.33) 
0.85*** 
(0.11) 
0.80*** 
(0.22) 
Dum*Input -0.10 (0.28) 
-0.76* 
(0.42) 
-1.18*** 
(0.50) 
-1.68*** 
(0.40) 
-1.72*** 
(0.43) 
0.21 
(0.13) 
0.28 
(0.23) 
Adj. R2 0.9613 0.8992 0.9615 0.9097 0.8764 0.9323 0.9101 
No of obs. 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 
 H0: δ > 0 (with a 1% critical value being 2.358) 
Test statistics: t 4.63 10.2 11.3 4.4 7.75 1.65 0.06 
Test result  δ < 0  δ < 0 δ < 0 δ < 0 δ < 0 δ > 0 δ > 0 
* Dum is 1 for the period after deregulation and 0 otherwise.  
* The Newey-West procedure is employed, so that the standard errors are autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust.  
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Table 2.7. The impact of deregulation in the oil industry (excluding a recession period)  
 
Dependent variables: product prices 
 
Gasoline  Heating oil Diesel BC oil BA oil Naphtha Z oil 
Constant  3.06*** (0.78) 
1.43*** 
(0.34) 
0.06 
(0.44) 
-0.50*** 
(0.16) 
-0.43* 
(0.25) 
0.18 
(0.14) 
0.61* 
(0.34) 
Dum   -4.67** (2.27) 
0.02 
(0.41) 
0.73*** 
(0.22) 
1.71*** 
(0.22) 
1.09*** 
(0.27) 
-0.29 
(0.21) 
-0.45 
(0.35) 
Input 0.86*** (0.13) 
1.34*** 
(0.22) 
1.87*** 
(0.10) 
1.82*** 
(0.13) 
2.14*** 
(0.23) 
0.92*** 
(0.13) 
0.92*** 
(0.30) 
Dum*Input 0.65** (0.26) 
0.04 
(0.23) 
-0.49** 
(0.11) 
-0.86*** 
(0.15) 
-0.68*** 
(0.24) 
0.25 
(0.16) 
0.27 
(0.31) 
Adj. R2 0.9809 0.9619 0.9891 0.9498 0.9567 0.9446 0.9229 
No of obs. 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 
 H0: δ > 0 (with a 1% critical value being 2.358) 
Test statistics: t 5.12 10.5 27.6 5.66 11.6 2.16 0.56 
Test result  δ < 0  δ < 0 δ < 0 δ < 0 δ < 0 δ > 0 δ > 0 
* Dum is 1 for the period after deregulation and 0 otherwise.  
* The Newey-West procedure is employed, so that the standard errors are autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust.  
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Table 2.8. The effect of foreign acquisition in the oil industry   
 
Dependent variables: product prices 
 
Gasoline  Heating oil Diesel BC oil BA oil Naphtha Z oil 
Constant  0.66*** (0.11) 
0.54 
(1.60) 
4.87*** 
(1.30) 
1.03* 
(0.61) 
0.72 
(0.99) 
0.22* 
(0.12) 
0.42*** 
(0.14) 
Dum1  -0.43** (0.17) 
-0.05 
(1.47) 
-5.54*** 
(1.55) 
-2.34*** 
(0.58) 
-2.00** 
(0.92) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.31 
(0.31) 
Dum2  -0.56 (0.36) 
0.81 
(1.59) 
-3.83*** 
(1.37) 
0.79 
(0.70) 
-0.18 
(0.97) 
-0.84** 
(0.32) 
-0.56*** 
(0.20) 
Input 0.57 (0.12) 
1.98** 
(0.83) 
0.08 
(0.41) 
1.19** 
(0.59) 
1.73* 
(0.94) 
1.02*** 
(0.09) 
1.08*** 
(0.13) 
Dum1*Input 0.44* (0.25) 
0.01 
(0.74) 
2.27*** 
(0.58) 
1.35** 
(0.53) 
1.17 
(0.85) 
-0.17 
(0.16) 
-0.27 
(0.28) 
Dum2*Input 0.67* (0.38) 
-0.57 
(0.82) 
1.23*** 
(0.42) 
-0.50 
(0.61) 
-0.22 
(0.93) 
0.39** 
(0.18) 
0.25* 
(0.14) 
Adj. R2 0.9664 0.9032 0.9697 0.9105 0.8816 0.9410 0.9140 
No of obs. 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 
* Dum1 is 1 for the period before the deregulation and 0 otherwise. 
* Dum2 is 1 for the period after foreign acquisition and 0 otherwise.  
* The Newey-West procedure is employed, so that the standard errors are autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust.  
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Table 2.9. The effect of foreign acquisition in the oil industry (excluding a recession period)  
 
Dependent variables: product prices 
 
Gasoline  Heating oil Diesel BC oil BA oil Naphtha Z oil 
Constant  0.38 (0.44) 
1.11*** 
(0.20) 
0.37* 
(0.21) 
1.24*** 
(0.06) 
0.92*** 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.32*** 
(0.05) 
Dum1  -0.07 (0.45) 
0.31 
(0.40) 
-0.30 
(0.34) 
-1.75*** 
(0.17) 
-1.36*** 
(0.27) 
0.11 
(0.15) 
0.28 
(0.34) 
Dum2  -0.29 (0.54) 
0.23 
(0.60) 
0.66 
(0.45) 
0.58* 
(0.34) 
-0.38 
(0.29) 
-0.69** 
(0.31) 
-0.46*** 
(0.17) 
Input 0.89* (0.49) 
1.56*** 
(0.09) 
1.48*** 
(0.06) 
0.84*** 
(0.05) 
1.24*** 
(0.06) 
1.08*** 
(0.04) 
1.08*** 
(0.03) 
Dum1*Input -0.03 (0.51) 
-0.21 
(0.24) 
0.38** 
(0.18) 
0.98*** 
(0.14) 
0.90*** 
(0.24) 
-0.16 
(0.14) 
-0.16 
(0.31) 
Dum2*Input 0.35 (0.58) 
-0.14 
(0.18) 
-0.15 
(0.10) 
-0.15 
(0.16) 
0.26 
(0.13) 
0.33* 
(0.16) 
0.24*** 
(0.08) 
Adj. R2 0.9813 0.9615 0.9893 0.9532 0.9564 0.9492 0.9239 
No of obs. 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 
* Dum1 is 1 for the period before the deregulation and 0 otherwise. 
* Dum2 is 1 for the period after foreign acquisition and 0 otherwise.  
* The Newey-West procedure is employed, so that the standard errors are autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust.  
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Table 2.10. Pricing behaviour when crude oil prices rise   
 
Dependent variables: product prices 
 
Gasoline  Heating oil Diesel BC oil BA oil Naphtha Z oil 
Constant  1.64*** (0.44) 
1.58*** 
(0.18) 
1.11*** 
(0.23) 
0.04 
(0.26) 
0.19 
(0.28) 
0.07 
(0.09) 
0.54*** 
(0.09) 
Dum  -0.60 (0.37) 
-0.30** 
(0.15) 
-0.17 
(0.19) 
0.19 
(0.22) 
0.006 
(0.23) 
-0.16* 
(0.08) 
-0.16* 
(0.08) 
Input 1.18*** (0.04) 
1.37*** 
(0.07) 
1.33*** 
(0.04) 
1.57*** 
(0.13) 
1.87*** 
(0.15) 
1.08*** 
(0.06) 
1.01*** 
(0.05) 
Dum*Input 0.04 (0.04) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.19 
(0.12) 
-0.09 
(0.12) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
Adj. R2 0.9594 0.8872 0.9457 0.7923 0.8082 0.9269 0.9102 
No of obs. 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 
* Dum is 1 when the price of crude oil rises, and 0 otherwise.   
* The Newey-West procedure is employed, so that the standard errors are autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust.  
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Table 2.11. Pricing behaviour when crude oil prices rise (excluding a recession period) 
 
Dependent variables: product prices 
 
Gasoline  Heating oil Diesel BC oil BA oil Naphtha Z oil 
Constant  1.42*** (0.44) 
1.44*** 
(0.12) 
0.85*** 
(0.07) 
-0.24* 
(0.14) 
0.19 
(0.28) 
-0.02 
(0.07) 
0.50*** 
(0.10) 
Dum   -0.46 (0.36) 
-0.20** 
(0.10) 
-0.08 
(0.09) 
0.36* 
(0.18) 
0.006 
(0.23) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
-0.13 
(0.09) 
Input 1.20*** (0.05) 
1.36*** 
(0.05) 
1.36*** 
(0.02) 
1.67*** 
(0.08) 
1.87*** 
(0.15) 
1.13*** 
(0.06) 
1.02*** 
(0.06) 
Dum*Input 0.03 (0.04) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
-0.0004 
(0.02) 
-0.25** 
(0.10) 
-0.09 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
Adj. R2 0.9764 0.9623 0.9871 0.9031 0.8082 0.9438 0.9187 
No of obs. 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
* Dum is 1 when the price of crude oil rises, and 0 otherwise.   
* The Newey-West procedure is employed, so that the standard errors are autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust.  
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Table 2.12. The effect of foreign acquisition in the paper industry   
 
Dependent variables: product prices 
 
Kraft paper Sanitary paper Woody paper Wood free paper  Art paper  
Constant  4.01*** (0.31) 
15.67*** 
(0.9) 
4.93*** 
(0.31) 
5.88*** 
(1.11) 
7.42*** 
(1.06) 
Dum  1.61*** (0.42) 
2.70** 
(1.26) 
2.57*** 
(0.45) 
7.06*** 
(1.33) 
5.72*** 
(1.24) 
Input  0.29*** (0.06) 
0.59*** 
(0.13) 
0.24*** 
(0.06) 
0.72*** 
(0.16) 
0.65*** 
(0.16) 
Dum*Input  -0.22*** (0.08) 
-0.39** 
(0.17) 
-0.27*** 
(0.08) 
-0.71*** 
(0.19) 
-0.63*** 
(0.19) 
Adj. R2 0.5557 0.3090 0.7740 0.7500 0.6722 
No of obs. 140 140 140 140 140 
H0: δ > 0, i.e., H0: φ < 1.13 H0: φ < 1.07 H0: φ < 0.83 H0: φ < 0.83 H0: φ < 0.83 
Test statistics: t -21.0 -9.24 -5.72 -0.84 -1.27 
Test result  δ > 0  δ > 0 δ > 0  δ > 0 δ > 0 
* The first three columns examine the effect of foreign acquisition, while the last two columns are given to compare the results 
with papers which have no foreign acquisition. Dum is 1 for the period after foreign acquisition and 0 otherwise.  
* The Newey-West procedure is employed, so that the standard errors are autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust.  
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Table 2.13. The effect of foreign acquisition in the paper industry (excluding a recession period)   
 
Dependent variables: product prices 
 
Kraft paper Sanitary paper Woody paper Wood free paper  Art paper  
Constant  3.88*** (0.14) 
1.53*** 
(0.05) 
4.78*** 
(0.28) 
5.83*** 
(1.11) 
7.38*** 
(1.06) 
Dum  1.36*** (0.24) 
0.29*** 
(0.09) 
2.73*** 
(0.39) 
7.17*** 
(1.32) 
5.74*** 
(1.25) 
Input price 0.33*** (0.03) 
0.66*** 
(0.09) 
0.25*** 
(0.05) 
0.69*** 
(0.15) 
0.60*** 
(0.15) 
Dum*Input price -0.18*** (0.04) 
-0.44*** 
(0.15) 
-0.28*** 
(0.07) 
-0.70*** 
(0.19) 
-0.58*** 
(0.19) 
Adj. R2 0.5957 0.3447 0.8759 0.8056 0.7778 
No of obs. 127 127 127 127 127 
H0: δ > 0, i.e., H0: φ < 1.13 H0: φ < 1.07 H0: φ < 0.83 H0: φ < 0.83 H0: φ < 0.83 
Test statistics: t -27 -7.16 -4.95 -0.35 -0.87 
Test result  δ > 0  δ > 0 δ > 0  δ > 0 δ > 0 
* The first three columns examine the effect of foreign acquisition, while the last two columns are given to compare the results 
with papers which have no foreign acquisition. Dum is 1 for the period after foreign acquisition and 0 otherwise.  
* The Newey-West procedure is employed, so that the standard errors are autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust.  
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Table 2.14. The effect of foreign acquisition in other industries   
 
Dependent variables: product prices 
Whiskey Carbon black  
1st 
acquisition 
2nd  
acquisition 
Lysine 
Whole sample Foreign acquisition
Constant  3.52*** (0.24) 
3.29*** 
(0.28) 
5.88*** 
(0.24) 
7.26*** 
(0.19) 
7.26*** 
(0.19) 
Dum   0.20 (0.70) 
1.55*** 
(0.36) 
-3.34*** 
(0.49) 
0.34*** 
(0.08) 
0.68 
(0.50) 
Input  0.69*** (0.23) 
1.08*** 
(0.27) 
-4.24*** 
(0.63)  
0.29 
(0.19) 
Dum*Input -0.03 (0.60) 
-1.45*** 
(0.34) 
9.29*** 
(1.87)  
-0.17 
(0.23) 
Adj. R2 0.2674 0.3706 0.5913 0.2733 0.2852 
No of obs. 116 116 140 140 140 
H0: δ > 0, i.e., H0: φ < 0.70 H0: φ < 1.428 H0: φ < 2.0 
Test statistics: t 0.61 1.15 -18 
Test result  δ > 0 δ > 0 δ > 0 
* Dum is 1 for the period after foreign acquisition and 0 otherwise.  
* The Newey-West procedure is employed, so that the standard errors are autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust.  
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Table 2.15. The effect of foreign acquisition in other industries (excluding a recession period)   
 
Dependent variables: product prices 
Whiskey Carbon black  
1st 
acquisition 
2nd  
acquisition 
Lysine 
Whole sample Foreign acquisition
Constant  4.43*** (0.24) 
2.79*** 
(0.56) 
6.36*** 
(0.66) 
7.26*** 
(0.19) 
9.11*** 
(0.21) 
Dum   0.42 (0.54) 
2.05*** 
(0.60) 
-3.49*** 
(0.08) 
0.34*** 
(0.08) 
-1.43*** 
(0.45) 
Input  -0.34 (0.22) 
1.59** 
(0.63) 
-5.90*** 
(2.22)  
-1.08*** 
(0.12) 
Dum*Input  0.06 (0.45) 
-1.96*** 
(0.65) 
9.21*** 
(3.24)  
1.29*** 
(0.18) 
Adj. R2 0.2616 0.2967 0.6701 0.2733 0.6327 
 
No of obs. 103 103 127 127 127 
H0: δ > 0, i.e., H0: φ < 0.70 H0: φ < 1.428 H0: φ < 2.0 
Test statistics: t -0.18 3.60 -18 
Test result  δ > 0  δ < 0 δ > 0 
* Dum is 1 for the period after foreign acquisition and 0 otherwise.  
* The Newey-West procedure is employed, so that the standard errors are autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust.  
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Table 2.16. The prediction on the effects of the deregulation in the LPG industry  
Dependent variables: product prices 
Butane Propane  
Deregulation 
(short sample)  
Deregulation 
(whole sample) FTC’s decision
Deregulation 
(short sample)  
Deregulation 
(whole sample) FTC’s decision
Constant  2.21*** (0.49) 
2.21*** 
(0.49) 
1.53*** 
(0.39) 
2.12*** 
(0.54) 
2.12*** 
(0.54) 
1.50*** 
(0.52) 
Dum   2.74*** (0.78) 
1.18 
(0.75) 
6.72*** 
(1.69) 
0.23 
(0.63) 
0.63 
(1.20) 
1.58 
(0.98) 
Input  1.28*** (0.17) 
1.28*** 
(0.17) 
1.57*** 
(0.08) 
1.59*** 
(0.20) 
1.59*** 
(0.20) 
1.88*** 
(0.17) 
Dum*input  -0.30 (0.21) 
0.02 
(0.20) 
-0.93*** 
(0.24) 
0.30 
(0.21) 
0.05 
(0.33) 
-0.39 
(0.27) 
Adj. R2 0.7460 0.8988 0.8926 0.7029 0.7340 0.7145 
No of obs. 114 140 140 114 140 140 
* Dum is 1 for the period after the deregulation and 0 otherwise in the first and second column for each product, while Dum is 1 for 
the period after FTC’s decision and 0 otherwise in the third column.  
 * The hypothesis that Ho: δ > 0 is rejected at a 1 % level for both cases. In other words, the results suggest a constant elasticity 
demand function for both products.   
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Table 2.17. The prediction on the effects of the deregulation in the LPG industry (excluding a recession period) 
Dependent variables: product prices 
Butane Propane  
Deregulation 
(short sample)  
Deregulation 
(whole sample) FTC’s decision
Deregulation 
(short sample)  
Deregulation 
(whole sample) FTC’s decision
Constant  1.77*** (0.47) 
1.77*** 
(0.47) 
1.00*** 
(0.24) 
1.81*** 
(0.50) 
1.81*** 
(0.50) 
1.00*** 
(0.38) 
Dum   3.18*** (0.75) 
1.61*** 
(0.74) 
7.25*** 
(1.66) 
0.54 
(0.59) 
0.94 
(1.15) 
2.08** 
(0.92) 
Input  1.33*** (0.21) 
1.33*** 
(0.21) 
1.67*** 
(0.07) 
1.58*** 
(0.23) 
1.58*** 
(0.23) 
1.98*** 
(0.16) 
Dum*input  -0.35 (0.24) 
-0.02 
(0.23) 
-1.03*** 
(0.24) 
0.30 
(0.24) 
0.06 
(0.34) 
-0.48* 
(0.27) 
Adj. R2 0.8836 0.9538 0.9460 0.8566 0.8648 0.8255 
No of obs. 101 127 127 101 127 127 
* Dum is 1 for the period after the deregulation and 0 otherwise in the first and second column for each product, while Dum is 1 for 
the period after FTC’s decision and 0 otherwise in the third column.  
 * The hypothesis that Ho: δ > 0 is rejected at a 1 % level for both cases. In other words, the results suggest a constant elasticity 
demand function for both products.   
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Chapter 3 
 
Foreign Firms and Price Competition in the 
Korean Grocery Superstore Industry 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Concerning the competitive consequences of foreign firms, the entry mode 
of FDI firms can affect their competitive impact. While greenfield FDI at least 
initially reduces market concentration, the acquisition of existing firms leaves the 
concentration unchanged. Furthermore, greenfield FDI firms as new establishments 
unfamiliar with local ways may act as a more disturbing competitive force than 
M&A FDI firms or local counterparts. Consequently, green-field FDI firms can be 
expected to produce more competitive outcomes. Recognizing the possible 
heterogeneity arising from different entry modes, the previous studies also attempted 
to control for this in their estimations, although not sufficiently. In explaining 
variations in industry margins, Co (2001) constructs two models which use either 
M&A FDI or greenfield FDI occurrences as a control variable, while Chung (2001) 
creates an industry average entry mode as an independent variable. In contrast, this 
study examines the competitive effect of each entry mode separately. In the 
preceding chapter, I studied the competitive consequences of foreign acquisition, 
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finding that foreign acquisition has no significant effect on pricing behaviour. This 
chapter explores the competitive effect of greenfield FDI firms by looking into 
pricing behaviour where only greenfield FDI took place.  
The grocery superstore industry in Korea provides an ideal opportunity to 
explore the effect of green-field FDI. First, the rapid expansion of the superstore 
sector along with a considerable degree of foreign entry produces significant 
variations in foreign presence over time even within a short spell of time. Since 1996, 
when the prohibition of foreign entry into the superstore sector was lifted, several 
global retail giants have entered, to quickly build up their chain networks. Secondly, 
by the nature of the retail industry, there exist local markets in the superstore industry, 
which allows us to observe cross-sectional variations in foreign firms’ presence. For 
the estimation, this chapter looks into the grocery superstore sector in Seoul from Jan. 
2001 to Dec. 2003, for which we can obtain store-level prices data.    
The main questions of this chapter are how different foreign firms are in 
pricing behaviour and how local and foreign firms react to each other. That is, the 
focus lies on the existence of difference or rivalry between local and foreign firms 
concerning price behaviour. If foreign firms affect pricing behaviour in the industry, 
there could be several possible manners in which this could happen. First, foreign 
firms could be more competitive in pricing policies than their domestic counterparts, 
as the traditional argument expects. As newcomers, they might not settle into the 
existing pattern of gentlemanly competition, so that they could stir up the collusive 
stability among local firms. Or they might be eager to build up their market share in a 
new market. Secondly, in response to foreign firms’ competitive pricing, domestic 
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firms may adopt more competitive pricing policies where foreign competitors have a 
presence. Given that most foreign firms are global giants which are thought to have 
competitive advantages over them, domestic firms might fear foreign competitors 
more than domestic ones. So even if foreign firms do not initiate competitive pricing 
policies, domestic firms might adopt more competitive pricing policies where foreign 
firms have a presence. Obviously, due to the strategic interdependence between 
competitors in oligopolies, a price-cut by any firm may provoke reactions from other 
competitors, leading to a situation where all the firms charge more competitive prices. 
To check this possibility, I set up an additional hypothesis that the competitive level 
in markets with foreign firms is higher than without foreign firms.1
For the estimation, I construct a reduced form of pricing equation based on a 
simple logit demand model. The logit demand follows Berry’s (1994) formulation, 
which allows for estimation without micro-level data, unlike the traditional discrete 
choice model influenced by Mcfadden (1981). For the specification of the supply 
side, I do not impose any specific assumptions on market equilibrium, unlike many 
other studies.  Instead, I attempt to measure the level of competitive intensity relative 
to Bertrand competition, following Kadiyali et. al. (2001) and Sudhir et. al. (2001). 
Their methodology is a conduct parameter approach in the context of the 
                                                 
 
1 Foreign entry through green-field investment populates industries to make markets less concentrated, 
which may, in turn, increase price competition. The ideal estimation would be to separate the 
competitive effect of addition of capacity from the competitive effect arising from the more 
competitive behaviour foreign firms might bring in. In this study, I focus on the above three processes, 
since I could not differentiate this effect from the others. Another justification for this is that there is 
no difference in this effect between domestic and foreign entry.  
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differentiated products industry, which allows us to measure the level of 
competitiveness by referring to a specific coefficient.  
Although the introduction of the simple logit demand leaves an analytical 
form of pricing equation, the logit model entails the well-known Independence from 
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property, which is equivalent to imposing a proportional 
substitution pattern across alternatives. The IIA property predicts that when a new 
entrant enters a market or a player lowers its prices, every player loses its market 
share proportionally. This implies that, in absolute terms, players with a larger 
market share lose more compared to other players with less market share. Although it 
is unrealistic in many settings, the IIA property is likely to reflect the economic 
reality in the superstore industry in Korea, where superstores are expanding at the 
expense of other formats of grocery stores, such as small grocery stores, which 
currently have a larger market share. And the existence of local markets alleviates 
the problem of unreasonable substitution patterns. By identifying local markets, we 
restrict substitution to taking place among superstores located nearby. Accounting for 
the fact that travel distance to a superstore is the most important factor in consumers’ 
choosing superstores to shop at, this restriction seems quite reasonable.  
Another issue arises from data availability. Direct sales data or store traffic 
data are not available. Instead, I construct market shares based on the parking space 
of superstores, which is found to be highly correlated with sales in the superstores. 
Although parking space is time invariant, the constructed market shares vary over 
time due to new entrants and exits. When new entry or exit takes place, I calculate 
market shares using the IIA property of the logit model. The nature of constructed 
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market shares has important implications for the estimation frameworks. The 
constructed market share does not vary unless new entry or exit happens, which 
means that the market share is determined out of the system. Therefore, similar to 
price-concentration studies, this study infers the pricing behaviour from the reactions 
of firms to varying market structure.   
The estimation strategy is similar to Parker and Roller (1997) and Sudhir et 
al. (2001). First I divide the sample into two groups of superstores and then estimate 
the level of competitiveness to make a comparison between these groups. To test the 
first hypothesis, that foreign stores are more aggressive in their pricing policies, I 
form two groups of superstores, such as foreign chains and domestic chains. Using a 
standard dummy variable technique, I then check whether there is a significant 
difference in the conduct parameter between the two groups. To examine the second 
hypothesis, I form a sub-sample using only observations of domestic superstores and 
then divide this sample into two groups, where one is a group of domestic 
superstores facing foreign competitors and the other is not. The similar dummy 
variable technique explained above is adopted to compare the conduct parameters for 
these two groups. A significant difference in the conduct parameter between these 
two groups suggests that domestic firms react more sensitively to the presence of 
foreign competitors. The same technique applies to the test of the third hypothesis. 
The only difference is to group by markets with foreign stores and those without. In 
addition, there is a possibility that factors other than the distinction between local and 
foreign firms play an important role in price competition. To check this, I estimate 
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another hypothesis that there is a significant difference in the pricing policy between 
leading and small chains.  
Unlike the previous studies, the results do not support the popular notion that 
foreign firms increase price competition. I find that the level of competitiveness 
between domestic and foreign stores is not significantly different, rejecting the first 
hypothesis. Regarding the second hypothesis, it does not seem that domestic stores 
adopt a more competitive pricing policy where they face foreign competitors. And 
there is no indication that markets with foreign stores are more competitive than 
those with only domestic stores. In short, foreign firms do not have a significant 
effect on price competition. In addition, I find that leading chains charge more 
competitive prices than small chains. Considering that the leading chains are a group 
of foreign and domestic retail giants, this finding also supports the main result that 
foreign firms have no significant effect on price competition.  
More experiments reveal the pattern that superstore chains set competitive 
prices for high-selling items, while less competitive prices for other items. Especially, 
this practice is apparent in leading chains’ pricing. And competitive intensity appears 
to increase as non-food product lines expand. Holton’s (1957) analysis provides a 
likely explanation. Superstores expand their product lines to non-food items with 
better margins in response to narrowing margins on high-selling items (or traffic 
builders). The expansion of new items, in turn, allows superstores to adopt a more 
aggressive pricing policy on traffic builders, since they can compensate for small 
margins on traffic builders with large margins on new items.  
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The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 gives a brief review of 
previous studies. Section 3 provides background information about the Korean 
grocery superstore industry. In Section 4, I construct the theoretical and empirical 
model, with some discussion of its properties. Section 5 discusses the market 
definition and data. Section 6 presents the results of the estimation, and Section 7 
concludes.  
 
3.2. Review of previous studies 
 
As outlined in the previous chapter, a small number of studies, such as Caves 
(1974), Co (2001) and Chung (2001), have examined the margin effects of FDI firms. 
However, this approach is subject to several criticisms. The price–market structure 
approach may be an alternative paradigm to examine the effect of foreign firms on 
price competition. This approach, based on a cross section of similar local markets, 
examines the relationship between prices and concentration to see how concentration 
affects prices. Finding a positive relationship between price and concentration is 
interpreted as suggesting that higher concentration causes higher prices and higher 
price-cost margins.  
There are several studies which employ the price-market structure paradigm 
in the retail industry. Lamm (1981), Cotteril (1986), and FTC vs Staples case 
(1997), 2  among many, fall within this type of study. They all find that market 
concentration has a positive effect on prices after controlling demand and cost side 
                                                 
2 See Baker (1999) and Dalkir and Frederick (1999).  
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factors, concluding that higher concentration leads to market power. Obviously, this 
approach has at least two advantages over the structure-performance paradigm. First, 
by using prices as a dependent variable, it can avoid measurement errors relating to 
the construction of profits (Marvel, 1978). Second, this approach typically looks at a 
cross-section of very closely related markets so that it can alleviate the problem of 
the inter-industry analysis stated above (Anderson, 1990).  
These studies, however, share common problems with the structure and 
performance studies. Although concentration is usually taken as exogenous in the 
price-market structure studies, concentration can be endogenous through the 
feedback from performance to structure, as Evans et al. (1993) argued. As Anderson 
(1990) pointed out, both paradigms lack a robust theoretical foundation derived from 
a model of firms’ optimising behaviour. This problem causes a failure in providing 
clear guidance for specifications and inferences: those variables which should be 
included are not made clear, only depending on an ad-hoc specification. More 
importantly, Bresnahan (1989) raised a pertinent argument, that a positive 
relationship between prices and concentration may not ensure the interpretation that 
higher concentration causes higher price-cost margins by changing conduct. Let us 
examine an example he presents. If the most cost-efficient firm in less concentrated 
markets, which plays an important role in setting market prices, is more efficient than 
the equivalent one in concentrated markets, then higher concentration may coincide 
with higher prices. This statistical relationship, however, does not necessarily imply 
more cooperative market behaviour in the concentrated markets. Otherwise, it could 
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be the result of lower costs in the less concentrated markets. Price-market structure 
studies have provided no satisfactory answer to this problem.  
A growing number of studies examine the nature of competition in 
differentiated product industries, employing a structural model where the demand 
system is combined with a pricing equation. For the specification of the demand 
system with differentiated products, many researchers rely on the discrete choice 
model, which has an advantage over the traditional supply and demand analysis that 
the parameters to be estimated are parsimonious. In particular, the methodology 
proposed by Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995) is very popular, since the method 
allows researchers to analyse the demand system when only aggregate data are 
available. While many studies, including Berry et al. (1995), focus on estimating 
unbiased demand and cost parameters under imperfect competition, assuming 
Bertrand competition, several papers show an interest in measuring market power in 
differentiated product industries. Loosely speaking, there are two types of 
approaches in identifying market power: the menu approach, and the conduct 
parameter approach. The logic of the menu approach is as follows (see Kadiyali et al. 
2001): first construct several econometric estimation models under different 
equilibrium assumptions, secondly estimate each of these models separately, and 
lastly choose one equilibrium that fits the data best, using goodness of fit tests. On 
the other hand, the conduct parameter approach attempts to identify different types of 
equilibrium through one parameter which measures market power (see Kadiyali et al. 
2001).  
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Taking the first approach, Nevo (2001) estimates market power in the ready-
to-eat cereal industry, comparing price-cost margins from different models of 
equilibrium with a crude measure of actual price-cost margin. Sudhir et al. (2001) 
and Sudhir (2001) take the latter, introducing the method of measuring competitive 
interactions relative to Bertrand competition. While Sudhir estimates time-invariant 
conduct parameters in each of several segments of the auto market, Sudhir et. al. 
focus on examining how demand and cost factors affect the level of market 
competitiveness, allowing market conduct to vary over time. On the other hand, it is 
very often the case that researchers face a situation where key variables are not 
available, such as market shares or prices. Thomadsen (2001) and Smith (2004) 
provide ways to estimate the discrete choice demand and supply without either 
market shares or prices data respectively. Thomadson specifies the demand system as 
a function of travel distances to fast food restaurants and prices, from which he 
constructs market shares using the famous logit formula. Then he employs the 
constructed market shares in the estimation in place of actual market shares. Smith 
does not obtain prices data for his sample supermarkets. Instead, he introduces chain 
dummy variables to capture variations in prices across supermarkets, taking 
advantage of the fact that supermarket operators set prices uniformly within a region.     
 
3.3 The Korean grocery superstore industry 
 
In this study, a grocery superstore is defined as a retail store with more than 
3,000 square meters of floor space, selling groceries such as food, alcoholic and non-
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alcoholic drinks, cleaning products, toiletries, household goods, etc. 3  Loosely 
speaking, there are five types of retail stores where consumers can purchase 
groceries: a convenience store, a small grocery store, a conventional market, a 
department store and a superstore.4 Among them, a superstore is a very distinctive 
format of grocery store in the sense that it provides consumers with one-stop grocery 
shopping to meet their weekly grocery needs. On average, a small grocery store and 
a convenience store are 600 square meters and 100 square meters in size respectively, 
while a superstore exceeds 13,000 square meters with over 30,000 items stocked 
(Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2002 and 2003). A department store 
focuses its business on clothing and footwear, earning only 14 per cent of its sales 
from food, while a superstore is a fully-lined-up grocery store, with grocery sales 
accounting for 70 per cent of its total sales (Korea National Statistical Office, 2003). 
Although conventional markets still play an important role in fresh food shopping, 
they cannot offer such a wide range of groceries and shopping quality as a superstore 
provides.  
The superstore was introduced by Emart for the first time in 1993. Since then, 
the superstore industry has been expanding very rapidly in terms of the number of 
outlets and turnover. As presented in Table 3.1, the number of superstores soared 
from 1 in 1993 to 222 in 2002. The total sales increased from 0.6 trillion Korean won 
                                                 
3 Although a grocery superstore is generally called a discount store in Korea, it is not like the discount 
store in the UK providing a limited range of goods at low prices, but rather equivalent to a 
supermarket in UK. Sometimes it is also called a supercenter. Here, I use the term superstore, rather 
than supermarket, to avoid confusion with a small grocery store, which is generally called a 
supermarket in Korea.  
4 A conventional market is a shopping area where a number of small retail or wholesale stores cluster 
with a lot of stalls. Typically many grocery stores in a conventional market focused on selling fresh 
food.  
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in 1995 to 17 trillion Won in 2002. Until recently, the pace of expansion has hardly 
seemed to slow down. Over the recent three years of 2000 to 2002, superstore chains 
doubled their number of outlets, with the turnover increasing at an annual rate of 
over 20%. Unsurprisingly, the rapid expansion of the superstore sector has coincided 
with the decline of other grocery formats, particularly small grocery stores and 
conventional markets. According to a survey carried out by the Korea Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry in 2002, small grocery stores and conventional markets 
suffered a 26 per cent drop in their sales when a new superstore opened nearby.   
This rapid development inevitably involves changes in market structure both 
on a national level and on a local level, providing a unique situation where we 
observe significant variations in market structure within a short spell of time as well 
as across areas. In particular, as the present top five chains started to aggressively 
expand their networks in 1996, they have emerged as market leaders quickly, with 
the market structure deteriorating. The current top five chains are Emart, Lottemart, 
Tesco, Carrefour and Walmart, where the first two are domestic and the last three 
foreign. Table 3.1 shows the trend of the number of their outlets and sales. Note that, 
except Emart, the other operators entered the industry relatively recently. Even Emart 
was not a leading operator up to 1996. The top five operators together accounted for 
more than 60 per cent of outlets in 2002. And their market share increased from 45% 
in 1999 to about 80 % in 2002, indicating a very concentrated market. In particular, 
Emart, the market leader, occupies more than 30 % of the market, selling slightly less 
than the sum of the next three leading chains’ sales. In short, the superstore industry 
is characterized as a typical oligopoly industry.  
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[ Insert Table 3.1 here ] 
 
Another interesting characteristic of the industry is that there is a sharp 
contrast in the role of foreign chains between the periods before and after 1996. This 
arises from the fact that government policy over foreign entry dramatically changed 
from total prohibition to full concession of free entry in 1996.5  Since Carrefour 
opened the first foreign store in 1996, several global retail giants, such as Tesco 
(1997), Walmart (1998) and Costco Wholesale (1998), have entered the superstore 
industry. Although Walmart and Costco Wholesale entered the market through M&A, 
most of their expansion has been made through green-field investment. As for 2002, 
they together accounted for one third of the market, while Tesco, Carrefour and 
Walmart took the positions of the second, fourth and fifth leading chain respectively. 
Over the growing presence of the foreign chains, there has been a widespread fear 
that the global retail giants will out-compete domestic chains and dominate the 
market due to their managerial superiority along with global sourcing power.  
An interesting pattern of foreign entry is that such firms appear to have a 
strong presence in several metropolitan areas, such as Seoul, while they have few 
outlets in the provinces. In this regard, Seoul is a good area in which to examine the 
impact of foreign entry, along with the fact that Seoul consists of a number of local 
markets. As Table 3.2 shows, the number of superstores in Seoul has risen sharply 
                                                 
5 Until 1996, foreign firms were allowed to open only less than 20 stores with floor space of less than 
3,000 square meters, which had the effect of virtually prohibiting foreign firms from entering the 
superstore industry.  
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since 1998, tripling from 14 in 1998 to 45 in 2003. As for 2003, although superstores 
in Seoul took one sixth of the total outlet number, they accounted for about one 
fourth of the total superstore sales (Korea National Statistical Office, 2004). Out of 
18 new outlets opened from 2001 to 2003, 16 outlets were opened by the big four 
operators, which made them dominant players in Seoul. All of the foreign chains 
have their presence in Seoul. As for 2003, there were 14 foreign outlets in Seoul, 
taking about one third of the total number. Carrefour is a dominant chain (7 outlets) 
among foreign ones, followed by Tesco (3 outlets), Costco Wholesale (3 outlets) and 
Walmart (1 outlet).  
 
[ Insert Table 3.2 here ] 
 
Table 3.3 presents various statistics relating to superstores. The first row 
represents the gross margin. The upward trend of the gross margin may reflect the 
increasing bargaining power of superstores due to their expansion. The operating 
profit fell sharply in 2002. The average size of superstores exceeds 13,000 square 
meters, slightly less than that of department stores but a great deal larger than other 
grocery stores. The number of items stocked in superstores is in a constantly upward 
trend.    
 
[ Insert Table 3.3 here]  
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3.4 The model 
 
To measure the level of market competitiveness, I construct a reduced form 
of pricing equation based on a simple logit demand. The logit demand follows 
Berry’s (1994) formulation, where an unobserved product characteristic enters the 
mean utility, serving as an error term in the demand regression equation. Unlike the 
traditional discrete choice model influenced by Mcfadden (1981), Berry’s 
methodology allows for the estimation using only macro data, such as brand (or 
firm)-level data. For the specification of the supply side, I do not impose any specific 
assumption on market equilibrium. Instead, following Kadiyali et al. (2001) and 
Sudhir et al. (2001), I attempt to measure the level of competition intensity relative to 
Bertrand competition.  
 
3.4.1 The theoretical model 
 
Suppose that we observe r = 1, …… , R markets, each with j= 1, …., Jr 
superstores. Each superstore is assumed to be a differentiated product for one-stop 
grocery shopping. From the perspective of consumers doing grocery shopping, a 
superstore can be viewed as a product possessing a bundle of distinctive 
characteristics, as Smith (2004) and the UK Competition Commission (2000) assume. 
The model allows consumers to purchase their groceries from other formats of 
grocery stores, in other words, the existence of the outside good j=0. In addition, we 
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can introduce another dimension of time, which defines a market as a combination of 
market and time, expanding the number of markets observed. Yet, here, for notation 
convenience, I do not consider the time dimension.    
 
3.4.1.1 The demand side 
 
Suppose there are, in each market, i = 1, …., Ir consumers, each of whom 
chooses a store from a choice set with J + 1 alternatives (j= 0, 1, 2,…., Jr) and 
undertakes to buy a basket of weekly grocery shopping in a shopping period. 6  
Consumers choose the alternative from which they can derive the highest utility. If 
the utility of superstores is less than that of the outside good, then consumers choose 
the outside good. The indirect utility of consumer i from choosing superstore j in 
market r is assumed to be a function of observed and unobserved superstore 
characteristics, price, consumer characteristics and unknown parameters. For a linear 
specification, the utility is given by 
(3.1) 
1, ......, , 1, .... , 1, ......,
ijr jr jr jr ijr
ri I j J r
u x p
R
β α ξ ε                             
=       =        =
= − + +  
                                                
  
where xjr is a k-dimensional vector of observed superstore characteristics, β is a k-
dimensional vector of taste parameters which are assumed to be invariant across 
 
6. Doubt could be raised about this assumption which is typical in the discrete choice model. In many 
cases, such as the purchase of a car or cereal, this might not hold true. People could buy more than one 
box of cereal or possess more than one car. Similar arguments can be applied to the grocery shopping 
in the superstore sector. The size and items of a basket vary across households since they are different 
in their size or income level. However, it is not so restrictive to assume that each person consumes a 
similar amount of groceries in a shopping period. Even if this assumption is not acceptable, I could 
say that this model is viewed as an approximation, as Nevo (2001) argues.  
 
 89
consumers, pjr is the price of superstore j in market r, α is the price response 
parameter to represent the level of dis-utility of the price consumers pay, ξ is the 
unobserved superstore characteristic, and ε is a random utility with a zero mean and 
unit variance, representing idiosyncratic consumers’ preferences for superstores.  
The mean utility plays an important role in the estimation procedure 
proposed by Berry (1994). Taking expectations on both sides of (3.1), the mean 
utility, denoted by δjr, of superstore j in market r is given as 
(3.2) jr jr jr jrx apδ β ξ                                      ≡ − +   
The existence of the outside good requires the specification of the utility 
from choosing not to purchase from superstores. In this context, the outside good can 
be viewed as shopping from other formats of stores, such as small grocery stores. 
Without the outside good, the homogenous increase in prices of all superstores does 
not lead to the decrease of quantities sold in the superstore sector. The utility of the 
outside good is given by 
(3.3) 0 0i r i ru ε=                            
It should be noted that the price and characteristics of the outside good are 
set to be zero, that is, p0r = 0, ξ0r =0, and x0r = 0. This is equivalent to normalizing the 
utility relative to the outside good, the mean utility of which is normalised to zero. In 
the consumer choice, the absolute level of utility does not matter, but the difference 
in utility matters.7 So it does not alter consumers’ choices to normalize the level of 
                                                 
7 As said earlier, a consumer chooses the alternative from which he derives the highest utility. That is, 
the choice rule is that , which depends on the relative difference in utility, not on 
the absolute level.  
0,j ku u j k− > ∀ ≠
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utility relative to one of the alternatives, as long as the relative differences in utility 
are maintained. And it is a common practice to measure utility relative to the outside 
good and to normalize that of the outside good to zero.8  
Now suppose that the random variable in (3.1) follows the distribution of 
i.i.d. Type I extreme value across products and consumers. Then, the well-known 
logit formula gives the market share of superstore j in market r as follows:  
(3.4) 
0
exp( )
exp( )
jr
jr J
kr
k
s δ δ=
=  ∑   
With the mean utility of the outside good normalised to zero, the difference 
between logs of the market shares of product j and the outside good gives   
(3.5) 0ln( ) ln( )jr r jr jr jr jrs s x pδ β α ξ                        − = ≡ − +  
where sjr and s0r are observed market shares. Now we can treat (3.5) as an estimation 
equation. The mean utility can be easily calculated from the observed market shares. 
The unobserved product characteristic can be viewed as an error term. It should be 
noted that the price is endogenous in (3.5), in that the price is affected by the error 
term. Therefore, the instrumental variable regression is needed to obtain a consistent 
estimator for the coefficients of interest. Note that equation (3.5) requires only store 
level data, which implies that we can estimate the demand parameters without micro 
level data.  
 
3.4.1.2 The supply side  
                                                 
8 It is obviously an option to normalize to some value other than zero. However, there is no point in 
doing this, since normalizing to zero is easier with the same effect. (Train, 2003)  
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While many studies simply assume Bertrand competition, I allow the 
conduct parameter as a free parameter measured relative to the Bertrand competition, 
following Kadiyali et al. (2001), and Sudhir et al. (2001).  Prices are assumed to be a 
strategic variable since, where products are viewed as differentiated ones, price 
competition is a more appealing assumption than quantity competition (Kadiyali et 
al., 2001). Each superstore is assumed to maximize their profits. The profit function 
of superstore j in market r is given by  
(3.6) 
( )
( )
f
jr jr jr jr jr
f
jr jr r jr jr
p mc Q C
p mc M s C
∏ = − −
       = − −                    
where sj is the market share of superstore j, mcjr is the marginal cost of superstore j, 
Mr is the size of market r, and Cf is the fixed cost.  
Suppose that superstores compete with each other under the Bertrand 
competition. Then the first order condition is given by  
(3.7) 1
( / )
jr jr jr
jr jr
p mc s
s p
= −  ∗∂ ∂         
Under the assumption of the logit model set out above, the term, (∂sjr/∂pjr), in 
(3.7) is given as  
(3.8) 1
(1 )
jr jr jr
jr jr jr jr jr
s s
p p s s
δ αδ
∂ ∂ ∂= = −∂ ∂ ∂ −        
where α is the price response parameter in the demand system.  
Substituting (3.8) into (3.7), the first order condition reduces to  
(3.9) 1
(1 )
jr jr
jr
p mc
sα= + −            
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Note that the second term on the right hand side is the Bertrand margin. If 
superstores set prices more cooperatively (or competitively), the margin will be 
larger (or smaller) than this. By introducing a multiplier Φ on the Bertrand margin, 
therefore, we could measure how large the margin is relative to the Bertrand 
competition: in other words, how competitive a market is.  
With the introduction of a multiplier on the Bertrand margin, the pricing 
equation is given as   
(3.10) 
(1 )
jr jr
j
p mc
sα
Φ= +                −  
The interpretation of Φ is as follows: Φ =1 is indicative of the Bertrand 
competition. If we benchmark the level of competition against the Bertrand one, 0 < 
Φ < 1 is more competitive and 1 < Φ is more co-operative. Note that there is no 
upper bound unlike in the case of homogeneous products.9 However, there can exist 
a lower bound. When Φ = 0, price-cost margins become zero, which means perfect 
competition. This lower bound provides an interesting implication in interpreting an 
estimate of the parameter Φ. When we have an insignificant estimate of Φ, it should 
not be viewed as a mis-specification of the model, but as an indication of perfect 
competition.    
 
                                                 
 
9 In the case of homogenous products, the pricing equation with a conduct parameter is given by 
(1 )i i
P
P mc q
Q
θ∂= − +
∂
 
where θ indicates a conduct parameter. θ being minus one means perfect competition, θ equal to zero 
is indicative of Cournot competition, and θ equal to (n-1) is perfect collusion. Hence the conduct 
parameter in the case of homogenous products has a lower and upper bound.  (See Bresnahan, 1989) 
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3.4.2 The empirical model 
 
The joint estimation of the pricing equation and demand equation produces 
estimates of the conduct parameter as well as the demand and cost parameters. 
However, due to the nature of the predetermined market shares data, explained later, 
this study mainly estimates a reduced form pricing equation. To estimate the pricing 
equation, we need to specify the marginal cost function. Assuming a constant 
marginal cost, I specify the marginal cost as a function of several observed and 
unobserved factors:  
(3.11) 1 2 3'jrt jr jrt jrt jrtmc wholesale time chainsizeγ β β β= + + + +    υ
                                                
  
where wholesale is prices paid by superstores to buy products from manufacturers. 
Time stands for a vector of two time dummy variables, chainsize represents the size 
of a chain, γ is a vector of store specific dummies and υ is an error term.  
The inclusion of wholesale and two time dummies reflects the cost structure 
in the superstore industry, which consists of three major factors: wholesale prices, 
and wage and distribution costs. Obviously, wholesale prices are a huge factor in the 
marginal cost in the retail industry in general. According to the UK Competition 
Commission (2000), the cost of buying goods covers more than 70 percent of the 
total revenue in superstores. The coefficient β1 is expected to have a positive sign.10 
And the labour and distribution cost are the next most important cost factors. I could 
 
10 It may be argued that wholesale prices might be endogenous. In the model, the observation unit is 
not a chain but a store. And sales in a superstore are marginal compared to the total sales of 
superstores or all grocery stores. Note that a store is just one out of more than 200 stores. Although a 
large chain obviously has bargaining power against manufacturers, a single store is less likely to affect 
wholesale prices.  
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not obtain wage rate and distribution cost data by stores on a monthly basis. Since 
wage contracts are settled once a year and the distribution cost hardly varies on a 
monthly basis, however, it is not unreasonable to assume that these cost factors do 
not vary very much over a year. Since the sample period covers three years 2001 to 
2003, two time dummies are introduced. Time 1 is assigned 1 for 2002 and 0 
otherwise, and Time 2 is assigned 1 for 2003 and 0 otherwise. It should be noted that 
the time dummies capture all the cost factors as well as margin factors which vary 
over time, which could have a negative or positive effect on prices. So, the sign of 
the parameter β2 is ambiguous. Chainsize serves as a proxy for chain level economies 
of scale, measured by the number of stores within a chain. The rapid expansion of 
chain networks may allow large chains to enjoy chain-level economies of scale 
through bargaining power. The coefficient β3 is expected to have a negative sign 
when chain level economies of scale exist. The store-specific dummy variables are 
introduced to control for unobserved store-specific cost factors. Store-level 
economies of scale, if any, could be captured by these store-specific dummies.  
With the addition of the marginal cost function, the pricing equation is 
completed as 
(3.12) 1 2 3 1 1'
(1 )
jrt jr jrt jrt jrt
jrt
p wholesale time chainsize
a s
γ β β β υ         = + + + + Φ  +−  
where Ф is the conduct parameter of interest. Note that the conduct parameter in the 
equation above measures the overall level of market competitiveness. With the 
estimation of the reduced form pricing equation, we could not separate the market 
conduct Φ from the price response parameter α. However, given the assumption that 
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the price response parameter is constant across markets and over time, the 
introduction of a dummy variable in a multiplicative form enables us to identify 
differences in market conduct between groups.11  
In the first place, I define two groups, domestic and foreign chains, to 
examine the hypothesis that foreign chains are more aggressive in their pricing 
policies. To compare the level of competitive intensity between the two groups, I 
introduce a dummy variable and specify the model as     
(3.13) 1 2 3 1 21 1 1'
(1 ) (1 )
jrt jr jrt jrt jrt
jrt jrt
Fordump wholesale time chainsize
a s a s
γ β β β υ= + + + +Φ  + Φ +       − −  
where Fordum is the dummy variable, assigned a value of 1 for foreign chains and 0 
otherwise. Ф1 measures the market conduct of domestic chains. A significant 
estimate of Ф2 implies different market conduct between the two groups, leaving an 
estimate of (Ф1 +Ф2) for foreign chains. A negative sign of Ф2 means that foreign 
chains have more competitive market conduct than domestic ones.  
The same technique can be applied in examining the hypothesis that foreign 
chains place fiercer competitive pressure on domestic ones. The difference is to use a 
sub-sample consisting of only domestic stores and to redefine a dummy variable. The 
estimation equation is given as    
(3.14) 1 2 3 1 21 1 1 1'
(1 ) (1 )
jrt jr jrt jrt jrt
jrt jrt
Dump wholesale time chainsize
a s a s
γ β β β υ= + + + +Φ  + Φ +   − −  
                                                
   
 
 
11 The assumption of the price response parameter being constant across markets, may be restrictive, 
even though we are looking at a city. The response to prices could be different according to region or 
income level. On the grounds of this, one might raise a doubt about the result. To test the possibility, I 
do a simple robust test as explained later. 
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where Dum1 is the dummy variable, assigned a value of 1 for a market where 
domestic firms face foreign competitors and 0 otherwise. Ф1 measures the market 
conduct of domestic chains without foreign pressure. (Ф1+Ф2) represents the 
competitive intensity of domestic chains facing foreign pressure. A negative sign of 
Ф2 means that foreign chains force domestic chains to act more competitively.   
I set up another model to test the third hypothesis, that markets with foreign 
chains are more competitive than those without foreign chains. The equation is given 
by  
(3.15) 1 2 3 1 21 1 1 1'
(1 ) (1 )
jrt jr jrt jrt jrt
jrt jrt
Marp wholesale time chainsize
a s a s
γ β β β= + + + +Φ  + Φ +− − υ  
where Mar1 is a dummy variable, assigned a value of 1 for a market where foreign 
firms have their presence and 0 otherwise. Ф1 measures the market conduct of 
markets with only domestic chains. (Ф1+Ф2) represents the competitive intensity of 
markets with foreign presence. A negative sign of Ф2 means that the competitive 
level of market with foreign chains is higher. Note that (3.15) is identical with (3.14) 
except that (3.15) employs a sub-sample consisting of domestic chains, while (3.14) 
uses the whole sample.  
Lastly, I attempt to look into whether there is a difference between leading 
chains and others in their pricing behavior. The same methodology applies with a 
different dummy variable as below: 
(3.16) 1 2 3 1 21 1 1'
(1 ) (1 )
jrt jr jrt jrt jrt
jrt jrt
Leadingp wholesale time chainsize
a s a s
γ β β β= + + + +Φ  + Φ +− − υ  
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where Leading is a dummy variable, assigned a value of 1 for the big four chains and 
0 otherwise.12 The interpretation is the same as the above. A negative sign of Ф2 
means that the leading chains are more competitive.  
            The conduct parameter above measures time-invariant overall competitive 
intensity. If time-variant factors have an effect on competitive intensity, the time 
invariant conduct parameter incorrectly estimates the true level of competitiveness. 
An examination of price data reveals a downward trend in prices over the sample 
period, suggesting there might be a increasing trend in competitive intensity. A likely 
explanation for the trend is as follows. The items in the sample fall within the 
categories of traffic builders which superstores sell at very low prices or prices that 
do not cover direct costs in order to attract customers. As Holton (1957) points out, it 
is an optimal strategy that superstores expand their product lines to non-food items 
with better margins to compensate for narrow margins on traffic builders. And the 
expansion of non-food items allows superstores to adopt more competitive prices on 
traffic builders. A couple of statistics can show the expansion of non-food product 
lines in the superstore industry. The proportion of food and beverages in total sales is 
in a steady decline with the growing importance of non-food items: 52.7 % in 2000, 
down to 48.8 % in 2002. And the number of products stocked in a superstore is 
increasing, from about 22,000 items in 2000 to 31,000 items in 2002.  
Unfortunately, I could not observe the relative importance of non-food items. 
Instead, assuming the importance of non-food items is increasing over time, I 
                                                 
 
12 Leading chains include Emart, Lottemart, Tesco and Carrefour. I dropped Walmart from the leading 
group in that it has only a single store in Seoul, even though it is a leading chain nationwide 
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introduce a trend variable and create an interaction variable of the trend variable and 
market share. To check the effect of the expansion of non-food items on pricing 
policies, I add the interaction variable into model (3.12) through (3.16). Adding the 
variable in equation (3.12) gives    
(3.17) 1 21 2 3 1'
(1 ) (1 )
jrt jr jrt jrt jrt
jrt jrt
Trendp wholesale time chainsize
a s a s
γ β β β υ     Φ Φ= + + + +  + +− −  
where Trend is a quarterly trend variable.  
In passing, it should be noted that sj is an endogenous variable, in that it is 
correlated with νjr. Therefore the instrumental variable estimation method is needed. 
The key issue in this model has been to find appropriate instruments for this 
endogenous variable. Berry (1994) suggested other firms’ characteristics as cost-side 
instruments, while Nevo (2001) employed the prices of the same products in other 
markets. However, due to the nature of predetermined market shares data, which will 
be explained later, this study will employ the traditional OLS procedure.  
 
3.4.3 The properties of the logit model 
 
The demand specification above assumes that the utility function is 
additively separated into two parts: the mean utility (denoted as δ) determined only 
by product characteristics, and the error term (denoted as ε), which is identically and 
independently distributed across consumers and products with the extreme value 
function exp(-exp(-ε)). This specification leads to the well-known Independence 
from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property.  
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With the logit specification, the ratio of market shares for any two alternative 
j and k is given 
(3.18) 
exp / exp
exp( )
exp / exp
j ij i j k
k k i
i
s
s
δ δ δ δδ δ= = −
∑
∑  
 where )exp( j kδ δ−  is the odds ratio. Note that the ratio does not depend on any 
alternatives other than j and k. In other words, no other alternatives or their 
characteristics enter the odds ratio. This implies that irrelevant alternatives cannot 
affect the relative odds of choosing j over k.  
This IIA property is equivalent to imposing proportional substitution across 
alternatives (Train, 2003). Suppose another (irrelevant) alternative, say r, lowers its 
prices. Obviously, alternative r gains market share at the expense of other 
alternatives, including j and k. The IIA property requires the odds ratio to be constant 
before and after the change:  
(3.19) 
0 1
0 1
j j
k k
s s
s s
=  
where superscript 0 denotes market shares before the change, and 1 after the change. 
For the ratio to be constant, each market share changes by the same proportion.  
The proportional substitution is manifested in terms of cross price elasticities. 
Using the well-known logit formula, the cross price elasticity is given by  
(3.20) jr ir ir irc ro ss
ir jr
s p s p
p s
α∂Ε = − =∂  
where α is the price response parameter, p is the price and s is market share. Note 
that j does not enter the formula. Therefore, the cross elasticities of sj with respect to 
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pi are identical across all alternatives j ≠ i. This means that all alternatives change by 
the same percentage. (Note that the cross price elasticity, by definition, is a 
percentage change in market share sj induced by a percentage change in price pi). 
However, in absolute terms, alternatives with larger market shares will change more 
than ones with smaller market shares.13 The same issue arises when a new alternative 
is introduced into the market. The proportional substitution means that, due to a new 
entrant, incumbent alternatives lose their market shares by the same percentage. 
Again, alternatives with a larger market share are expected to suffer more.14  
This IIA property is clearly unrealistic in many settings. Consider an 
example given by Berry et al. (1995). They suppose an automobile market with three 
brands of Mercedes, BMW and Yugo (an inexpensive car), where Mercedes and 
Yugo have the same market share. Then the IIA property predicts that an increase in 
the price of BMW brings the same increase in the demand for Mercedes and Yugo. 
This result is not compatible with the economic reality, where demand for Mercedes 
increases much more than demand for Yugo since Mercedes is closer to BMW in the 
product space. A similar contradiction happens when a new product (eg. Seat as 
                                                 
13 Let us consider a simple example. Suppose there are three alternatives in a market: j, k and i. And 
suppose they currently account for 50, 30 and 20 per cent of the market respectively. Then suppose 
alternative i lowers its prices to gain an 8 % point increase in its market share. This means that 
alternatives j and k together lose 8 per cent of the market. By proportional substitution, then, 
alternatives j and k should lose their market shares by the same percentage, i.e., 10 per cent each. 
Therefore, the market share of alternative j drops from 50 per cent to 45 per cent, while that of 
alternative k decreases from 30 per cent to 27 per cent. Note that, in absolute terms, alternative j with 
a larger market share suffers from a heavier loss than alternative k with a smaller market share. 
 
14 Suppose there are two incumbent alternatives in a market, j and k, currently accounting for 70 and 
30 per cent of the market respectively. Then suppose alternative i enters the market, to capture 20 per 
cent of the market. By proportional substitution, then, alternative j and k should lose their market 
shares proportionally, by 20 per cent each. Therefore, the market share of alternative j drops from 70 
per cent to 54 per cent, while that of alternative k decreases from 30 per cent to 24 per cent. Note 
again that, in absolute terms, alternative j undergoes a heavier loss.  
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another inexpensive car) enters the market. But this property predicts an equal effect 
on Mercedes and Yugo, while we expect a greater effect on Yugos than on the more 
expensive Mercedes. With the existence of the outside good, which is normally set to 
have the largest market share among alternatives, the problem becomes worse. The 
IIA property means that the introduction of a new alternative, eg. Seat, draws more 
customers from those who do not purchase cars (the outside good) than from current 
customers for other cars. However, the reality is that Seats are likely to steal current 
customers purchasing similar models without generating new customers for cars.    
However, the IIA property is likely to a large extent to reflect the economic 
reality in the superstore industry in Korea. First, when a new superstore enters a 
market, the substitution pattern matches that of the IIA property explained above. As 
mentioned earlier, the superstore industry has been expanding very rapidly along 
with a number of new entrants, while other formats of grocery stores, i.e. the outside 
alternatives, are still dominant, accounting for the largest market share in grocery 
shopping. When a new superstore opens nearby, it is the case that a large number of 
customers switch their place of grocery shopping from the outside alternatives to the 
superstore. A survey conducted by the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 
2002 strongly evidences this tendency. It states that small grocery stores and 
conventional markets suffer from a 26 per cent drop in their sales when a new 
superstore opens nearby.15 In short, a new superstore attracts a lot of new customers 
from the outside good with the largest market share, which fits into the IIA property.  
                                                 
15 Fearing heavy losses in their sales, small grocery stores associations often organize campaigns or 
try to influence decisions of local governments against new superstores.   
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One might raise doubts over the use of the IIA property, on the grounds that 
when a new superstore enters or a superstore lowers its prices, the IIA property 
predicts greater effects on superstores with larger market shares, while it is 
reasonable to expect greater effects on superstores with similar characteristics. The 
most important characteristic of superstores in consumer choice is the location. 
According to a consumer survey conducted by AC Nielson Korea, consumers 
consider distances to superstores (40%) as the most important factor in choosing 
superstores to shop at, with prices (22%) recognized as the next important factor.16 
This is consistent with the conventional notion that grocery shopping falls within 
local markets. Based on the catchment area approach (explained later), this study 
identifies local markets in Seoul. By identifying local markets, we restrict 
substitution to happening among superstores within a local market. In this respect, 
this is similar to the idea of the nested logit model to deal with the restrictive 
substitution pattern of the logit model. With the fact that most superstores typically 
cluster together in the centre of local areas, I could go further, to argue that 
differences in distances to superstores greatly decrease within a local market.17 To 
the extent that this argument, as well as greater effects on superstores with larger 
market shares, is not correct, the logit model is viewed as an approximation.       
 
3.5 Market Definition and Data 
                                                 
 
16 See the Korea Business Newspaper (September 23, 2003).  
 
17 It is often said that there is less variations in quality or their formats among superstores in trade 
publications.  
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3.5.1 Product and geographical market definition 
 
To evaluate the level of market competitiveness, we should first define 
relevant markets where market competition takes place, which, in turn, acts as a base 
for the calculation of market shares and other independent variables varying by 
markets. The US merger guidelines provide a useful paradigm for concepts in 
defining a relevant market. It is called a “hypothetical monopolist method”, where 
the economic market is defined as the minimum number of products (a relevant 
product market) and the smallest geographical area (a relevant geographical market) 
in which a hypothetical profit-maximizing monopolist could impose a small but 
significant and non-transitory increase in price (hereafter SSNIP).  
First consider a relevant product market in this context. The hypothetical 
monopoly test asks whether, in a defined group of products, a hypothetical 
monopolist could profitably impose a SSNIP. Since it is not easy to apply this test 
directly in practice, it is a conventional approach to look at the nature of demand as 
well as practices of suppliers. With the help of some evidence from these, I define 
grocery shopping in the superstore sector as the relevant product market, where a 
superstore is defined as a grocery store with more than 3,000 square meters of floor 
space. In the first place, the superstore sector provides consumers with a very 
distinctive shopping service: the purchase of a bundle of groceries in one visit, i.e. 
one-stop grocery shopping. Obviously, other formats of grocery stores, such as small 
grocery stores, convenience stores and conventional markets, could be alternatives 
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for grocery shopping. The first two types of grocery stores, however, cannot provide 
consumers with such one-stop shopping since they are too small. Huge differences in 
size strongly support this argument. In 2001, floor space of mid-sized grocery stores 
and convenience stores in Seoul was, on average, less than 600 m2 and 100 m2 
respectively, while the average size of superstores exceeded 13,000 m2. Although 
conventional markets are still important grocery shopping places, they cannot offer 
such a wide range of groceries and shopping quality as superstores do.  
In addition, price monitoring programs run by superstores are other evidence 
for the argument that the superstore sector alone constitutes a relevant product 
market. To be price competitive compared to other superstores, they undertake 
monitoring of other superstores’ prices. Along with this, they run programmes, 
where costumers can claim twice (or several) times the price they have paid if they 
should find cheaper products in other superstores. These practices suggest that 
superstores consider other superstores as direct competitors rather than other grocery 
stores. Based on similar reasoning and evidence, other studies (Cotterill, 1986, Smith, 
2004, UK Competition Commission, 2000) define grocery shopping in the superstore 
sector as a product market. Cotterill’s result shows that defining product markets 
broadly reduces the ability of the entire model in explaining pricing behaviour.   
Now consider the definition of geographical markets. The hypothetical 
monopoly test asks whether, in a defined area, a hypothetical monopolist could 
profitably impose a SSNIP. In an economic sense, a geographical market should be 
defined from the viewpoint of consumers. If, given a defined geographical market, 
consumers could switch their grocery shopping to superstores in other areas in 
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response to a SSNIP, the defined geographical market should be enlarged and tested 
again until this switch does not happen. However, it is difficult to define a 
geographical market depending on the SSNIP test from the perspective of consumers, 
since it requires very rich data relating to consumers, which economists do not enjoy 
in most cases. Therefore, in practice, many researchers and antitrust authorities resort 
to a simpler method in delineating geographical markets: to take the catchment area 
approach or simply to employ existing statistical areas. Loosely speaking, UK 
Competition Commission (2000), Cotterill (1986), and FTC v. Staples case (1997) 
adopt the concept of a catchment area, while Lamm (1981) employs existing 
statistical areas. Typically, a catchment area is defined as an area falling within a 
certain distance (eg. a 3 km, or 15 minute drive) around a store, based on the 
consumers’ shopping pattern, that they do not travel far away to shop for groceries. 
Without the two factors considered below, a catchment area could constitute a 
distinctive geographical market.  
Two factors could make geographical definition of markets more 
complicated. First, pricing policies of superstores are an important factor in defining 
geographical markets. If superstores set prices uniformly across a nation or region, 
the economic market cannot be the local one as the catchment area approach assumes. 
Smith (2001) defines larger geographical markets than local catchment areas, taking 
account of the fact that supermarket chains do not set prices store by store but mostly 
on a regional basis. Secondly, as the UK Competition Commission (2000) points out, 
overlapping catchments could cause problems in defining the geographical market 
using the catchment area approach. If several catchment areas overlap, an SSNIP 
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causes a significant loss of demand, resulting in an unprofitable outcome. This means 
that the geographical market should be defined as a larger one. On the other hand, if 
overlapping is not significant, the loss of demand could be so small for a hypothetical 
monopolist to maintain the increased price. In this case, the catchment area can still 
constitute the economic market.  
Basically, this study follows the catchment area approach. I define a 
catchment area as an area falling within 3 km around a store. According to the Korea 
Chain Store Association, superstores consider a 3 Km catchment area as their key 
market, since the majority of their customers come from within this area. In making a 
decision about entering a market, they tend to look at the 3 km catchment area 
closely. In this study, the pricing pattern of superstores does not make things 
complicated. For high-selling (or frequently purchased) items, at least, superstore 
operators in Seoul allow their stores to set prices on a store basis in order for each 
store to respond quickly to local demand and competitive circumstances. 
Examination of the data set shows that there are significant variations in prices across 
stores within a chain. However, the existence of overlapping catchment areas causes 
a problem. To address this, I define larger markets where catchment areas are 
overlapping. Based on this procedure, I identify 12 non-overlapping local markets. 
However, the geographical market definition is, by nature, arbitrary to some extent. 
To check the robustness of the geographical market definition, I try other 
geographical market delineations and re-estimate the models.  
 
3.5.2 Data   
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This study looks into the grocery superstore sector in Seoul from Jan 2001 to 
Dec 2003. Based on the procedure explained in the previous section, I identify 12 
non-overlapping local markets across Seoul. The sample covers two-thirds of 
superstores in Seoul. As of 2003, out of 45 superstores in Seoul, 30 superstores are 
included. Out of 30 superstores in the sample, 23 superstores belong to domestic 
chains while 7 superstores belong to foreign ones. On the other hand, 12 superstores 
are outlets of top 4 chains, while 18 superstores belong to smaller chains. The study 
uses monthly data. Table 3.4 summarizes the structure of the database.  
 
[ Insert Table 3.4 here ] 
 
For the estimation, we need data for following variables: prices and market 
shares, store and chain characteristics, wholesale prices and some dummy variables. 
These data are obtained from several sources. The data on prices are collected from 
the price levels in Seoul produced by the Seoul Metropolitan City (hereafter SMC). 
The data on store and chain characteristics are gathered from the Yearbook of the 
Distribution Industry (various editions) published by the Korean Chain Store 
Association (hereafter KCSA). Wholesale prices are collected from the Bank of 
Korea’s wholesale prices index. 
The price data needs more explanation, since they mainly determine the 
structure of the whole data set. SMC monitors the prices of 30 high-selling (or 
frequently purchased) groceries from 8 retail stores by every district on a monthly 
 108
basis, in order to check the cost of living across Seoul. The retail stores monitored 
include small grocery stores, convenience stores and department stores as well as 
superstores. SMC have changed the stores monitored from time to time, usually 
replacing small grocery stores with superstores to reflect the increasing importance 
of superstores in grocery shopping. Sometimes they drop superstores from the stores 
surveyed. Consequently, superstores have a different number of observations over 
time. That is, this characteristic of the price data constitutes an unbalanced panel for 
the whole data set.  
Prices are defined as weighted average prices of several grocery items. Out 
of 30 items surveyed, 6 items18 are chosen such that it is possible to compare the 
price levels across superstores and over time: instant noodles, packed milk, chocolate 
pies, tuna, flour and sugar. To aggregate the prices of these items, I use weights 
assigned to these items in the production of the Consumer Prices Index. Obviously, it 
is ideal to use shares of these goods in sales of superstores, which is not available in 
this study. However, the weights above might be reasonable proxies since they are 
constructed based on the importance of these goods in the household grocery 
expenditure. This is why SMC chooses these items to monitor the price levels in 
Seoul. The aggregated prices are deflated using the general consumer prices, and 
then indexed relative to the mean assigned a value of 100. 
                                                 
 
18 Out of 30 goods, I discard fresh food because it may be considerably variable in quality. Also, I 
have to exclude some products, regarding which it is not possible to compare prices due to 
discontinuity over time or across superstores. SMC sometimes changes the grocery items monitored 
over time or across districts.   
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Although they do not represent the general price level in a superstore, the 
aggregated prices can at least indicate the price level of high-selling items perceived 
by consumers. As said earlier, the study views as a product one-stop shopping in the 
superstore. By the nature of one-stop shopping, consumers are likely to be interested 
in the general price level of a basket of grocery shopping rather than the individual 
prices of each item. Of course, the aggregated price above is not an ideal proxy to 
represent the general level of prices in a superstore because items chosen are a small 
number of goods. These items, however, typically fall within the group of high-
selling (or frequently purchased) items in the superstore, with their prices well 
exposed to consumers. Also, remember that they are representative grocery items in 
the household grocery expenditure. 30 items surveyed by SMC cover all the top 10 
selling items in superstores, while 3 out of 6 items in the sample belong to the top 10 
selling items. 19  In addition, they are the most popular national brands in each 
category. For these items usually called traffic builders, superstores employ 
distinctive pricing policies to attract customers by setting very low prices that do not 
cover direct costs in some cases (Competition Commission, 2000). As Holton (1957) 
argues, small or negative margins from traffic builders can be compensated for by 
large margins from other items, if there is strong complementarity between traffic 
builders and other items.  
Direct sales data for these items or store traffic data are not obtained. Instead, 
market shares are calculated based on the parking space of superstores. By the nature 
                                                 
19 According to Emart, the following items have been the top 10 selling goods in their stores for the 
last 10 years: nappies, beer, soju (an alcoholic beverage), instant noodles, milk, coke, chocolate pies, 
prawn-flavoured snacks, powdered milk, and detergents.  
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of one-stop shopping, consumers purchase a bundle of various groceries in one visit 
to a superstore, which typically involves the use of their cars. A consumer survey by 
AC Neilson Korea evidences this pattern: a car (63%) is a dominant mode of 
transportation to a superstore, followed by walking (25%) and public transportation 
(8%).20 Accordingly we can expect sales in the superstore to be closely related to the 
availability of parking space. To check this out, I estimate the correlation between 
parking space and sales, using a data set of KSCA where store-level annual sales are 
available. As expected, the correlation ratio (0.70) is considerably high, which 
provides grounds to construct market shares based on parking space.   
Calculating market shares involves a market share for the outside good. 
Usually, it is not easy to observe the market share of the outside good directly. 
Following Nevo’s (2000) suggestion, therefore, I define the total size of a market and 
then subtract that of the inside goods from the total size of the market. I assume the 
total size of a market as the product of the number of households in a market and the 
average grocery expenditure per household, where the average grocery expenditure 
per household is obtained from the Korean National Statistics Office, household 
expenditure in cities. Then, in order to convert the total expenditure into the total size 
in terms of parking space, the total size is divided by the average sales per unit of 
parking space in Seoul, which are obtained from the data set of KSCA. While the 
total size minus combined parking space of superstores produces the market share of 
                                                 
 
20 See the Korea Business Newspaper (September 23, 2003).  
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the outside good, market shares of inside goods are given as a proportion of their 
parking space to the total market size.  
Although parking space is normally time invariant, the constructed market 
shares based on parking space could vary over time due to new entrants and exits. 
When new entrants or exits take place, I calculate market shares using the IIA 
property of the logit model. As said earlier, the IIA property predicts that all 
incumbent stores as well as the outside good will lose (or gain) their market share by 
the same percentage when new entry (or exit) takes place. This means that, in 
absolute terms, those with larger market shares will lose more than others with 
smaller market shares. This property is unrealistic in many settings. In the context of 
the superstore sector, however, the IIA property reflects the real world to a large 
extent: a new store steals more consumers from the outside good which has the 
largest market share in a market.  
Note the fact that the constructed market shares do not vary unless new entry 
or exit happens. That is, by construction, the market shares are determined out of the 
system, that is, they are exogenous. As a result, we could say that the model 
examines how predetermined market structure affects prices. This result has a 
significant implication for the estimation methodology. With endogenous market 
shares, many studies take the instrumental variable estimation to obtain consistent 
estimators. By contrast, this study adopts the traditional OLS procedure since market 
shares are viewed to be predetermined. Relating to this point, one may argue that 
market shares are still endogenous since high prices attract new entrants. However, a 
superstore operator cannot enter a market immediately. It takes about one year from 
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a plan to enter a market to the completion of the entry. Considering the fact that this 
study employs monthly observations, it is reasonable to assume that entry decisions 
are predetermined before pricing decisions are made.21  
A wholesale price is a weighted average of wholesale prices of the items 
concerned. The wholesale price for each product is collected from the Bank of Korea, 
and then is aggregated using the weights stated above. The aggregated wholesale 
prices are deflated using the general consumer prices, and then indexed relative to 
the mean assigned a value of 100. Note that the wholesale prices are constant across 
local markets, since Bank of Korea reports one time series across the nation. The size 
of a chain is measured by the number of stores within the chain in each month. To 
construct this, I use the opening dates of superstores, the information of which is 
obtained from KCSA. Due to the rapid expansion of superstore chains, we could see 
variations over time in the size of the chain.  
In addition, several dummy variables are defined. To see how aggressive 
foreign firms are in pricing policies, I define a dummy variable, Fordum, which is 
assigned a value of 1 for a foreign superstore. Zero means a domestic superstore. 
Similarly, to examine how sensitively domestic firms react to the presence of foreign 
firms, I define another dummy variable, DUM1, where DUM1 is assigned a value of 
1 for a market where domestic firms face foreign firms, and 0 otherwise. To see 
whether there are differences in market conduct between leading and small chains, I 
                                                 
 
21 On the other hand, current prices could have an effect on future market structure and thus future 
prices, which requires the explicit formulation of a dynamic framework. However, this study employs 
a static model, implicitly assuming that firms do not take account of the possible dynamic aspects in 
their pricing decisions. I leave this to future work.  
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define a dummy variable, Leading, which is assigned a value of 1 for the big four 
chains. As shown in Table 3.1, in the superstore sector, Emart, Lottemart, Tesco and 
Carrefour account for about 75 per cent of the market nationally. Zero means the rest 
of the chains. To control for cost differences, I introduce two time dummy variables, 
Time1 and Time2, where Time1 is assigned a value of 1 for year 2002 and Time 2 is 
assigned a value of 1 for year 2003. The base year is 2001. Lastly, 30 store-specific 
dummy variables are created to control for store-level heterogeneity.   
Table 3.5 presents summary statistics for the major variables. The prices 
vary across markets and over time, while most variations in prices are due to 
variations over time. The wholesale prices vary over time and are constant across 
markets.22 For the remaining variables, cross-sectional variations are dominant. The 
market share does not vary over time except when new entry or exit happens. 
Although the size of chain varies over time, differences between chains turn out to be 
very considerable.  
 
[ Insert Table 3.5 here ] 
 
3.6 The estimation results 
 
Table 3.6 presents the results for several models of the pricing equation based 
on the identification of 12 local markets. The dependent variable is the weighted 
average price of 6 items for all the columns. Estimation of each model is 
                                                 
22 Due to the nature of unbalanced panel data, wholesale prices have some variations across markets. 
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implemented using ordinary least squares (OLS) under the assumption of 
independently and identically distributed error terms. All the regressions include the 
store-specific dummy variables, which are not reported here. That is, the fixed effect 
methods are employed. 
Column 1 refers to the result for the baseline model, where I measure the 
overall level of market competitiveness in Seoul. Most variables have the expected 
signs and are significant. The effect of the wholesale price is, as expected, significant, 
implying that superstores pass on about five-sixths of the increase in the wholesale 
prices to their retail prices. The coefficients on Time 1 and Time 2 show that other 
cost factors, such as labour and distribution costs, also have a significant effect on 
retail prices.23 The coefficient of chain size has a negative sign as expected, but is 
not significant.  
The estimated coefficient on market share needs more explanation. As said 
earlier, the coefficient on market share is the conduct parameter divided by the price 
response parameter, /φ α . Without information on the price response parameter, 
therefore, we could not identify the conduct parameter separately.24 Note that, in the 
logit formulation, the store-level price elasticity is given by (1 )ip sε α= − , where α is 
the price response parameter, p is the price and si is the market share. It should be 
noted that we are considering the store-level price elasticity rather than the market-
level price elasticity.25 Once we have the information on the price elasticity, we can 
                                                 
23 Certainly, the time dummy variables could pick up time-varying factors other than the cost factors.  
24 The joint estimation of the pricing equation with the demand system can separate the conduct 
parameter. However, the simultaneous estimation is not possible here, since the market share variable 
predetermined by the nature of construction cannot be the dependent variable in the demand equation.  
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deduce the value of the price response parameter using the formula. Since I can 
neither estimate the price elasticity due to data limitation nor find it from previous 
studies, I have no choice but to rely on a rough guess on the value of the price 
elasticity.  
The standard micro-economic theory predicts that the store-level price 
elasticity is larger than the conduct parameter whose value could be any non-
negative number as explained earlier in (3.10).26 When the price elasticity is 1, the 
corresponding price response parameter should be 0.0091, evaluated at the sample 
means. With the estimated coefficient on the transformed market share, i.e. /φ α , 
being 22.3, then, the conduct parameter becomes 0.202. Likewise, in the case that the 
price elasticity is 2, 3, 4 and 5, the conduct parameter should be 0.405, 0.608, 0.813 
and 1.014 respectively. Table 3.7 summarizes the explanations above. A demand 
elasticity of 5 implies that a 5 percent increase in prices results in a 25 percent 
decrease in quantity demanded. Where quality differences are not large just as in the 
Korean grocery superstore sector, a demand elasticity of 5 is expected to produce 
few differences in prices among grocery superstores. Given the significance price 
dispersion found in the sample27, therefore, it is not unrealistic to assume that the 
                                                                                                                                          
25 The market-level price elasticity for grocery shopping may be less than 1, reflecting inelastic 
demand of grocery shopping. However, the store-level demand elasticity should be larger than the 
market-level demand elasticity. 
26 Suppose superstores set prices rather than quantity. At the equilibrium, the marginal revenue should 
be equal to the marginal cost. With simple manipulation, this condition is given as  
(1 )mr p mcε
Φ= − =  
where ε is the store-level price elasticity of demand and Φ is the conduct parameter. Since the 
marginal cost is positive, the marginal revenue should be positive as well, which requires that the 
price elasticity should be larger than Φ . 
27 As of Dec 2003, for example, the prices range from 95.9 to 102.6, where the prices are normalized. 
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price elasticity is less than 5. Even with the price elasticity at 5, the estimated 
conduct parameter is nearly equal to 1, indicating the Bertrand competition. 
Columns 2 to 5 in Table 3.6 investigate whether there exist differences in 
market conduct between groups of stores. One of main questions in the study is 
whether foreign stores are more aggressive in their pricing strategies compared to 
their domestic counterparts. Model 2 examines the question by including a variable 
of FCMS, which is defined as the product of Market share and a dummy variable 
assigned 1 for foreign stores and 0 otherwise. The estimated coefficients are almost 
identical to those from the baseline model, except on Market share and FCMS. As 
said earlier, the coefficient on Market share measures the market conduct of domestic 
stores, while that on FCMS measures the relative competitiveness of foreign stores. 
The coefficient on FCMS is not significant, suggesting that there is no significant 
difference in the pricing strategies between these two groups.  
The model of column 3 deals with the second question, whether domestic 
stores sensitively respond to the presence of foreign stores. Note that this model uses 
observations only from domestic stores and that it includes a variable of DCMS, 
which is defined as the product of Market share and a dummy variable assigned a 
value of 1 for a store facing foreign competition and 0 otherwise. The coefficients 
other than on Market share and DCMS follow a similar pattern to the baseline model 
(or model 2), even though the coefficient on chain size turns out to be very 
significant. Both of the coefficients on Market share and DCMS are insignificant. 
This result rejects the hypothesis that domestic stores respond more sensitively to 
foreign competitors than to domestic competitors.  
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Column 4 refers to the third hypothesis, that markets with foreign presence 
are more competitive than other markets with only domestic chains. To this end, I 
include a multiplicative form of variable, MFMS, which is the product of Market 
share and a dummy variable assigned 1 for markets with foreign firms and 0 
otherwise. The results are not different from models 2 or 3. The key coefficient on 
MFMS is not significant, rejecting the hypothesis. Relying on the results from 
columns 2 and 4, I conclude that foreign firms make no differences in the price 
competition.    
Column 5 examines the hypothesis that leading chains are different from 
other chains in their pricing strategies. The result is interesting, especially the 
coefficients on Market share and BFCM. Note that BFCM is the product of Market 
share and a dummy variable assigned a value of 1 for leading chains and 0 otherwise. 
The coefficient on Market share measures the competitive level of the base group, i.e. 
small chains, while the coefficient on BFCM reflects the relative competitiveness of 
the leading chains compared to the base group. The estimated coefficient on BFCM 
has a large value with significance, implying a large difference in pricing behaviour 
between the two groups.28 Taking into account the fact that the leading chains consist 
of local and foreign giants, this finding also supports the argument that foreign firms 
make no difference in the price competition. It appears that characteristics other than 
firms’ nationality are more important in explaining pricing behaviour. The point 
                                                 
28 As Holton (1957) points out, retail margins on food are narrow, which forces superstores to expand 
their product lines to more lucrative ones. In the sample, the average floor space of leading chains is 
found to be larger than that of other chains by more than 2,000 square meters, suggesting leading 
chains seek more extensive product lines. It means that they may have strong motivation to increase 
store traffic through lowering the prices of loss leaders more.  
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estimates of coefficients on Market share and BFCM have very large values. This 
may be due to large standard errors, which are not surprising given small variations 
in market shares. Remember that market shares in the data set vary only when new 
entry or exit takes place.  
 
[ Insert Table 3.6 here ] 
[ Insert Table 3.7 here ] 
 
Table 3.8 reports the results when a trend interaction variable is added to the 
models in Table 3.6. As said earlier, the trend interaction variable surrogates the 
growing importance of non-food product lines in superstores sales. The coefficient is 
very significant with a negative sign across models, strongly suggesting superstores 
are adopting more aggressive pricing on loss leaders as non-food items increase. The 
addition of the trend variable does not change the main results: still, foreign firms 
have no significant effect on price competition. It should be noted that with the 
addition of the trend variable, the magnitude of the conduct parameter has decreased 
and the difference between leading and small chains becomes insignificant (just 
beyond 10% level). However, as we will see in Table 3.9, the difference between 
them remains significant in high-selling items.  
 
[ Insert Table 3.8 here] 
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Tables 3.9 and 3.10 display the results for subsets of items. The aim is to 
examine further the hypothesis that superstore chains set prices low for loss leaders. 
Depending on the weights given to these items in the construction of the consumer 
prices index, I separate 6 items into 2 subsets of items, high-selling and less high-
selling items.29 Table 3.9 reports the results for the first group, while Table 3.10 
shows the results for the second group. The results for the high-selling items in Table 
3.9 are very similar to those in Table 3.6. Foreign firms appear to have no significant 
effect on price competition. And the market leaders seem to be more aggressive in 
their pricing policies than the other chains. The difference is that the estimated 
coefficient on market share becomes insignificant with a smaller value, suggesting 
that superstores set very competitive prices for the high-selling items.  
The second group in Table 3.10 presents more interesting results. First, the 
coefficient on Market share in column 1 has a larger value with higher significance, 
strongly indicating that superstores charge less competitive prices for the less high-
selling items so as to earn higher margins. Secondly, the different pattern between 
the market leaders and the other chains suddenly disappears. As presented in column 
4, the coefficient on BFCM is not significant, although it has a negative sign as in 
other models. It does not appear that the leading chains set significantly lower prices 
from the other chains for these items. This finding is consistent with the argument 
that superstores compensate for small margins on loss leaders with larger margins on 
                                                 
 
29 The first group includes milk, Korean instant noodles, tuna, and chocolate pies, while the second 
group consists of sugar and flour. 
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other items. In passing, note that foreign chains are still not different from domestic 
ones in the pricing policy for any subset of items.  
 
[ Insert Table 3.9 here ] 
[ Insert Table 3.10 here ] 
 
Tables 3.11 and 3.12 experiment with whether the results are robust to 
changes in the geographical market definition. As said earlier, the local market 
definition necessarily involves arbitrariness to some extent. To examine this, I re-
estimate the models using other local market definitions. Table 3.11 is based on 
smaller local markets, while the models in Table 3.12 are estimated using larger local 
markets. The main results remain unchanged: there is no significant difference in the 
market conduct between domestic and foreign firms, while, in contrast, there appears 
a considerable difference between the leading chains and small chains. We can see 
that, in the case of 9 local markets, the coefficients on Market share and BFCM have 
a larger value compared to those in the smaller market definition. This can be 
explained. The larger local markets decrease variations in the market share compared 
to the smaller market definition. Given the prices, smaller variations in the market 
share, in turn, produce a larger coefficient on Market share. Based on the evidence 
found in the several publications published by the Korean Chain Store Association, I 
prefer the 12 local markets definition to others.   
 
[ Insert Table 3.11 here ] 
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[ Insert Table 3.12 here ] 
 
Table 3.13 checks whether the price response parameter varies across 
regions. Remember that I rely on the assumption that the price response parameter is 
constant across markets in order to compare the market conduct between groups. 
However, the price response parameter may vary according to the level of household 
income or region. To test this, I construct a simple version of the model, where I 
include regional dummy variables to reflect the different levels of income or regions. 
In column 1, I divide Seoul into three regions based on the number of car owners, 
while, in column 2, I use the geographical proximity to form three regions. The idea 
of this test is as follows. If there exists a significant difference in the price response 
parameter across regions, the coefficients on the regional dummies are expected to be 
significant.30 Table 3.13 shows that the coefficients are not significant, suggesting 
the price response parameter is not significantly different across regions.     
 
[ Insert Table 3.13 here ] 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
In this research, I empirically investigate the popular notion that foreign 
firms as newcomers increase price competition. To this end, I test three hypotheses: 
                                                 
30 Apparently, even if the price response parameter varies according to the level of income or regions, 
there is a possibility that differences in the market conduct cancel out differences in the price response 
parameter. To that extent, this test is not robust.   
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(1) foreign firms are more aggressive in their pricing policy; (2) domestic firms play 
more competitively where they face foreign firms; and (3) markets with foreign firms 
are more competitive compared to markets with only domestic firms. In addition, to 
check other factors in the pricing behaviour, I develop another hypothesis, that 
leading chains are different from small chains in their pricing policy. The unique 
development of the Korean superstore industry allows us to empirically examine 
these hypotheses. Since the prohibition of foreign entry was lifted in 1996, the 
superstore industry has experienced a large influx of foreign direct investment. This 
produces significant time series variations in foreign firms’ presence, even over a 
short period of time along with cross-sectional ones, which provides the ground on 
which to construct market shares based on parking space. For the estimation, I 
construct a reduced form pricing equation using a simple logit model. I then measure 
the level of competitiveness and compare the levels between groups of superstores. 
Unlike the previous studies, the results do not support the popular notion that 
foreign firms increase price competition: there is no significant difference in pricing 
behaviour between the foreign and domestic chains; domestic chains are not likely to 
react sensitively to the presence of foreign competitors; and there is no evidence that 
markets with foreign firms are more competitive than those without foreign ones. 
Interestingly, it seems that leading chains undertake more competitive pricing 
policies than small chains, especially in high-selling items. Given that the leading 
chains consist of foreign and domestic retail giants, this evidence also supports the 
conclusion that foreign firms have no significant effect on price competition. In 
conclusion, the results indicate no existence of difference or rivalry between local 
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and foreign firms, strongly indicating the alternative view that foreign firms are 
expected to behave as a member of an oligopoly group instead of as mavericks.   
More examination of sub-samples of items supports Holton’s argument: 
superstore chains charge competitive prices for high-selling items, while less 
competitive prices for less high-selling items. Leading chains seem to be more 
engaged in this practice. They set more competitive prices for the high-selling items 
than small chains do. However, the difference between leading and small chains 
disappears in the less high-selling items.  
To obtain more general conclusions relating to this issue, more studies are 
needed. First, this study uses a small number of items, most of which are believed to 
be sort of (so-called) traffic builders, limiting the generalization of the results. 
Estimating a larger number of items might produce different results from this study. 
Particularly for non traffic builders, less exposed to price competition, superstore 
chains might adopt different pricing policies. Secondly, I employ a reduced form 
pricing equation, assuming a simple logit demand, that is, a homogeneous consumer 
response to prices and no interaction between consumer and product characteristics. 
With the help of rich data on market share and consumer characteristics, future work 
needs to relax this assumption, estimating jointly the pricing and demand equation.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 3.1. Superstores: Number of Outlets and Turnover 
 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 2001 2002
Number 1 4 17 27 47 68 94 135 176 222 
Emart 1 2 4 6 9 13 19 27 41 50 
Lottemart - - - - 1 4 8 16 23 31 
Tesco - - - - 1 1 2 7 14 21 
Carrefour - - - 3 3 6 11 19 21 24 
Walmart - - - 2 4 4 5 6 9 15 
Others - 2 13 16 29 40 49 60 68 81 
Turnover1 - - 0.6 1.8 3.1 4.9 7.5 10.5 13.8 17.3
Emart - - - - - - 1.5 2.9 4.1 5.6 
Lottemart - - - - - - 0.6 1.1 1.6 2.3 
Tesco - - - - - - 0.4 0.6 1.5 2.4 
Carrefour - - - - - - 0.9 1.1 1.5 2.0 
Walmart - - - - - - - 0.4 0.6 0.7 
1. Trillion Korean won  
Source: Korean Chain Store Association and Korea National Statistical Office 
 
 
Table 3.2. Superstores: Number of Outlets and Turnover in Seoul 
 98 99 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Number  14 20 29 38 41 45 
Foreign ones 1 3 6 10 10 14 
Turnover1 1.1 1.7 2.5 3.2 4.0 4.4 
1. Trillion Korean won 
Source: Korean Chain Store Association and Korea National Statistical Office 
 
 
Table 3.3. Several statistics relating to superstores in Korea 
 2000 2001 2002 
Gross margin (%) 14.8 15.9 16.1 
Operating profit (%) 3.7 3.7 2.2 
Average floor size  10,859 13,550 12,522 
The number of items stocked 21,766 25,494 31,303 
Source: Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
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Table 3.4. The Structure of the Sample 
Sample period 2001 Jan – 2003 Dec 
Region studied  Seoul in Korea 
Local markets defined 12 non-overlapping markets in Seoul 
(9 or 14 local markets definition is tried as a 
robust test) 
Number of entire stores in Seoul as 
of Dec 2003 45 
- Domestic vs Foreign 31 vs. 14 
- Leading chains vs Small chains 28 vs 17 
Number of sample stores as of Dec 
2003 30 
- Domestic vs Foreign  23 vs 7 
- Leading chains vs Small chains  12 vs 18 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5. Data description 
 
 Mean Std.Dev Min Max Store Variation 
Month 
Variation
Prices  100 2.64 79.55 109.22 26.9% 73.1% 
Wholesale Prices  100 1.39 97.28 103.15 - 93.8% 
Market shares 0.087 0.078 0.008 0.30 99.5% 0.5% 
Chainsize  20.4 16.7 1 58 97.5% 2.5% 
* These results are based on the identification of 12 local markets.  
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Table 3.6 Results for the effect of foreign firms on price competition (1)  
 
 Time invariant conduct model  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Wholesale 0.84*** (13.30) 
0.84*** 
(13.29) 
0.75*** 
(16.05) 
0.84*** 
(13.32) 
0.84*** 
(13.41) 
Time 1 0.82*** (2.86) 
0.81*** 
(2.84) 
1.09*** 
(5.35) 
0.82*** 
(2.86) 
0.87*** 
(3.05) 
Time 2 0.59* (1.81) 
0.60* 
(1.83) 
0.33 
(1.42) 
0.65** 
(1.96) 
0.79** 
(2.32) 
Chain size -0.51 (-1.34) 
-0.52 
(-1.38) 
-1.00*** 
(-3.52) 
-0.56 
(-1.47) 
-0.74* 
(-1.87) 
Market share 22.3** (1.96) 
18.6 
(1.54) 
-2.89 
(-0.29) 
11.9 
(0.84) 
85.0** 
(2.57) 
MSTrn      
FCMS  26.12 (0.90)    
DCMS   13.69 (0.84)   
MFMS    25.8 (1.24)  
BFCM     -69.8** (-2.01) 
Adj. R2 0.4445 0.4444 0.5814 0.4451 0.4476 
No of obs. 591 591 468 591 591 
* The dependant variable is the weighted average prices of 6 items. All models 
include store specific dummy variables, which are not reported here. Here, Market 
share=1/(1-Si), FCMS=Fordum*1/(1-Si), DCMS=Dum1*1/(1-Si), 
MFMS=Mar1*1/(1-Si), and BFCM=Leading*1/(1-Si).   
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Table 3.7. Conduct parameter  
Price elasticity E Ε=1 Ε=2 Ε=3 E=4 E=5 
Price response parameter α 0.0091 0.0182 0.0273 0.0365 0.0455 
Conduct parameter ф 0.202 0.405 0.608 0.813 1.014 
* Note that the calculation is based on the coefficient on Market share being 22.3 and 
that the price response parameter is evaluated at the sample means.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 128
 
Table 3.8 Results for the effect of foreign firms on price competition (2) 
 
 Time variant conduct model  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Wholesale 0.85*** (13.52) 
0.84*** 
(13.51) 
0.76*** 
(16.74) 
0.85*** 
(13.55) 
0.85*** 
(13.60) 
Time 1 1.90*** (4.53) 
1.89*** 
(4.51) 
2.19*** 
(7.11) 
1.90*** 
(4.53) 
1.88*** 
(4.49) 
Time 2 2.51*** (3.94) 
2.52*** 
(3.94) 
2.29*** 
(4.79) 
2.57*** 
(4.02) 
2.56*** 
(4.01) 
Chain size -0.005 (-0.01) 
-0.02 
(-0.05) 
0.6** 
(-2.10) 
-0.05 
(-0.14) 
-0.22 
(-0.52) 
Market share 18.9* (1.67) 
15.4 
(1.28) 
-6.89 
(-0.70) 
8.5 
(0.61) 
69.3** 
(2.09) 
MSTrn -0.25*** (-3.49) 
-0.25*** 
(-3.48) 
-0.25*** 
(-4.68) 
-0.25*** 
(-3.49) 
-0.23*** 
(-3.27) 
FCMS  25.1 (0.88)    
DCMS   13.4 (0.85)   
MFMS    25.8 (1.25)  
BFCM     -55.9 (-1.61) 
Adj. R2 0.4555 0.4553 0.6003 0.4561 0.4571 
No of obs. 591 591 468 591 591 
* The dependant variable is the weighted average prices of 6 items. All models 
include store specific dummy variables, which are not reported here. Here, Market 
share=1/(1-Si), MSTrn = Trend*1/(1-Si), FCMS=Fordum*1/(1-Si), 
DCMS=Dum1*1/(1-Si), MFMS=Mar1*1/(1-Si), and BFCM=Leading*1/(1-Si).   
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Table 3.9 Regressions using a subset of items (1)  
 
 4 items 
 1 2 3 4 
Wholesale 0.80*** (12.46) 
0.80*** 
(12.43) 
0.80*** 
(12.45) 
0.80*** 
(12.53) 
Time 1 2.03*** (4.74) 
2.02*** 
(4.71) 
2.02*** 
(4.74) 
2.02*** 
(4.7) 
Time 2 2.75*** (3.91) 
2.56*** 
(3.90) 
2.60** 
(3.96) 
2.63*** 
(4.00) 
Chain size 0.07 (0.17) 
0.06 
(0.14) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.16 
(-0.36) 
Market share 16.0 (1.32) 
14.0 
(1.08) 
5.64 
(0.37) 
71.9** 
(2.01) 
MSTrn -0.23*** (-3.05) 
-0.23*** 
(-3.03) 
-0.23*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.21*** 
(-2.83) 
FCMS  13.4 (0.45)   
MFMS   24.9 (1.15)  
BFCM    -62.0* (-1.66) 
Adj. R2 0.3983 0.3975 0.3986 0.4001 
No of obs. 620 620 620 620 
* The dependant variable is the weighted average prices of 4 items. All models include 
store specific dummy variables, which are not reported here. Market share=1/(1-Si), 
MSTrn = Trend*1/(1-Si), FCMS=Fordum*1/(1-Si), DCMS=Dum1*1/(1-Si), 
MFMS=Mar1*1/(1-Si), and BFCM=Leading*1/(1-Si).   
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Table 3.10 Regressions using a subset of items (2)  
 
 2 items 
 5 6 7 8 
Wholesale 0.73*** (11.33) 
0.73*** 
(11.33) 
0.76*** 
(11.33) 
0.73*** 
(11.31) 
Time 1 -0.42 (-0.70) 
-0.41 
(-0.69) 
-0.41 
(-0.82) 
-0.41 
(-0.69) 
Time 2 0.76 (0.85) 
0.76 
(0.85) 
0.72 
(0.80) 
0.75 
(0.84) 
Chain size -1.42** (-2.55) 
-1.41** 
(-2.53) 
-1.37** 
(-2.45) 
-1.38** 
(-2.35) 
Market share 33.8** (2.09) 
35.5** 
(2.07) 
43.9** 
(2.16) 
25.3 
(0.53) 
MSTrn -0.48*** (-4.83) 
-0.48*** 
(-4.82) 
-0.49*** 
(-4.83) 
-0.49*** 
(-4.80) 
FCMS  -11.9 (-0.28)   
MFMS   -24.3 (-0.82)  
BFCM    9.45 (0.19) 
Adj. R2 0.6533 0.6528 0.6531 0.6528 
No of obs. 653 653 653 653 
* The dependant variable is the weighted average prices of 2 items. All models include 
store specific dummy variables, which are not reported here. Market share=1/(1-Si), 
MSTrn = Trend*1/(1-Si), FCMS=Fordum*1/(1-Si), DCMS=Dum1*1/(1-Si), 
MFMS=Mar1*1/(1-Si), and BFCM=Leading*1/(1-Si).   
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Table 3.11. Regressions based on an alternative geographical market definition (1) 
 
 14 local markets  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Wholesale 0.84*** (13.41) 
0.84*** 
(13.40) 
0.76*** 
(16.84) 
0.84*** 
(13.40) 
0.85*** 
(13.56) 
Time 1 1.67*** (4.02) 
1.67*** 
(4.02) 
2.16*** 
(7.07) 
1.67*** 
(4.04) 
1.71*** 
(4.14) 
Time 2 2.12*** (3.33) 
2.13*** 
(3.34) 
2.32*** 
(4.86) 
2.15*** 
(3.37) 
2.26*** 
(3.55) 
Chain size -0.05 (-0.13) 
-0.03 
(-0.09) 
-0.56* 
(-1.95) 
-0.11 
(-0.27) 
-0.35 
(-0.83) 
Market share 20.6** (2.24) 
23.1** 
(2.12) 
-4.71 
(-0.48) 
9.81 
(0.69) 
82.7*** 
(2.92) 
MSTrn -0.19*** (-2.73) 
-0.19*** 
(-2.74) 
-0.24*** 
(-4.56) 
-0.19*** 
(-2.71) 
-0.17*** 
(-2.49) 
FCMS  -7.59 (-0.42)    
DCMS   28.3** (2.10)   
MFMS    17.4 (1.02)  
BFCM     -68.4** (-2.31) 
Adj. R2 0.4534 0.4525 0.6045 0.4534 0.4576 
No of obs. 591 591 468 591 591 
*The dependant variable is the weighted average prices of 6 items. Columns 1 to 5 
report the results for 14 local markets. All models include store specific dummy 
variables, which are not reported here. Market share=1/(1-Si), MSTrn = Trend*1/(1-
Si), FCMS=Fordum*1/(1-Si), DCMS=Dum1*1/(1-Si), MFMS=Mar1*1/(1-Si), and 
BFCM=Leading*1/(1-Si).   
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Table 3.12. Regressions based on an alternative geographical market definition (2) 
 
 9 local markets 
 6 7 8 9 10 
Wholesale 0.85*** (13.59) 
0.84*** 
(13.57) 
0.76*** 
(16.66) 
0.85*** 
(13.58) 
0.86*** 
(13.73) 
Time 1 1.97*** (4.69) 
1.97*** 
(4.68) 
2.22*** 
(7.20) 
1.98*** 
(4.71) 
1.97*** 
(4.71) 
Time 2 2.65*** (4.09) 
2.65*** 
(4.09) 
2.34*** 
(4.81) 
2.67** 
(4.12) 
2.72*** 
(4.19) 
Chain size -0.05 (-0.14) 
-0.05 
(-0.14) 
-0.64** 
(-2.14) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.30 
(-0.73) 
Market share 33.8* (1.71) 
33.1 
(1.49) 
-58.3 
(-0.80) 
99.2 
(0.95) 
113.0** 
(2.44) 
MSTrn -0.26*** (-3.58) 
-0.26*** 
(-3.58) 
-0.26*** 
(-4.77) 
-0.26*** 
(-3.58) 
-0.24*** 
(-3.27) 
FCMS  2.76 (0.06)    
DCMS   60.56 (0.85)   
MFMS    -65.8 (-0.64)  
BFCM     -93.2* (-1.89) 
Adj. R2 0.4559 0.4549 0.6012 0.4553 0.4584 
No of obs. 591 591 468 591 591 
*The dependant variable is the weighted average prices of 6 items. Columns 1 to 5 
report the results for 9 local markets. All models include store specific dummy 
variables, which are not reported here. Market share=1/(1-Si), MSTrn = Trend*1/(1-
Si), FCMS=Fordum*1/(1-Si), DCMS=Dum1*1/(1-Si), MFMS=Mar1*1/(1-Si), and 
BFCM=Leading*1/(1-Si).   
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Table 3.13. Regressions for simple tests on the price response parameter  
 1 2 
Wholesale 0.85*** (13.56) 
0.85*** 
(13.56) 
Time 1 1.90*** (4.53) 
1.90*** 
(4.53) 
Time 2 2.56*** (3.98) 
2.57*** 
(4.00) 
Chain size -0.04 (-0.10) 
-0.05 
(-0.14) 
Market share 46.6 (1.29) 
39.2 
(1.47) 
MSTrn -0.25*** (-3.46) 
-0.25*** 
(-3.46) 
REG1MS -38.6 (-1.02) 
-31.3 
(-1.06) 
REG2MS -13.8 (-0.34) 
-5.80 
(-0.17) 
Adj. R2 0.4554 0.4554 
No of obs. 591 591 
* The dependant variable is the weighted average prices of 6 items. The regressions 
include the store specific dummy variables, which are not reported here. MSTrn= 
Trend*1/(1-Si), REG1MS=REG1*1/(1-Si), and REG2MS=REG2*1/(1-Si).  
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Chapter 4  
 
Foreign Firms and Entry Decisions in the Korean 
Grocery Superstore Industry 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In the preceding chapters, I examined the nature of price competition 
between domestic and foreign firms. Although price competition is one of the most 
important aspects in competition, firms operating in oligopolistic markets are well-
known for employing a number of strategies in competing with their rivals. They 
may concentrate on non-price strategies, such as advertising and product quality, 
rather than on fierce price competition which might lead to a worst situation where 
all firms involved are losing profits. That is, there is possibility that domestic and 
foreign firms have several ways to relax price competition. In chain-store industries 
like supermarkets, restaurants, and clothes stores, where a number of stores are run 
under common ownership or management, the decision to enter a market or not can 
be one of the most important choices in competing with rivals. In these industries, 
markets are, in nature, localized, so that they face a situation to decide where to open 
outlets among a number of local markets which are different in demand and 
competitive circumstances. While profits, prices or costs are normally not observable, 
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we can observe entry decisions made by firms. With the introduction of an 
assumption that entry decisions are made based on the post-entry profits firms expect 
to earn given market and competitive conditions, then we can infer the nature of 
underlying competition from the entry decisions.  
The Korean grocery superstore industry provides an ideal context to explore 
the nature of competition between domestic and foreign firms from their entry 
decisions. First, this industry is very fast developing through aggressive expansion, 
which enables us to observe a number of entries in a short period of time. Since 1996 
when legal restrictions against foreign entries were lifted, several foreign chains 
quickly became major players against domestic rivals through building up their chain 
networks organically. Another attractive feature is that the industry is dominated by 
several chains, two domestic and three foreign retail giants. Combined, they account 
for 80 per cent of the market and about 80 per cent of new entries during the sample 
period. Hence this study focuses on these five chains’ entry behaviour. A point to 
note is that the leading chains started to build their networks at nearly the same time. 
Out of five leading chains, four chains entered the industry in 1996 or 1997, when 
the first chain operator had only six stores. Therefore, there is little possibility that 
simply being early or late entrants makes different entry patterns.  
Another advantage is that the availability of firm-level data allows us to look 
at entry decisions on a firm basis. Due to the lack of entry occurrences in many 
empirical settings it is common to base the estimation on pooled data of many firms 
or market-level data, implicitly assuming that entry behaviour is the same (or very 
similar) between firms. However, it is more reasonable to assume that each firm may 
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have its own entry strategy or behaviour, that is, to allow for asymmetry in entry 
behaviour between different firms. In addition, this study can exploit the information 
on de novo entries. This aspect also differentiates itself from many studies which 
examine entry decisions using existing market structure rather than new entries. A 
related issue is the treatment of existing stores. While many studies treat existing 
stores as identical to new entries with the assumption that firms decide to continue 
existing stores every period, this study counts only de novo entries and considers 
existing stores as predetermined. This feature is similar to Toivanen and Waterson 
(2001) and Cotterill and Haller (1992). Given the fact that closing existing stores is a 
very rare event and involves huge sunk costs, the different treatment between de 
novo entries and existing stores is more reasonable in this industry.  
A number of recent studies have empirically examined firms’ entry decisions 
by using discrete choice models. In particular, Bresnahan and Reiss (1990 and 1991) 
construct and estimate discrete choice models by explicitly introducing a game 
theoretic framework. They show that a simultaneous move game even with two 
potential entrants can fail to produce a unique equilibrium, which makes meaningful 
estimation impossible. They propose two main solutions to secure a unique 
equilibrium. The first one is to model entry decisions on the equilibrium number of 
entering firms, which is unique. As Berry (1992) shows, however, the computational 
burden makes this approach unavailable where more than two potential entrants are 
involved. As a special case, it is possible to estimate the model where a restrictive 
error structure is imposed like Manuszak (2002) and Chevalier (1995). A popular 
alternative is to introduce a sequential move game to eliminate a situation where 
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multiple equilibria arise. If firms make entry decisions sequentially, early movers can 
claim markets where either firm can earn profits, eliminating the case of multiple 
equilibria. In constructing an estimation model, therefore, many empirical studies 
(Mazzeo, 2002, Seim 2002, and Toivanen and Waterson 2001), including Bresnahan 
and Reiss (1990), examine two (two types of) potential entrants or introduce the 
concept of a sequential move game.  
Following many studies, this study introduces a sequential move game 
concept: larger chains are assumed to move first and smaller chains follow next, 
which implies that two domestic firms move first with three foreign firms following. 
The order of entry above is motivated by the reasoning that large chains may be a 
natural consequence of early mover’s advantages. The fact that domestic firms as 
long-serving retail giants in the retail industry hold most monopoly markets also 
helps to justify the assumption. To check the robustness of the entry assumption, 
alternative orders of entry are tested, finding similar results. A sequential move game 
entails an endogeneity problem in the leaders’ estimations. Following Toivanen and 
Waterson (2000 and 2001), to deal with this, this study constructs leaders’ 
conjectures on followers’ optimal responses by using a simulation technique. While 
they model on a duopoly, this study extends the method to an oligopoly industry.  
For the test, I set up two hypotheses: (1) firms may care about how many 
competitors they will face after entry, that is, whether they are concerned with 
overall market structure in their entry decisions, as the traditional wisdom of 
industrial organization expects; and (2) firms may be more concerned with which 
competitors they will face, that is, there could be a more intense rivalry between a 
 138
 
certain group of firms, like foreign and domestic firms. The estimation strategy is as 
follows. For the first hypothesis, I estimate the latent regression of entry decisions on 
the number of competitors by firm. Then I compare entry patterns between domestic 
and foreign chains to see how different they are. Second, to see how intense rivalry 
between them evolves after foreign entry, I check how they react to foreign and 
domestic rivals’ presence.  
The estimation result on pooled data is that firms avoid the presence of 
competitors, consistent with the traditional wisdom of industrial organization that an 
increasing number of rivals decrease firms’ profits. Closer examination of each chain, 
however, presents a different story. Sharp asymmetry is found in entry behaviour 
between local and foreign firms. While domestic chains avoid entering markets with 
a growing presence of rivals, foreign firms do not care about how many competitors 
they will face after entry. That is, overall market structure matters for domestic 
chains but not for foreign chains. However, further experiments do not suggest 
intense rivalry between them. Instead, three large chains are found to react to each 
other sensitively, strongly suggesting the existence of intense rivalry between them. 
Again the results support the alternative argument, that the oligopolistic 
consideration is a dominant factor in competition. The finding that foreign firms care 
less about overall market structure may simply imply that they have a more 
optimistic view of post-entry profits or they prefer established markets to new ones. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the estimation 
strategy and modelling issues. Section 3 presents the data and background 
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information about the Korean grocery superstore industry, with some descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 covers the estimation results, while Section 5 concludes.    
 
4.2. The empirical Model 
 
This paper builds a discrete choice model where entry decisions made by 
grocery superstore chains are related to market and firm characteristics. Like many 
studies on firms’ entry, profits, prices or costs are assumed to be unobservable 
directly. Instead, I assume that we can observe entry decisions made by superstore 
chains, along with the information about potential entrants. That is, we have the 
information about who are potential entrants, and whether a potential entrant enters a 
certain market in a given time. A firm is assumed to make entry decisions based on 
the post-entry profits which they expect given the nature of post-entry competitive, 
and demand and cost conditions. If the expected profit is positive they enter, and 
otherwise they do not. With the introduction of this assumption, we could draw 
inferences about entrants’ profits and market competition from the information about 
entry decisions. In other words, the qualitative information on entry decisions can 
reveal the nature of underlying market competition between domestic and foreign 
chains.  
 
4.2.1. A traditional entry model 
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Traditional entry studies like Cotterill and Haller (1992) borrow the basic 
idea of a single-person qualitative choice model. In examining labour force 
participation by individuals, for example, researchers cannot directly measure the 
level of utility each individual derives from alternative choices. They can observe 
only whether individuals enter a job market or not. In constructing a model, therefore, 
they utilize a standard latent variable technique. They view the utility level as an 
unobservable variable formulated as a function of explanatory variables. The 
observation rule is set such that if the level of utilities achieved by participating in 
the labour market is larger than a certain threshold, people enter a labour market, and 
not if less than the threshold. The assumption on the distribution of the error term 
completes the modelling. Then the estimation reveals the relationship between the 
latent utility and explanatory variables.   
The traditional entry studies mirror the method for a single-person 
qualitative choice model. They view observed entry decisions as a reflection of an 
underlying regression. Then a standard latent regression model can be set up as  
(4.1) * ( )ijt ijt ijtvπΠ = +   
where π(·) stands for a systematic part of profits, which normally includes 
market  characteristics and market structural variables, and  is an error term to 
capture unobserved profit components. As with an individual choice model, 
researchers do not have direct measures of profits, and can only observe whether 
firms enter a market or not. The observation rule is given as 
ijtv
(4.2)   
*
*
1 0
0 0
ijt ijt
ijt ijt
E if
E if
  =    Π ≥
=     Π <
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That is, a potential entrant enters a market if he can earn a non-negative 
profit, and does not enter if he only earns a negative profit. The error term is 
normally assumed to follow a normal or logistic distribution, which results in a 
simple probit or logit model.  
The interpretation focuses on the coefficient on market structure variables, 
such as concentration ratio or the number of firms in a market. A negative coefficient 
implies that profits are negatively related to market structure, consistent with the 
traditional wisdom of industrial organization. This is where a traditional entry model 
departs from a single-person qualitative choice model. In the case of an individual 
choice model, it is reasonable to assume that an individual’s payoff does not depend 
on others’ choices. In contrast, when we examine firms’ entry decisions in industries 
where there are only a small number of firms, firms’ profits greatly depend on rivals’ 
actions. In an attempt to take account of this strategic nature, a traditional entry 
model includes market structure variables as independent variables. Limitations arise 
from the inadequate treatment of the interrelated nature of firms’ entry decisions. 
When making entry decisions, firms take account of the optimal entry decisions of 
other firms as well as other numerous market conditions. Thus market structure is in 
nature endogenous in the system. Traditional entry models failed to deal with the 
endogeneity of market structure variable, simply treating them as exogenous. A more 
fundamental shortcoming is the lack of equilibrium concept identified by Bresnahan 
and Reiss (1990), which I will explain in the next part. Despite the theoretical 
weakness, however, the simple discrete choice model can still provide a rough 
picture of the competitive nature in question. It is a common practice to estimate 
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simple discrete choice models as a baseline or a point of comparison and, in many 
cases, the estimation produces very similar results to more general models. In this 
study, I start with simple probit models as well.  
 
4.2.2. An empirical entry model in oligopoly markets 
 
In oligopoly industries, as mentioned earlier, firms make interrelated entry 
decisions since their profits greatly depend on rivals’ actions. To take account of this 
strategic situation in firms’ entry decisions, Bresnahan and Reiss (1990 and 1991) 
and Berry (1992) explicitly introduce a game theoretic framework in their seminal 
paper.    
This study follows the framework of a standard two-stage entry game. In the 
first stage, each potential entrant is assumed to make decisions to enter a market or 
not. Then, in the second stage, they compete with each other in prices or quantities, 
which determines post-entry profits. As we could not observe firms’ post-entry 
profits, the profits are treated as unobserved random variables. The post-entry profit 
is assumed to be of form 
(4.3) * ' ( )ijt ijt ijt ijth vβΠ = Χ + +   
where a vector X stands for a vector of market characteristics affecting 
market demand and cost conditions, h(·) denotes a function of market structural 
variables and  is an error term to capture unobserved profit components. Π* is a 
latent variable, and by assumption, we only observe the outcomes of decisions made 
by firms, whether to enter a market or not. Hence, the observation rule is given as 
ijtv
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(4.4)  
*
*
1 0
0 0
ijt kijt
ijt ijt
E if
E if
 =   Π ≥
=    Π <
That is, entry decisions are made if potential entrants expect positive post-
entry profits, and no-entry decisions if negative profits. It should be noted that this 
study assumes potential entrants play a one-shot entry game. That is, I assume a 
static model, not considering the possibility that this period’s decisions may affect 
future ones. And I assume that potential entrants play a game every year in a given 
market.  
The game theoretic structure requires the existence of a unique equilibrium 
to model firms’ entry decisions for the estimation. Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) show 
that a simultaneous move game even with two potential entrants can fail to produce a 
unique equilibrium, where either of two potential entrants can make a positive profit 
and hence either of them can enter the market to establish a monopoly market. This 
implies the existence of multiple equilibria in this game, which makes it impossible 
to use a standard discrete choice model for the analysis of entry decisions. Without 
the explicit consideration of the game theoretic framework, traditional entry models 
failed to recognize this aspect. Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) suggest several solutions 
to this. First, the introduction of other equilibrium selection rules can eliminate a 
non-unique equilibrium situation. For example, a simple assumption that firms never 
have profits in that region can exclude the presence of multiple equilibria. However, 
this is obviously ad hoc. Another alternative is to model entry decisions with regard 
to the equilibrium number of entering firms, which is unique. In this method, the 
number of equilibrium entrants becomes a dependent variable and a market rather 
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than a firm will be the unit of observation. This is a very popular approach which 
many succeeding studies take. As Berry (1992) shows, however, more than two 
potential entrants pose a serious computational problem.1 In addition, the unit of 
observation is a market in a given year, which makes it impossible to use the 
identification of potential entrant. As a result, we cannot analyse the competitive 
behavior between domestic and foreign firms, which is the main object of the study.      
This study resorts to the last alternative, introducing the assumption of a 
sequential move game. In the above example, the multiple equilibria arise because 
two potential entrants make entry decisions simultaneously. If they make entry 
decisions sequentially, the indeterminate region disappears with a unique equilibrium 
ensured all the time. The intuition is that once there is an order in entry decisions, the 
first mover can make an entry decision to claim a monopoly market, eliminating 
situations where the identity of entrant is not determined. Especially where there are 
a number of potential entrants, the introduction of an order of entry decisions is a 
popular solution. Many researchers, including Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), Berry 
(1992) and Waterson and Toivanen (2001), introduce the assumption of a sequential 
move solution concept to secure the presence of a unique equilibrium.  
Regarding the order of entry decisions, I assume that larger chains (in terms 
of outlet numbers) move first and smaller chains follow next. In the context of the 
superstore industry, this means that two domestic chains move first with three 
 
 
1 If we accept a restrictive error structure, like perfect correlation between unobservables, we can 
build up a simple ordered probit or logit as a special case.  
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foreign chains following next.2 The justification for this crucially depends on how 
reasonable the assumption is in the context of the industry in question. First, the 
assumption is motivated by the reasoning that, other things being equal, early 
movers’ advantages might have helped larger chains to create larger networks than 
their rivals. They might exploit early movers’ advantages to claim lucrative 
monopoly or duopoly markets. In addition, the fact that two domestic chains have 
been retail giants for a long time in the retail industry helps to justify the above 
assumption. They have been the first and third largest company in the department 
store sector, which had been the largest retail sector before grocery superstore sector 
outpaced it in 2000. Therefore, they might possess the knowledge and experience to 
move ahead of foreign competitors in entry decisions.3 The fact that most monopoly 
markets are claimed by these domestic chains supports this assumption. Out of 37 
monopoly markets in 2004, 32 markets are claimed by two domestic chains, in which 
Emart accounts for 20 markets while Lottemart 12 markets. To check how robust the 
results are to the assumption, I re-estimate the model using different orders of entries. 
An alternative order of entry decisions could be that chains with larger market share 
move first and small chains follow next.4   
Turning to the profit function, the specification of estimation model depends 
on the structure of two parts of the profit function: a systematic part of profits and an 
 
 
2 As seen in Table 4.1, this assumption results in the order of Emart-Lottemart-Tesco-Carrefour-
Walmart.  
3 Many trading sources attribute the success of the market leader, Emart, to the acquirement of a large 
number of potential sites ahead of rival chains.   
4 Another alternative is to assume that early entrants into the industry move first while late entrants 
follow them. This order of entry coincides with the main assumption, considering that domestic chains 
are long-serving retail giants in Korea.  
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unobservable component of profits which is captured by a random term. Following 
Berry (1992), the former is assumed to be a variable portion of profits and the latter a 
fixed cost part. The systematic part of profits in (4.3) is defined as  
(4.5) 
1 2 3 4
' ( )
( ) '
ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt ijt
V X h
Pop Apart Bigcity h Dum
β
β β β β
= +
    = + + + + +
 
  γ  
where Pop stands for the size of population, Apart denotes the proportion of 
residents living in apartment blocks, Bigcity is a dummy variable to have a value of 1 
if a local market is a part of a large city or 0 otherwise, h(·) is a function of market 
structural variables, and lastly Dum stands for a set of chain or period dummy 
variables. As said earlier, the systematic part of profits is viewed as representing 
variable profits, which is affected by several factors of market demand and the 
competitive conditions. First, the size of population basically determines the total 
demand for grocery superstore shopping in a given market. Since the larger its 
population is, the more superstores a local market can accommodate, a positive 
relationship between population and profits is expected. Given the size of population, 
the type of residence is an important factor in determining the size of demand. The 
inclusion of Apart as an independent variable is motivated by the fact that residents 
in apartment blocks are important customers in grocery superstore shopping. In 
Korea, apartments are the most popular type of housing, normally constituting a 
wealthy area where the demand for grocery superstores is strong. A number of trade 
sources indicate that superstore chains regard residents in apartment blocks as key 
customers, and hence, in deciding the site of a new store, consider the existence of 
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large apartment blocks in the catchment area as a key factor.5 Therefore, we can 
expect a positive relationship between profits and the proportion of people living in 
apartment blocks. It may be the case that superstore chains focus their activities on 
metropolitan areas such as Seoul, where the demand for grocery superstores may be 
stronger. I also include a set of period dummy variables to control for the differences 
in profits arising from different periods. Superstore chains may have different cost 
structures. To control for this, I introduce a set of chain dummy variables as long as 
the specification is allowed. In a kind of robust test, I include several other variables 
which might affect variable profits, such as the price of land and population density, 
as independent variables. Finding that they are insignificant and do not affect the 
results, I drop them in the main estimation. 
Of main interest is the market structure function, which may contain 
variables to represent market competitive circumstances. The conventional wisdom 
of industrial organization has it that market structure, like the presence of 
competitors, greatly affects firms’ profits. Therefore, the number of competitors in a 
given market is an obvious candidate for a market structure variable. To see how 
chains react to foreign and domestic rivals, I split the number of competitors into 
domestic and foreign ones. To take account of the fact that superstores chains have a 
tendency not to open an additional store where they already have a presence, I 
include the number of its own stores as a control variable. Since the specification 
 
5 Personal interviews with several directors of leading chains also confirm this fact. 
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varies across the models, I will leave the exact specification of market structure 
variables to the section below on estimation results.  
Regarding market structural variables, an important issue to note is an 
endogeneity problem. In a sequential move game, early movers take account of 
followers’ decisions in making their entry decisions, while followers can make their 
decisions taking the leaders’ decisions as given. Therefore in the estimation of the 
leaders’ decisions, a typical endogeneity problem arises. A simple solution is to 
assume that leaders are short-sighted in conjecturing rivals’ optimal reactions. That is, 
when they make entry decisions, they assume the number of rivals’ stores will 
remain the same. This is very ad hoc. This study employs the method proposed by 
Toivanen and Waterson (2000 and 2001) to simulate followers’ optimal responses to 
leaders’ decisions. The intuition behind the methodology is that leaders take account 
of their conjectures on followers’ moves in making their decisions.  
The procedure is as follows. For simplicity, consider the case of three 
potential entrants, firm A, B and C, where A is the first mover, B the second mover, 
and C the last mover. The first step is to estimate the last mover’s entry decisions, 
where the last mover views the two early movers’ entry decisions as given. That is, if 
both A and B have entered the market, the last mover has to face two additional 
competitors than in the previous period. If either A or B has entered the market, C 
faces one more rivals’ store than in the previous period. Therefore, we can estimate 
the last mover’s entry decisions based on the traditional probit model, without 
worrying about any endogeneity problem. This step produces the coefficients for the 
last mover. 
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The next step is to estimate the second mover’s entry decisions. While B 
views the first mover’s entry decisions as given, it has to make conjectures on the 
last mover’s entry decisions when making its entry decisions. In creating B’s 
conjectures on the last one’s decisions, I follow the method proposed by Toivanen 
and Waterson (20001 and 2001). First, I exploit the last one’s estimated coefficients 
to create a systematic part of profits. Then, for an unsystematic part of profits, I draw 
R pseudo random numbers from a standard normal distribution. Now, we can create 
simulated entry decisions of the last mover conjectured by the second mover based 
on  
(4.6) 
ˆˆ1( 0) 1
ˆˆ1( 0) 0
ijt ijt
ijt ijt
if true
if otherwise
π ε
π ε
+ ≥ =     
+ ≥ =     
where 1( ) is an indicator function having a value of 1 if it is true and 0 otherwise. 
Then we could add the sum of this conjecture and the first mover’s decisions to the 
existing number of rivals’ stores. Now we fit this number into the second mover’s 
log likelihood function instead of the number of rivals’ stores in the previous period. 
The second step produces the coefficients for the second mover. 
The final step is the estimation of the first mover’s entry decisions. In 
comparison with the second or the last mover, the first mover has to make 
conjectures on the two followers’ moves. The procedure to create simulated entry 
decisions is the same as the one in the second mover’s estimation. For the last 
mover’s entry decisions, I utilize the last mover’s estimated coefficients obtained in 
the first step, with drawing R pseudo random numbers from a standard normal 
distribution. This produces conjectures on the last mover’s decisions. Then, I move 
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on to simulated entry decisions of the second mover conjectured by the first mover. 
First I use the second one’s estimated coefficients to create a systematic part of the 
second mover’s profits. Second I draw R pseudo random numbers from a standard 
normal distribution. This procedure creates simulated entry decisions of the second 
mover conjectured by the first mover. It is the last step that we add these conjectures 
on the second and last mover’s decisions to the existing number of rivals’ stores and 
fit this number into the first mover’s log likelihood function instead of the number of 
followers’ stores in the previous period. Where there are more than three potential 
entrants, this procedure can be expanded likewise. 
 
4.3. Entry in the grocery superstore industry and the data 
 
4.3.1. Entry in the grocery superstore industry  
 
To analyse the entry patterns of domestic and foreign firms, the study 
exploits the rapid expansion of chain networks in the Korean grocery superstore 
industry. 6  Several features make the grocery superstore industry a favourable 
candidate for the empirical investigation in question. First, the grocery superstore 
sector is a very fast-growing industry, which enables us to observe a number of 
entries on a firm basis over a short period of time. Table 4.1 depicts the fast growth 
 
6 As in the previous chapter, a grocery superstore in this study is defined as a retail store with floor 
space of more than 3,000 square meters, selling grocery items. Although there are several other types 
of grocery stores, as explained earlier, this study focuses on the grocery superstore industry. 
Excluding other types of grocery stores can be justified by the fact that other types of grocery stores 
cannot provide the same kind of one-stop grocery shopping service that grocery superstores provide. 
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in terms of store numbers since 1996, along with details on five leading chains. Since 
the first store was opened in 1993, grocery superstores are, at a rapid pace, replacing 
old types of grocery shopping like traditional grocery markets: the total number of 
outlets soared from 1 in 1993 to 270 in 2004. The year of 1996 marked a turning 
point in the development of the grocery superstore industry. As the liberalization 
programme relating to the retail industry had been established, the prohibition of 
foreign firms opening (any kinds of) superstores was abolished.7 Since then, several 
foreign retail giants, such as Carrefour (1996), Tesco (1997) and Walmart (1998)8, 
have entered the grocery superstore sector and quickly joined the leading group of 
chains through aggressive expansion of their networks. The fact that the grocery 
superstore sector was a new industry left them not many options but to build their 
chain networks organically. This provides a chance to see how domestic and foreign 
chains compete with each other in the entry stage. The study looks at the period of 
1997 to 2004, when we could see entries by both domestic and foreign firms.  
 
[ Insert Table 4.1 here ] 
 
Another feature to note is that the industry is a typical oligopoly at the 
national level as well as at the local level. Since 1997, the current top five chains 
 
 
7 Until 1997, foreign firms were allowed to open only less than 20 stores with floor space of less than 
3,000 square meters, which virtually prohibited foreign firms from entering the grocery superstore 
industry.  
8 Although Walmart entered the market through acquiring Macro Korea, another foreign chain, most 
of their expansion has been made through organic growth. Macro Korea opened 4 stores in 1996-1997 
before the acquisition. In the main estimation, I treat those 4 stores as entries made by Walmart. 
Dropping the first two years or Walmart from the sample does not change the main findings.   
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have quickly emerged as market leaders, collectively accounting for 80 per cent of 
the market in sales in 2002, even though, except for Emart which is the first grocery 
superstore chain in Korea, they were relatively late entrants. The leading group 
consists of two domestic retail giants, Emart and Lottemart, and three global retail 
giants, Tesco, Carrefour and Walmart. Their dominance has become more and more 
apparent. During the period of 2000 to 2004, the five leading chains accounted for 
106 new outlets out of 136 new entries. In the last two years, the top five chains 
accounted for all the new outlets, while other small chains opened none. Although 
there are about 20 chains altogether, I therefore focus on the entry behaviour by the 
leading chains who are thought to be the strategic players. Another point is that the 
leading chains started their business practically at the same time. As seen in Table 
4.1, three of the leading chains opened their first store in 1996 or 1997. Even Emart, 
the first superstore operator, had only six stores. Therefore, there is little possibility 
that being early entrants or late entrants makes a systematic difference in their entry 
behaviour.  
The availability of firm-level data is another key advantage. This enables us 
to look at entry decisions on a firm level, while many other studies base their 
estimation on a market-level or on the pooled data of many firms. Therefore, in 
building models, this study can allow for heterogeneity in entry behaviour between 
firms.      
Grocery shopping is in nature local, given the fact that consumers do not 
travel too far to do it. As a result, it is logical to define local markets as a 
geographical market. The study identifies 160 local markets across Korea, based on 
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the administrative areas, which could be small cities or administrative districts in 
metropolitan cities. Note that in defining local markets, I exclude whole rural areas 
since the demand is not sufficient to support a grocery superstore. The exclusion can 
be justified by the fact that no superstore chains have ever opened an outlet targeting 
these rural areas.9 The delineation of local markets according to administrative areas 
is, to a large extent, ad hoc. Although each small city constitutes a rather isolated 
market, as in Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Manuszak (2002) where they selected 
a sample of isolated towns to avoid the problem of geographical market definition, 
the boundary of local markets in metropolitan cities is not clear-cut similar to 
Toivanen and Waterson (2001). To see whether the geographical definition might 
affect the result, I estimate the model for a sub-sample of data set including only 
small cities.   
 
4.3.2. The data 
 
The study requires data for market and store characteristics. The information 
on stores is collected from the Korean Chainstore Association (TKCA), which 
publishes the list of superstores containing opening dates, store locations and floor 
space by chain every month. Since the list is exhaustive, we could safely construct 
variables on market competition as well as an entry variable. The independent 
variables on market characteristics include population and housing types, which are 
 
9 There is a store located in a rural area, but it is targeting a neighbouring city. 
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collected from the database of the Korean Statistical Office. The data on population 
come from the Census of Population and the Resident Registration Population, while 
the data on housing types is obtained from the Census of Housing. The Censuses on 
Population and Housing take place every 5 years. To obtain annual data for 
population, therefore, I supplement the Census of Population using the Resident 
Registration Population produced every year. On the other hand, in the case of 
housing type, I use the 2000 Census of Housing for the whole sample period because 
there is no alternative for annual housing data. This assumes that there is no 
significant change in housing type during the period. Given the fact that a large scale 
of housing construction has not been common, the assumption is not particularly 
unrealistic.  
As said earlier, the sample period is from 1997 to 2004. This implies that we 
can observe eight annual observations, since each chain is assumed to make entry 
decisions each year in a given market. 10  To construct the dependent variable, I 
observe whether a chain enters a given market or not each year. For the construction 
of market structure variables, such as the number of rivals’ stores operating in a 
market, or the number of its own stores operating already, basically I count the 
number of stores in question at the beginning of each year. In a sequential move 
game, reflecting the nature of sequential entry, I count the number of stores at the 
 
 
10 One might raise a question about the annual observation unit. In other words, one can object to the 
assumption that the length of the entry stage is a calendar year. Similar arguments to Toivanen and 
Waterson (2001) can be made: leading chains publish annual reports, and they announce annual plans 
of new outlet openings.  
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end of each year, although leaders’ conjectures on followers’ optimal responses are 
obtained through a simulation technique.  
Table 4.2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the sample. As the 
statistics show, the local markets are different in terms of the size of population and 
housing type. The size of population ranges from 53,000 to 677,000. Apart is the 
ratio of households living in apartment blocks to total households. The summaries of 
Apart indicate that the relative importance of people living in apartment blocks 
differs significantly across local markets. The number of own stores already 
operating in a market does not exceed 2, suggesting that chains are less likely to open 
multiple stores in a given market. The number of existing stores varies considerably 
as well. While 7 stores compete with each other in a market, less than one store is, on 
average, operating. Although, excluding 33 local markets which have never received 
any new entries, the average rises to 2, the number is still not large.  
 
[ Insert Table 4.2 here ] 
 
4.3.3. Some descriptive results 
 
Before considering the estimation results, I briefly look at some descriptive 
statistics concerning entry behaviour. First, to examine the importance of market 
structure in entry decisions, I cross-tabulate the frequency of entries by number of all 
existing stores in the market. Table 4.3 presents the results. As expected, the entry 
frequency decreases as the number of existing stores increases, suggesting that 
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entries are negatively related to market concentration. And it is found that no entry 
takes place in a market with more than 4 existing stores. The difference in entry 
pattern between domestic and foreign chains deserves more attention. Leading 
domestic chains appear to enter markets where competitive pressure from 
competitors is not intensive. Of 101 entries made by two domestic chains, nearly half 
of them occur in new markets and nearly 80 per cent of entries occur where there are 
less than two existing competitors. That is, they appear to prefer monopoly or 
duopoly to oligopoly. In addition, new entries sharply decrease as the number of 
existing stores rises, suggesting a negative relationship between entries and the 
number of existing stores. On the other hand, foreign counterparts reveal a different 
pattern. They are less likely to enter new markets and instead more likely to enter 
markets with one or two existing competitors compared to their domestic 
counterparts. The negative relationship between entries and the number of incumbent 
stores is not as apparent as in the case of domestic chains.  
 
[ Insert Table 4.3 here ] 
 
One might raise doubts about the argument that these findings suggest 
different entry strategies between the two, saying that the different pattern above 
might just reflect “a snap-shot of long-term process” in the development of the 
grocery superstore industry. There is possibility that, as late entrants into the industry, 
foreign firms might have no choice but to open a store where domestic chains 
already have a presence. If this is the case, the entry pattern should be like the above 
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without different entry strategies between them. However, as said earlier, nearly all 
the leading chains have started to build up their networks since 1996, so that there is 
no such time gap to produce the late entrant effect. Furthermore, the second domestic 
chain, Lottemart, which is the last entrant among the leading chains, reveals a very 
different entry pattern from foreign chains.   
Although Table 4.3 examines the likely effect of overall market structure on 
entry decisions made by leading chains, there is a possibility that leading chains may 
be more concerned with the presence of other leading chains which are strategic 
players covering markets nationally. In addition, since foreign entry was permitted in 
1996, there has been a widespread fear that foreign chains possessing high 
managerial know-how and global sourcing power as global retail giants may out-
compete domestic chains and dominate the market. Hence, local chains might 
sensitively react to the presence of foreign chains. Table 4.4 presents simple statistics 
relating to the entry frequency by number of other leading stores. It appears that both 
domestic chains prefer to enter a market where no leading chains have a presence. Of 
101 new entries during the sample period, more than 70 per cent of entries took place 
where competitive pressure from rival chains was absent. Especially in the case of 
Lottemart, the second domestic chain, three-quarters of entries occurred where there 
were no other leading chains. Although foreign chains also appear to be more 
responsive to the presence of other leading stores than to the total number of existing 
stores, they still are less sensitive than domestic chains are. The frequency of new 
entries made by domestic chains sharply decrease as the number of other leading 
chains rises, while the decrease of new entries by foreign chains is rather flat. The 
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statistics might suggest the existence of asymmetry between domestic and foreign 
chains in the responses to rivals’ presence.  
 
[ Insert Table 4.4 here ] 
 
Another pattern of entry behaviour needs to be mentioned. Superstore chains 
display a strong tendency not to enter markets where they already have a presence. 
Table 4.5 depicts the pattern. Of 170 entries, only 11 entries occur where they 
already have a presence. Another observation to note is that there is no case in which 
each superstore chain made multiple entries in a given market/year combination. The 
implication is that grocery superstore chains take their own presence as an important 
factor in deciding whether to enter a market, which is an underlying reason to include 
a variable for such a store’s own presence as an independent variable.      
 
[ Insert Table 4.5 here ] 
 
4.4. The estimation results 
 
4.4.1. Simple probit models 
  
The main aim of the study is to investigate the nature of competition 
between domestic and foreign chains. As a baseline model, I employ a simple probit 
model. Although the simple probit model has limitations, as explained earlier, the 
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model is still useful to view a broad picture. Many previous studies estimate a simple 
probit model as a baseline model or as a point of comparison, obtaining the similar 
qualitative results that more general models produce.  
Table 4.6 examines the effect of overall market structure on entry decisions. 
Two profit functions are defined as 
(4.7) 1 2 3 4 5 6 'ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijtPop Apart Bigcity Own All Dumβ β β β β β γ εΠ = + + + + + + +  
(4.8) 1 2 3 4 5 6 'ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijtPop Apart Bigcity Own Leading Dumβ β β β β β γ εΠ = + + + + + + +  
where both All and Leading are market structural variables, the former counting the 
number of all the existing stores in the market and the latter measuring the number of 
leading chains’ stores in the market respectively, and where Own is a control 
variable for its own presence. The first equation is for the odd number columns, 
while the second equation for the even number columns. The dependent variable is a 
binary choice of entry or no entry. Throughout the columns, I include two sets of 
dummy variables to control for differences arising from different periods and 
different chains: period dummies and chain dummies, which I do not report here. 
Employing the full sample of data, the first and second column examines the entry 
decisions of leading chains, implicitly assuming that leading chains are the same (or 
very similar) in their entry behaviour. Population and Apart produce a significant and 
positive estimate respectively, suggesting that the larger the population is, and the 
more people live in apartment blocks, the more likely it is that superstore chains 
enter the market: in other words, the more profits they can earn. These results are 
consistent with expectations. It seems that entering a market in a large city is not a 
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significant factor in entry decisions. As expected from the simple descriptive 
statistics, Own has a significant and negative coefficient. In columns 1 and 2, as seen 
in the simple descriptive statistics, All and Leading have a significant and negative 
coefficient, suggesting that firms are not inclined to enter a market where 
competitors have a presence. This result is consistent with the traditional wisdom of 
industrial organization that firms’ profits decrease as the number of competing firms 
increases. 
Although the results in the whole sample are consistent with the wisdom of 
industrial organization, closer examination of the foreign and domestic group 
produces a different story. While columns 3 and 4 examine entry decisions by 
domestic firms, columns 5 and 6 deal with those by foreign firms. Regarding Pop, 
Apart and Own, the estimation produces similar results to the whole sample, with no 
qualitative difference between the two groups observed. An interesting result is the 
large difference between domestic and foreign chains in the response to the rivals’ 
presence or to market structure. In the case of domestic chains, as seen in columns 3 
and 4, Leading and All have a significant and negative estimate, indicating that 
domestic chains expect diminishing profits as competitors in a market are increasing. 
Therefore domestic chains are cautious in entering markets where rivals’ stores 
already exist. In contrast, as seen in columns 5 and 6, the coefficients on Leading and 
All are not significant, even though their signs are negative as expected, indicating 
that foreign chains pay less attention to the presence of competitors than domestic 
counterparts when they make entry decisions. In other words, they do not expect that 
their profits will decrease significantly as the number of competitors increases. The 
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parameter on Bigcity is insignificant in both groups, although the estimated 
parameters have opposite signs.  
 
[ Insert Table 4.6. here]  
 
Table 4.7 examines how firms respond to foreign and domestic competitors. 
To do this, I split the number of leading chains’ stores into two variables: the number 
of foreign rivals’ stores and domestic rivals’ stores. Hence, the profit function (of the 
second column in each group) is slightly modified as  
(4.9) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 'ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijtPop Apart Bigcity Own Diff Same Dumβ β β β β β β γ εΠ = + + + + + + + +  
where Diff and Same stand for the number of other group’s stores and own group’s 
stores. That is, in the case of domestic chains, Diff measures the presence of foreign 
competitors and Same counts the number of domestic rivals’ stores, while in the case 
of foreign chains, Diff measures the presence of domestic counterparts and Same 
indicates the competitive pressure from other foreign chains. Again the dependent 
variable is a binary choice of entry or no entry.   
Concerning Pop, Apart and Own, the results are again very similar between 
the two groups of chains. However, there is sharp asymmetry between them in the 
response to foreign or domestic rivals. Domestic firms expect decreasing profits with 
the growing presence of foreign rivals, so that they refrain from entering markets 
where foreign rivals have a presence. On the other hand, foreign chains seem to 
expect that the presence of domestic or foreign rivals does not pose a significant 
threat to their profits, given insignificant coefficients on Diff in columns 3 and 4. 
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Another interesting result is a large difference in values of coefficients on Diff and 
Same in column 2.11 This might indicate that domestic firms consider competitive 
pressure from domestic rivals more seriously than that from foreign rivals.  
 
[ Insert Table 4.7 here ] 
 
The above estimation is based on pooled data, implicitly assuming that 
chains within a group make the same (or very similar) types of entry decisions in 
response to market conditions. Although this is a common practice, it is an arbitrary 
assumption to a large extent. It is more reasonable to assume that each superstore 
chain may have its own entry strategy or pattern. However, in many empirical 
settings,12 estimation by chains is not possible simply due to data availability. In this 
regard, the current data set has a big advantage in assessing entry decisions by each 
chain. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 analyse and compare entry decisions by chain. While Table 
4.8 focuses on the response to the overall presence of rivals, Table 4.9 looks at how 
each chain responds to the presence of a certain group of rivals, that is, foreign 
competitors and domestic competitors. The profit functions are defined as being the 
same as (4.7) and (4.8).13 The interpretation focuses on the estimated parameters on 
market structural variables, such as Leading, Same and Diff. First, let us consider the 
 
11 The test rejects the hypothesis of two coefficients having the same values.  
12 Cotterill and Haller (1992) is a typical case, where they pool entry decisions by 20 supermarket 
chains. Except for the market leader, the meaningful estimation for each chain seems impossible due 
to the small number of entry occurrences.     
13 In the case of Walmart, I drop a variable of Own since no entry occurs where there is already its 
own store. For Carrefour in Table 4.9, I drop a variable of Same for a similar reason to the case of 
Walmart. Since there is no entry where foreign rivals have a presence, Same has no explanatory power 
statistically. 
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results in Table 4.8. There is still a large difference between foreign and domestic 
chains in the reaction to overall market structure. While, in columns 1 and 2, 
negative and significant estimates on Leading suggest that domestic chains expect 
decreasing profits with the growing presence of rivals, all estimates on Leading 
across foreign chains are insignificant, indicating that they do not fear their profits to 
be affected by rivals’ presences. The overall results are consistent with Table 4.6.  
Table 4.9 provides a different story from the estimation of grouping data 
shown in Table 4.7. The sharp asymmetry between domestic and foreign chains 
found in the estimation of grouping data disappears. Emart reacts sensitively to the 
presence of its domestic rival (that is, Lottemart), but not to foreign chains. On the 
contrary, Lottemart seems to avoid foreign rivals rather than its domestic rival (in 
this case, Emart). Remember that, as shown in Table 4.7, domestic chains seemed to 
avoid both domestic and foreign chains’ presence. This might indicate that pooling 
data is not appropriate for this industry. Of interest is the result relating to Tesco: the 
coefficient on Diff is now significant, suggesting that Tesco seems to avoid entering 
markets with domestic rivals. Given the fact that Tesco belongs to the top three 
chains, along with Emart and Lottemart, these results may imply that the rivalry 
between the top three chains is more important than that between foreign and 
domestic chains. 14  
 
[ Insert Table 4.8 here ] 
 
14 Tesco is the third largest chain in outlet numbers but the second largest chain in sales.  
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'
1,2,3,4,5
ijt i i ijt i ijt i ijt i ijt i ijt ijtPop Apart Bigcity Own Leading Dum
wherei
[ Insert Table 4.9 here ] 
 
4.4.2. Multivariate probit models15 
 
A natural extension of the simple probit models in Table 4.8 and 4.9 would 
allow for a system of equations with correlated unobserved profit components among 
the five chains. The intuition is that each chain has its own unobserved profit 
components, reflecting possible differences in the structure of fixed costs, but that 
these unobserved profit components may be correlated in a given market. This is in 
line with the basic idea of a seemingly unrelated regression model, except that the 
dependent variables are binary choice variables. This leads to a standard multivariate 
probit model. In this case, the system of five profit functions can be formulated as  
(4.10)
,1 2 3 4 5 6β β β β β β γ εΠ = + + + + + + +
          =
'
1,2,3,4,5
ijt i i ijt i ijt i ijt i ijt i ijt i ijt ijtPop Apart Bigcity Own Diff Same Dum
wherei
  
(4.11) 
,1 2 3 4 5 6 7β β β β β β β γ ε
                  
Π = + + + + + + + +
 =
                                                
 
The former is for Table 4.10, the latter for Table 4.11. Tables 4.10 and 4.11 
present the results, which are not different from the simple probit models in Tables 
4.8 and 4.9. A large difference between foreign and domestic chains still appears 
concerning their reaction to the overall presence of rivals, as seen in Table 4.10. For 
domestic chains, the estimated coefficients on Leading are negative and significant, 
 
15 Following Cappellari and Jenkins(2003), this study employs a simulation method to estimate the 
multivariate probit regression model.  
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while the estimates are not significant for foreign stores. Table 4.11 displays the 
same pattern as Table 9. Regarding the reactions to foreign or domestic rivals, 
asymmetry between domestic and foreign chains declines significantly. Instead, the 
result again suggests that the rivalry between the top three chains is more important. 
It should be noted that this model assumes short-sighted firms which anticipate the 
number of rivals’ stores to remain unchanged even at the end of the period. In the 
sense that this formulation does not take account of rivals’ strategic responses, this 
model is based on a reduced form of profit function.  
 
[ Insert Table 4.10. here ] 
[ Insert Table 4.11. here ] 
 
4.4.3. Sequential entry game: simulated maximum likelihood estimation 
models 
 
In an attempt to overcome the unrealistic assumption of short-sighted 
entrants, Tables 4.12 and 4.13 explicitly introduce the concept of a sequential move 
entry game, assuming that there is an order of entry decisions: larger chains (in terms 
of outlet numbers) move first and smaller chains follow next. That is, in Table 4.12 
and 4.13, entry decisions are, by assumption, made in the order of Emart-Lottemart-
Tesco-Carrefour-Walmart, where the first two chains are domestic and the rest 
foreign. Thus followers view leaders’ decisions as given. In contrast, leaders take 
into account the optimal responses of followers when making their decisions, which 
 166
 
leads to a typical endogeneity problem. To deal with this, as mentioned earlier, the 
study employs a simulated maximum likelihood estimation method. The profit 
function is defined similar to (4.7) and (4.8). The only difference is the way of 
counting market structural variables and of forming log-likelihood functions in the 
leaders’ estimation.  
In the case of Table 4.12, the overall picture does not depart from its 
counterparts of simple or multivariate probit models. Regarding the responses to the 
presence of other leading chains, asymmetry between domestic and foreign chains is 
again apparent. Domestic chains expect decreasing profits with the growing presence 
of competitors, while foreign chains pay little attention to the overall presence of 
rivals. Table 4.13 examines the responses to the presence of foreign or domestic 
rivals, as in Tables 4.9 and 4.11. There are some changes compared to the 
counterparts of the simple and multivariate models. In the case of Lottemart, the 
coefficient on Same becomes significant, and the estimate on Diff in Tesco becomes 
more significant. That is, Lottemart fears domestic rivals’ presence as well as that of 
foreign competitors, while Tesco considers the presence of domestic rivals as being 
more serious than that of other foreign rivals. And all the significant estimates on 
Same and Diff have larger values. Altogether, these allow us to argue that the rivalry 
of the top three chains is a more likely situation. To check this possibility of the 
rivalry explicitly, I split the number of leading stores into two other variables: the 
presence of three large chains’ stores and the presence of others. Table 4.14 presents 
the results. As expected from Table 4.13, a strong asymmetry between the three large 
chains and others appears. The three large chains take into account each other’s 
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presence more seriously, while others pay little attention to the presence of them. The 
results suggest the intense competition between the three large chains, which forces 
them to avoid other large chains. In summary, it seems that the distinction between 
large chains and others is more important than the identification of foreign and 
domestic chains.   
To check whether the assumption on the order of entry decisions affects the 
estimation results, I try an alternative assumption relating to the order of entry 
decisions: a chain with a larger market share moves first before chains with smaller 
market share make decisions. This assumption is motivated by the reasoning that, 
with other things being equal, early movers’ advantages might have helped them 
account for a larger market share. The results are not different from the baseline 
order of entries. 
 
[ Insert Table 4.12. here ] 
[ Insert Table 4.13. here ] 
[ Insert Table 4.14. here ] 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter infers the nature of competition between foreign and domestic 
firms from entry decisions. The Korean grocery superstore industry serves as an ideal 
testing ground for the exploration of this phenomenon. The rapid expansion of the 
industry along with a large scale of foreign entries enables us to compare entry 
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decisions made by foreign and local firms. If foreign firms, as in many cases, are 
allowed to enter markets only after domestic competitors establish their networks, 
there is strong possibility to observe different entry patterns between foreign and 
domestic firms just because foreign firms are late entrants into the industry. Given 
that they started their business at the same time as their domestic counterparts, 
however, we can safely treat the difference between the two, if found, as a genuine 
one in terms of entry strategies. In addition, in contrast to many studies, the 
availability of comprehensive firm-level entry data allows us to exploit the 
information on de novo entry, and to allow for different entry behaviour between 
firms. Concerning modelling issues, I introduce a sequential move game concept to 
secure a unique equilibrium. In dealing with the endogeneity problem in the leaders’ 
estimation, I extend a simulation technique proposed by Toivanen and Waterson 
(2001) to an oligopoly industry.  
The estimation based on pooled data produces the results that the presence of 
competitors deters entries, supporting the old wisdom that firms’ profits decrease 
with the increasing number of competitors. However, closer examination of each 
chain provides a rather different story. Regarding the responses to overall market 
structure, there is a significant difference between domestic and foreign firms. While 
domestic chains avoid entering markets with the growing presence of competitors, 
how many competitors they will encounter after entry does not deter foreign firms 
from entering the market. That is, overall market structure matters for domestic firms 
but not for foreign firms. Along with the little evidence on the rivalry between local 
and foreign chains, this finding may imply that foreign firms have more optimistic 
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views of post-entry profits or they prefer established markets to new ones. Another 
interesting result is asymmetry between the top three chains and others. The three 
large chains avoid each other’s presence, while small chains do not care about the top 
three chains’ presence, indicating the intense rivalry between the three large chains. 
These findings again support the alternative view on a foreign firms’ role in 
competition: foreign firms also are expected to act as a member of an oligopoly 
group rather than as a kind of maverick. Another point to note is that, given that there 
are significant differences in firms’ responses to rivals’ presences, the study indicates 
that it may be problematic to assume identical (or very similar) entry behaviour 
between firms as many studies do.    
Extension of this paper would deepen our knowledge about firms’ entry 
decisions as well as the competitive interactions between foreign and domestic firms. 
This thesis has assumed that superstore chains make independent decisions on every 
market-period combination, without considering entry decisions on other markets or 
future decisions. Modelling of multi-store operations in chain-store industries or the 
explicit consideration of the dynamic nature of firms’ entry decisions could provide 
more insight into the underlying causes of market structure or the nature of market 
competition.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 4.1 Trend in the number of outlets 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total 27 47 68 94 135 176 222 253 271 
Top five 11 18 28 45 75 108 141 163 181 
Emart 6 9 13 19 27 41 50 59 69 
Lottemart 0 1 4 8 16 23 31 34 38 
Tesco 0 1 1 2 7 14 21 28 31 
Carrefour 3 3 6 11 19 21 24 27 27 
Walmart 2 4 4 5 6 9 15 15 16 
Others  16 29 40 49 60 68 81 90 90 
 
 
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics of sample 
 Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Population (100,000) 2.68 1.34 0.53 6.77 
Apartratio  0.481 0.184 0 0.897 
Ownstore  0.09 0.299 0 2 
Number of existing stores 0.7943 1.135 0 7 
Number of leading chains 0.3618 0.6846 0 4 
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Table 4.3 The entry frequency by number of existing stores 
# Entry 0 1 2 3 4  Total 
Whole sample  72 51 30 10 7 170 
Domestic chains 52 28 12 4 5 101 
  Emart 29 20 7 4 3 63 
  Lottemart 23 8 5 0 2 38 
Foreign chains 20 23 18 6 2 69 
  Tesco 6 9 12 2 2 31 
  Carrefour 9 11 2 2 0 24 
  Walmart 5 3 4 2 0 14 
 
Table 4.4 The entry frequency by number of other leading stores  
# Entry 0 1 2 3 Total 
Whole sample  112 40 16 2 170 
Domestic chains 74 20 6 1 101 
  Emart 45 13 5 0 63 
  Lottemart 29 7 1 1 38 
Foreign chains 38 20 10 1 69 
  Tesco 15 10 5 1 31 
  Carrfour 17 5 2 0 24 
  Walmart 6 5 3 0 14 
 
Table 4.5 The frequency of entry by number of its own existing stores 
 0 1 2 Total 
 #Entry 159 11 0 170 
   Emart 57 6 0 63 
   Lottemart 36 2 0 38 
   Tesco 29 2 0 31 
   Carrefour 23 1 0 24 
   Walmart 14 0 0 14 
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Table 4.6 Probit models of entry decisions on overall market structure     
Whole sample Domestic Foreign 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Own -0.48*** 
(-3.40) 
-0.62***
(-4.51) 
-0.44***
(-2.57) 
-0.64***
(-3.84) 
-0.54** 
(-2.12) 
-0.58** 
(-2.39) 
All  -0.13*** 
(-3.14)  
-0.21***
(-3.63) 
 -0.03 
(-0.56) 
 
Leading  -0.19***
(-3.30) 
 
-0.30***
(-3.39)  
-0.09 
(-1.18) 
Population 0.17*** 
(5.32) 
0.17*** 
(5.36) 
0.18*** 
(4.25) 
0.18*** 
(4.18) 
0.15*** 
(3.24) 
0.16*** 
(3.40) 
Aaprt 1.45*** 
(5.87) 
1.42*** 
(5.79) 
1.43*** 
(4.35) 
1.32*** 
(4.08) 
1.51*** 
(3.97) 
1.57*** 
(4.15) 
Bigcity 0.01 
(0.18) 
-0.006 
(-0.08) 
-0.07 
(-0.72) 
-0.10 
(-1.04) 
0.13 
(1.15) 
0.12 
(1.06) 
Constant -3.32*** 
(-15.4) 
-3.33***
(-15.5) 
-3.37***
(-11.7) 
-3.32***
(-11.7) 
-4.10*** 
(-12.1) 
-4.16***
(-12.2) 
Nobs 6400 6400 2560 2560 3840 3840 
LogL -689.97 -689.35 -381.78 -382.63 -301.52 -300.96 
 Note that period and chain dummies included are not reported here. Asymptotic t-
statistics in parentheses  
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Table 4.7 Probit models of entry decisions on domestic/foreign rivals’ presence  
Domestic Foreign  
1 2 3 4 
Own 
-0.61*** 
(-3.65) 
-0.65*** 
(-3.87) 
-0.59** 
(-2.42) 
-0.59** 
(-2.42) 
Diff 
-0.24* 
(-2.29) 
-0.25** 
(-2.39) 
-0.17 
(-1.64) 
-0.17 
(-1.65) 
Same  
-0.39*** 
(-2.62) 
 
-0.03 
(-0.29) 
Population 
0.16*** 
(3.76) 
0.18*** 
(4.16) 
0.16*** 
(3.47) 
0.16*** 
(3.47) 
Aaprt 
1.18*** 
(3.71) 
1.33*** 
(4.09) 
1.59*** 
(4.23) 
1.61*** 
(4.22) 
Bigcity 
-0.10 
(-0.96) 
-0.10 
(-1.04) 
0.12 
(1.06) 
0.12 
(1.05) 
Constant 
-3.16*** 
(-11.6) 
-3.32*** 
(-11.7) 
-4.18*** 
(-12.3) 
-4.20*** 
(-12.2) 
Nobs 2560 2560 3840 3840 
LogL -386.14 -382.33 -300.30 -300.26 
Note that period and chain dummies included are not reported here. Asymptotic t-
statistics in parentheses  
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Table 4.8. Probit models of individual chain’s entry decisions on overall market 
structure  
Domestic Foreign 
 
Emart Lottemart Tesco Carrefour Walmart 
Own 
-0.66*** 
(-3.26) 
-0.62** 
(-2.03) 
-0.41 
(-1.28) 
-0.66 
(-1.58) 
- 
Leading 
-0.23** 
(-1.98) 
-0.36*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.13 
(-1.14) 
-0.13 
(-0.76) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
Population 
0.18*** 
(3.23) 
0.19*** 
(2.75) 
0.16** 
(2.20) 
0.16 
(1.47) 
0.22** 
(2.11) 
Aaprt 
1.04** 
(2.48) 
1.63*** 
(3.19) 
1.63*** 
(2.71) 
1.94*** 
(3.01) 
0.77 
(0.96) 
Bigcity 
-0.10 
(-0.79) 
-0.13 
(-0.79) 
0.07 
(0.45) 
0.30 
(1.51) 
-0.04 
(-0.18) 
Constant 
-3.01*** 
(-10.5) 
-2.99*** 
(-9.85) 
-4.24*** 
(-7.92) 
-3.74*** 
(-8.56) 
-3.89*** 
(-7.18) 
Nobs 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 
LogL -230.01 -152.50 -126.81 -101.97 -65.79 
Note that period dummies included are not reported here. Asymptotic t-statistics in 
parentheses  
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Table 4.9 Probit models of individual chain’s entry decisions on domestic/foreign 
rivals’ presence  
Domestic Foreign 
 
Emart Lottemart Tesco Carrefour Walmart 
Own 
-0.68*** 
(-3.35) 
-0.62** 
(-2.03) 
-0.46 
(-1.41) 
-0.72* 
(-1.67) 
- 
Same 
-0.45** 
(-2.02) 
-0.32 
(-1.55) 
0.04 
(0.27) 
- 
0.18 
(0.83) 
Diff 
-0.16 
(-1.21) 
-0.40** 
(-2.16) 
-0.29* 
(-1.78) 
0.08 
(0.46) 
-0.13 
(-0.59) 
Population 
0.18*** 
(3.23) 
0.19*** 
(2.76) 
0.16** 
(2.20) 
0.09 
(1.22) 
0.23** 
(2.15) 
Aaprt 
1.06** 
(2.52) 
1.63*** 
(3.19) 
1.66*** 
(2.72) 
1.75*** 
(2.76) 
0.69 
(0.85) 
Bigcity 
-0.10 
(-0.73) 
-0.12 
(-0.78) 
0.07 
(0.42) 
0.32 
(1.60) 
-0.05 
(-0.23) 
Constant 
-3.03*** 
(-10.5) 
-3.64*** 
(-9.50) 
-3.09*** 
(-8.88) 
-3.78*** 
(-8.55) 
-3.85*** 
(-7.13) 
Nobs 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 
LogL -229.29 -152.46 -125.76 -102.16 -65.23 
Note that period dummies included are not reported here.  Asymptotic t-statistics in 
parentheses  
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Table 4.10 A multivariate probit model of entry decisions on overall market structure  
Domestic Foreign 
 
Emart Lottemart Tesco Carrefour Walmart 
Own 
-0.66*** 
(-3.28) 
-0.60** 
(-1.99) 
-0.44 
(-1.36) 
-0.67 
(-1.61) 
- 
Leading 
-0.23* 
(-1.94) 
-0.34** 
(-2.55) 
-0.11 
(-0.99) 
-0.12 
(-0.74) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
Population 
0.18*** 
(3.21) 
0.18*** 
(2.68) 
0.15** 
(2.05) 
0.12 
(1.60) 
0.22** 
(2.15) 
Aaprt 
1.04** 
(2.49) 
1.60*** 
(3.16) 
1.66*** 
(2.77) 
1.91*** 
(2.99) 
0.80 
(1.00) 
Bigcity 
-0.11 
(-0.82) 
-0.09 
(-0.60) 
0.09 
(0.54) 
0.26 
(1.28) 
-0.02 
(-0.11) 
Constant 
-3.01*** 
(-10.5) 
-2.98*** 
(-9.93) 
-4.24*** 
(-7.91) 
-3.75*** 
(-8.63) 
-3.92*** 
(-7.27) 
Nobs 1280 
LogL -670.98 
Note that period dummies included are not reported here. Asymptotic t-statistics in 
parentheses. LR test rejects the hypothesis that there is no correlation among errors at 
5 percent level.   
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Table 4.11. A multivariate probit model of entry decisions on domestic/foreign 
rivals’ presence 
 Domestic Foreign 
 Emart Lottemart Tesco Carrefour Walmart 
Own 
-0.68*** 
(-3.36) 
-0.60** 
(-1.99) 
-0.51 
(-1.52) 
-0.72* 
(-1.71) 
- 
Same 
-0.42** 
(-1.92) 
-0.32 
(-1.54) 
0.04 
(0.28) 
- 
0.18 
(0.87) 
Diff 
-0.15 
(-1.19) 
-0.37** 
(-2.03) 
-0.28* 
(-1.73) 
0.07 
(0.40) 
-0.12 
(-0.59) 
Population 
0.18*** 
(3.23) 
0.18*** 
(2.70) 
0.16** 
(2.16) 
0.11 
(1.49) 
0.24** 
(2.20) 
Aaprt 
1.07** 
(2.55) 
1.64*** 
(3.22) 
1.69*** 
(2.76) 
1.64*** 
(2.59) 
0.76 
(0.91) 
Bigcity 
-0.09 
(-0.73) 
-0.12 
(-0.74) 
0.08 
(0.51) 
0.31 
(1.52) 
-0.08 
(-0.35) 
Constant 
-3.02*** 
(-10.6) 
-3.64*** 
(-9.50) 
-3.07*** 
(-8.75) 
-3.80*** 
(-8.61) 
-3.93*** 
(-7.14) 
Nobs 1280 
LogL -665.67 
Note that period dummies included are not reported here. Asymptotic t-statistics in 
parentheses. LR test cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no correlation among 
errors at 5 percent level. 
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Table 4.12 Sequential entry game: entry decisions on overall market structure 
Domestic Foreign 
 
Emart Lottemart Tesco Carrefour Walmart 
Own 
-0.36 
(-1.58) 
-0.64** 
(-2.07) 
-0.44 
(-1.36) 
-0.70* 
(-1.65) 
- 
Leading 
-0.31** 
(-2.39) 
-0.39*** 
(-2.91) 
-0.19 
(-1.64) 
0.006 
(0.04) 
0.10 
(0.67) 
Population 
0.19*** 
(3.39) 
0.21*** 
(2.94) 
0.18** 
(2.40) 
0.10 
(1.26) 
0.21** 
(1.96) 
Aaprt 
1.15*** 
(2.68) 
1.74*** 
(3.34) 
1.79*** 
(2.90) 
1.81*** 
(2.78) 
0.61 
(0.75) 
Bigcity 
-0.09 
(-0.72) 
-0.13 
(-0.79) 
0.08 
(0.45) 
0.31 
(1.57) 
-0.04 
(-0.17) 
Constant 
-3.10*** 
(-10.5) 
-3.05*** 
(-9.82) 
-3.18*** 
(-8.94) 
-3.84*** 
(-8.01) 
-3.48*** 
(-6.52) 
Nobs 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 
LogL -229.00 -151.79 -126.07 -102.26 -65.57 
Note that period dummies included are not reported here. Simulated maximum 
likelihood estimation methods are employed. Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses  
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Table 4.13. Sequential entry game: entry decisions on domestic/foreign rivals’ 
presence 
Domestic Foreign 
 
Emart Lottemart Tesco Carrefour Walmart 
Own 
-0.71*** 
(-3.44) 
-0.64** 
(-2.08) 
-0.51 
(-1.52) 
-0.69 
(-1.56) 
- 
Same 
-0.56** 
(-2.49) 
-0.33* 
(-1.79) 
0.06 
(0.35) 
-0.59 
(-1.46) 
0.28 
(1.48) 
Diff 
-0.21 
(-1.58) 
-0.44** 
(-2.31) 
-0.37** 
(-2.34) 
0.19 
(1.12) 
-0.10 
(-0.48) 
Population 
0.20*** 
(3.46) 
0.21*** 
(2.95) 
0.18** 
(2.30) 
0.10 
(1.32) 
0.23** 
(2.07) 
Aaprt 
1.20*** 
(2.76) 
1.75*** 
(3.36) 
1.78*** 
(2.83) 
1.76*** 
(2.73) 
0.51 
(0.61) 
Bigcity 
-0.10 
(-0.73) 
-0.12 
(-0.75) 
0.07 
(0.43) 
0.32 
(1.54) 
-0.08 
(-0.34) 
Constant 
-3.15*** 
(-10.4) 
-3.78*** 
(-9.34) 
-4.37*** 
(-7.81) 
-3.84*** 
(-7.99) 
-3.84*** 
(-7.04) 
Nobs 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 
LogL -227.72 -151.71 -124.43 -99.92 -64.46 
Note that period dummies included are not reported here. Simulated maximum 
likelihood estimation methods are employed. Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses  
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Table 4.14. Sequential entry game: entry decisions on large/small chains’ presence 
Large chain Small chain 
 
Emart Lottemart Tesco Carrefour Walmart 
Own 
-0.73*** 
(-3.50) 
-0.65** 
(-2.08) 
-0.51 
(-1.52) 
-0.64 
(-1.47) 
- 
Large 
-0.49** 
(-2.84) 
-0.39** 
(-2.25) 
-0.37** 
(-2.35) 
0.08 
(0.56) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
Small 
-0.08 
(-0.52) 
-0.40* 
(-1.74) 
0.06 
(0.35) 
-4.23 
(-0.02) 
0.26 
(1.02) 
Population 
0.20*** 
(3.43) 
0.21*** 
(2.95) 
0.18** 
(2.30) 
0.11 
(1.32) 
0.21** 
(1.99) 
Aaprt 
1.19*** 
(2.75) 
1.75*** 
(3.35) 
1.78*** 
(2.83) 
1.77*** 
(2.71) 
0.55 
(0.68) 
Bigcity 
-0.10 
(-0.77) 
-0.13 
(-0.78) 
0.07 
(0.43) 
0.32 
(1.56) 
-0.04 
(-0.19) 
Constant 
-3.14*** 
(-10.4) 
-3.05*** 
(-9.74) 
-4.37*** 
(-7.81) 
-3.87*** 
(-7.93) 
-3.82*** 
(-7.01) 
Nobs 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 
LogL -227.45 -151.66 -124.43 -100.77 -65.28 
Note that period dummies included are not reported here. Simulated maximum 
likelihood estimation methods are employed. Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses  
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Chapter 5  
 
Conclusion 
 
To analyze the competitive impact of foreign firms in the host economy, this 
thesis has investigated the competitive behaviour of foreign firms using empirical 
settings in Korea. I set up two competing hypotheses: (1) as the popular belief argues, 
foreign firms as newcomers could introduce more competitive behaviour to the host 
economy; or (2) as an alternative argument anticipates, the essence of oligopoly may 
underlie the competition between foreign and local firms. Three empirical studies, 
one of the price competition in homogenous industries, one of the price competition 
in a differentiated product industry, and lastly one of entry decisions, have 
demonstrated that foreign firms have no significant impact on market competition in 
the host economy. (1) In the test on the competitive impact of foreign acquisition, it 
is found that foreign acquisition does not lead to an increase in market competition. 
(2) The study on price competition in the grocery superstore industry finds no 
difference or rivalry between foreign and local firms in their pricing behaviour. An 
additional test demonstrates that the difference between leading and small chains 
stands out, suggesting the rivalry among leading chains. This finding can also be 
viewed as reinforcing the main findings, given that the leading chains are a group of 
both domestic and foreign firms. (3) Another study on firms’ entry behaviour draws 
an inference that an intense rivalry among leading firms emerges rather than the 
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rivalry between domestic and foreign firms. All these findings give strong support to 
the alternative view on the competitive role of foreign firms: foreign firms act as a 
member of oligopoly group rather than as a kind of maverick in a market. That is, in 
understanding the nature of competition in oligopoly, the essence of oligopoly is a 
fundamental factor.   
The results have important implications for government policies toward FDI 
inflows. Apart from the effects on macro variables, such as capital formation and 
employment, the benefits of FDI inflows greatly depend on the competitive effect of 
foreign firms and the potential technology transfer from foreign to local firms. And 
FDI firms’ competitive pressure on local firms is viewed as one of the main channels 
for the technology transfer. Therefore, the popular belief that foreign firms act as 
new competitive forces underlies the policies to promote FDI inflows. However, the 
results of this thesis raise a serious question about this reasoning. To the extent that 
foreign firms behave as a member of an oligopoly group, the benefits obtained from 
foreign firms can be very limited. To realize the potential benefits of foreign firms’ 
entry, therefore, government action should be directed to developing more efficient 
and competition-enhancing policies.   
In arriving at these results, this dissertation follows the basic idea of the 
NEIO paradigm. Compared to the previous studies examining the margin effects of 
foreign firms, this thesis attempts to model and estimate pricing or entry behaviour. 
The underlying assumption is that price-cost margins are not properly observable, 
since marginal costs cannot directly be observed. Hence, this dissertation tries to 
measure the impact of foreign firms on market competition by comparing a conduct 
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parameter to measure the level of market competitiveness, or by inferring the 
underlying competitiveness of the market from observed entry behaviour.  
Another distinctive feature is the emphasis on a single industry or very 
closely related markets within an industry. The previous studies relied on a cross-
sectional study, implicitly assuming that industry-specific factors could be controlled 
by a small number of observable measures. They asked whether the presence of 
foreign firms helped to explain variations in margins across industries. In contrast, 
this thesis views industry-specific factors as not controllable in this way, following 
the argument of NEIO. A straightforward solution is to use a single industry or very 
closely related markets which share industry specific features in common. Within the 
context of a single industry, then, I ask whether foreign entry leads to an increase or 
decrease in market competition, or foreign presence produces intense rivalry between 
domestic and foreign firms.  
The focus on a single industry provides another advantage of examining the 
impact of M&A FDI and greenfield FDI separately. Even though a different entry 
mode of FDI may lead to different competitive consequences, a cross-sectional study 
is not able to control fully for the possible heterogeneity between M&A and 
greenfield FDI. In contrast, in each empirical setting of this dissertation, only one 
type of FDI firm is involved. Foreign firms appear to make acquisitions to avoid 
adding capacities in mature industries, while they rely on greenfield FDI in a newly 
developing industry. This feature allows us to examine each impact respectively.  
Turning to each empirical study, Chapter 2 compares the pricing behaviour 
between two periods before and after foreign acquisition. In developing an empirical 
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model, I borrow the basic idea from Sumner (1981), who attempts to proxy market 
competitiveness in the responses of prices to marginal costs. To overcome a problem 
of his method that estimation results greatly depend on the demand specification, I 
construct a reduced form of pricing equation based on a very general form of demand 
function. This is possible by focusing on relative changes rather than the absolute 
levels of market competitiveness. Then I compare the level of market 
competitiveness between two periods to examine the impact of foreign acquisition. 
In interpreting the comparison results, partial information on marginal costs plays a 
crucial role, where the information on costs is obtained from the simple fixed-
coefficient production technologies employed in the sample industries.  
For the empirical estimation, the study exploits the sharp distinction in 
foreign firms’ role found in several industries in Korea. The structural stability apart 
from foreign acquisitions during the sample period leads us to ascribe the change in 
market competitiveness, if any, to foreign acquisitions. The existence of a recession 
period just following the economic crisis could cast doubt on the results, since the 
degree of collusion may have increased in the recession period. In an attempt to 
control for the likely effect of the recession period on market competition, I exclude 
the recession period from the sample period, obtaining qualitatively similar results.  
To check the validity of the methodology, I conduct a simple experiment by 
taking advantage of prior information on the relative level of market competitiveness 
in the LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) industry. The methodology has shown a good 
predictive power in finding the relative changes in market competitiveness. A 
possible extension of this empirical test would be to compare the prediction of this 
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methodology with that from a standard NEIO study that estimates a system of 
demand and pricing equation. Certainly, such an extension greatly depends on the 
availability of quantity data.   
To further the examination, using the development of the grocery superstore 
industry in Seoul, Chapter 3 asks whether foreign firms’ pricing behaviour is more 
competitive or whether domestic firms react to foreign presence more sensitively. In 
building the model, the study employs a reduced form of pricing equation based on a 
simple logit demand. In contrast to other studies, I do not impose any specific 
equilibrium concept, but set up a model to measure the level of market 
competitiveness relative to the Bertrand competition.  
The well-known IIA property of the logit model is viewed to reflect well the 
reality of the grocery superstore industry, given that the superstore sector as a new 
industry is replacing other formats of grocery stores. Identifying local markets also 
helps to alleviate the problem of the restrictive pattern of substitution in the logit 
model. In dealing with unavailable quantity data, I construct a market share variable 
based on the parking space of superstores. Since market share is viewed to be 
predetermined, this study adopts a simple OLS procedure. Along with the main result, 
the practice of traffic builders is found. While setting less competitive prices on other 
items, superstore chains charge lower prices on high-selling items to attract more 
customers.   
A further study is possible in several aspects. The study employs a reduced 
form of pricing equation, lacking the estimation of demand side. A richer data set 
with market share and consumer characteristics can further the examination, allowing 
  
 186
for more relaxed substitution patterns than a simple logit model. In addition, the fact 
that the study uses a small number of items called traffic builders limits the 
generalization of the results. Expansion to items other than traffic builders may 
reveal different patterns of pricing policies.  
Chapter 4 examines entry decisions by firms in the superstore industry. 
Compared to Chapter 3 looking at superstores in Seoul, the data set here is 
comprehensive of all the stores in Korea, which allows us to capture a whole picture 
of competition in this sector. The empirical model is formulated as a discrete choice 
model, following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992). A sequential move 
game concept is introduced, which secures the existence of a unique equilibrium. An 
order of entry is assumed where larger chains move first and smaller chain follow 
next, which implies that two domestic chains make decisions first with foreign firms 
following. As a robust check, I try alternative orders of entry, finding similar results.     
In dealing with the endogeneity problem in the leaders’ estimation, I extend 
the simulation methodology proposed by Toivanen and Waterson (2001) into an 
oligopoly industry. The underlying intuition is that early movers take account of the 
optimal responses of followers in their decisions. The comprehensive firm-level data 
set allows for asymmetry in entry behaviour among chains. Given that there are 
significant differences in firms’ responses to market conditions, the results raise 
doubts about the common practice to implicitly assume identical entry behaviour 
among firms.   
The simulation methodology implicitly assumes perfect knowledge of 
leaders of followers’ actions. This ignores any uncertainty involved in firms’ entry 
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decisions, which can arise in the real world. A more realistic set-up to allow for 
uncertainty would deepen our knowledge about the underlying nature of firms’ entry 
behaviour. This thesis has assumed that superstore chains make independent 
decisions on every market-period combination, without considering entry decisions 
on other markets or future decisions. Therefore, another extension would be to 
explicitly consider the multi-store operation in chain-store industries or its dynamic 
nature in modelling entry decisions.  
Returning to the main hypothesis of the thesis, the competitive impact of 
foreign firms can vary over time. Even if it is the case that foreign firms, as 
newcomers into a market, act in a more competitive way initially, as they age and 
become native, they are more likely to get accustomed to the prevailing pattern of 
cooperation among their domestic counterparts. Therefore, we might observe hardly 
any behaviour of foreign firms distinguishable from home-based firms, if we 
examined the impact after that point in time space. Given the fact that foreign firms’ 
entry is a new development in Korea, however, the empirical settings in this 
dissertation safely exclude this possibility.  
There could be another long-term effect of foreign firms on competition. As 
they may out-compete and drive out their domestic rivals from the market thanks to 
their cost or technology advantages, foreign firms could raise market concentration. 
This possibility has received much attention from a number of researchers, although 
the empirical evidence is not clear enough to draw a conclusion. However, this thesis 
has not considered this dynamic aspect, since the empirical settings do not allow us 
to look into this. Of an interesting future work would be an empirical study to 
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examine if foreign firms lead to an increase or decrease in concentration, using time 
series data.  
Another limitation arises from the narrow scope relating to the impact of 
greenfield FDI firms. MNCs can be favoured potential entrants into concentrated 
national markets where high entry barriers are blocking local potential entrants. 
Therefore, these markets will be, in equilibrium, less concentrated and thus more 
competitive if MNCs may enter them. This could be one possible way in which 
greenfield FDI firms contribute to increasing market competition. To check this 
possibility, many studies have examined the relationship between foreign entry and 
entry barriers, finding a positive relationship between them. Focusing on the 
competitive behaviour of greenfield firms after entry, however, this dissertation has 
not looked into this kind of competitive impact of greenfield FDI firms.           
A last point is related to the nature of a single industry study. To avoid the 
shortcomings of a cross-sectional study, I return to the old tradition of a case study 
on individual industries. A problem with this is that the focus on a single industry 
cannot come without the loss of generalization. The results of this dissertation may 
only be restricted to the industries in question. As the proponents of a single industry 
study emphasize, the competitive impact of foreign firms might vary across 
industries and across countries, depending on their specific circumstances. To build 
up more generalized results, we need to wait for more studies on other industries and 
other countries to come.   
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